



## REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WASHINGTON PEACE AGREEMENT: JANUARY 2026

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**Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa**

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*This report presents the assessment of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, conducted by a group of independent experts, on the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, signed on June 27, 2025, for the period from January 1<sup>st</sup> to January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2026.*

*The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is an independent platform dedicated to monitoring, evaluating, and promoting the effective implementation of peace agreements in Africa, starting with the Washington Peace Agreement. Established in August 2025, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is based on the observation that many peace agreements in Africa have failed, not because of their content, but because of a lack of rigorous monitoring of their implementation. In the absence of an objective mechanism to measure compliance with commitments, each party remains free to assert its own compliance with the Agreement or to accuse the other of violating it. Far from replacing the official mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement established by the Agreement itself, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa provides reliable, up-to-date, and factual data on the progress of the peace commitments made by the parties.*

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*Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool (PAIMT), designed and adapted by one of its experts (Dr. Roger-Claude Liwanga, drawing on his previous experience with The Carter Center evaluating peace agreements in Africa), and inspired by a methodology similar to that of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.*



## ACRONYMS

AFC-M23	Congo River Alliance – March 23 Movement
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
CONOPS	Concept of Operations of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda
EAC	East African Community
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
JOC	Joint Oversight Committee
JSCM	Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo
PAIMT	Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda
SADC	Southern African Development Community
AU	African Union
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	1
2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK .....	5
3. IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS: JANUARY 2026.....	8
3.1. Implementation Table by Task .....	8
3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: January 2026.....	9
3.3. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the DRC.....	10
3.4. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by Rwanda.....	10
3.5. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the International Community.....	11
3.6. Interpretation of Quantitative Results.....	11
4. OBSERVATIONS.....	13
4.1. Progress Made .....	13
4.2. Delays and Obstacles .....	13
4.3. Causes of Delays .....	14
5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS .....	15
5.1. Recommendations to the DRC Government .....	15
5.2. Recommendations to the Rwanda Government .....	15
5.3. Recommendations to the JOC and the JSCM.....	15
5.4. Recommendations to the United States (and the American Congress) .....	16
5.5. Recommendations to Qatar .....	16
5.6. Recommendations to the African Union and the AU Mediator .....	16

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## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Seven months after the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement of 27 June 2025 between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, progress observed in its implementation remains limited, uneven distributed, and characterized by a gradual loss of momentum. The assessment for January 2026 confirms the persistence of a phase of stagnation in the implementation process, with the overall execution rate remaining stable at 23.3%, unchanged from the levels recorded in November<sup>1</sup> and December 2025.<sup>2</sup>

The main positive developments observed during the period from 1 to 31 January 2026 relate primarily to the institutional and diplomatic framework, notably through the following:

- The convening of a high-level meeting on the coherence and consolidation of peace processes in the DRC and the Great Lakes region, held in Lomé (Togo) on 16–17 January 2026, at the conclusion of which a new African Union (AU) mediation architecture was adopted;<sup>3</sup>
- The regional tour undertaken by the AU Mediator and the Panel of Facilitators, launched in late January 2026 and conducted notably in the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi, to render the new AU mediation architecture fully operational;<sup>4</sup>
- The extraordinary meeting of the Specialized Committee of Defense Experts, held in Livingstone (Zambia) from 8 to 10 January 2026 under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), devoted to examining the worsening security situation in eastern DRC;<sup>5</sup>
- The diplomatic consultations conducted by Angolan President João Lourenço (also serving as the AU Chairperson) with Congolese authorities, opposition political forces, representatives of the AFC/M23, and religious leaders, with a view to relaunching an inclusive political dialogue aimed at addressing the persistent security crisis in the eastern part of the country;<sup>6</sup>
- The hearings held on 22 January 2026 by the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Congress focused on the state of the peace process between the DRC and Rwanda and on the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement;<sup>7</sup> and
- The confirmed withdrawal of the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) from the city of Uvira,<sup>8</sup> in accordance with the requirements of the international community.

However, significant challenges were marked by the intensification of hostilities in eastern DRC, the failure to fulfill the core security-related and priority obligations provided for under the Agreement (particularly the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures), as well as persistent impediments to effective humanitarian access for civilian populations, all of which continue to experience significant delays in implementation.

During the period under review, *the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa* recorded the following observations:

- Although the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) ultimately withdrew from the city of Uvira in accordance with the requirements of the international community, clashes between the movement and the Armed Forces of the

<sup>1</sup> Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, « Report on the Assessment of the Implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement: November 2025 ». [https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/files/ugd/ddb61b\\_9c73a731dbe4441c944d447d68a85cb6.pdf?index=true](https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/files/ugd/ddb61b_9c73a731dbe4441c944d447d68a85cb6.pdf?index=true)

<sup>2</sup> Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, « Report on the Assessment of the Implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement: December 2025 ». [https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/files/ugd/ddb61b\\_f443e97dd1ca4239b1cadda5f646a2be.pdf?index=true](https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/files/ugd/ddb61b_f443e97dd1ca4239b1cadda5f646a2be.pdf?index=true)

<sup>3</sup> Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, de la Coopération, de l'Intégration Africaine, et des Togolais de l'Extérieur, « Communiqué final de la réunion de haut niveau sur la cohérence et la consolidation du processus de paix en République Démocratique du Congo et dans la région des grands lacs. » <https://diplomatie.gouv.tg/communique-final-de-la-reunion-de-haut-niveau-sur-la-coherence-et-la-consolidation-du-processus-de-paix-en-republique-democratique-du-congo-et-dans-la-region-des-grands-lacs/>

<sup>4</sup> Congo Profond, « Crise à l'Est de la RDC : Après Kinshasa, les facilitateurs de l'UA à Kigali, un rapport très attendu à Addis-Abeba ». <https://congoprofond.net/crise-a-lest-de-la-rdc-apres-kinshasa-les-facilitateurs-de-lua-a-kigali-un-rapport-tres-attendu-a-addis-abeba/>

<sup>5</sup> ICGLR, « Press-Communique on the Extraordinary Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Defence on 10 January 2026. » <https://icglr.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Press-Communique-ICGLR-Defence-Ministers-Extraordinary-Meeting-Jan2026.pdf?x10169>

<sup>6</sup> RFI, « Est de la RDC: Églises, opposition... offensive diplomatique tous azimuts de l'Angola ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260114-est-de-la-rdc-%C3%A9glises-opposition-offensive-diplomatique-tous-azimuts-de-l-angola>

<sup>7</sup> US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, « Advancing Peace in DRC and Rwanda through President Trump's Washington Accords ». <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/advancing-peace-in-drc-and-rwanda-through-president-trump-s-washington-accords>

<sup>8</sup> SABC News, « Army Returns to Strategic East DRC Town after Rebel Withdrawal ». <https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/army-returns-to-strategic-east-drc-town-after-rebel-withdrawal/>



Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) continued throughout January 2026 in several areas of North Kivu (such as Mpombi, Iteya, Buma, and Masisi-Centre), as well as in South Kivu (Uvira and its surrounding areas).<sup>9</sup> These hostilities persisted despite the adoption, at the extraordinary meeting of the ICGLR held on 10 January 2026, of a Memorandum of Understanding between the ICGLR, the Government of the DRC, and the AFC/M23 (in their capacity as parties to the Doha Declaration of Principles), concerning the operationalization of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+) and the terms of reference of the ceasefire supervision and verification mechanism.<sup>10</sup>

- While the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) and the Joint Oversight Committee (JOC) are required, under the Washington Peace Agreement, to convene every month, neither body held any meeting in December 2025 or January 2026. This situation is particularly concerning given that these structures respectively constitute the primary politico-security framework for strategic and operational coordination between the DRC and Rwanda and the technical mechanism responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Agreement.
- At the same time, although a preparatory meeting was held online within the framework of the Doha process, bringing together the concerned parties (the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23) in the presence of representatives of the Qatari and U.S. mediations, this negotiation framework is currently at a standstill, as the parties have not met for further exchanges since mid-November 2025.<sup>11</sup>
- In parallel, the regional tour undertaken by the AU Mediator and the Panel of Facilitators, launched in late January 2026, aimed at operationalizing the new AU mediation architecture.<sup>12</sup> In fact, the new AU mediation architecture (comprising a Mediator, a panel of five Facilitators each responsible for a specific thematic area, and an independent Joint Secretariat) constitutes an institutional innovation aimed at enhancing the coherence of the Washington and Doha peace processes, legitimacy, and effectiveness of African-led peace efforts in the DRC.<sup>13</sup> The Panel of Facilitators, composed of five former African Heads of State, is mandated to conduct field missions, engage with various stakeholders, gather relevant information, and report to the AU Mediator with a view to develop a mediation framework document. However, this architecture presents several structural weaknesses, notably the absence of a clear normative framework defining the complementarity and non-exclusivity of commitments arising from the Washington and Doha processes, as well as the AU's coordinating role. It is further undermined by the lack of a standard methodological instrument designed to guide and harmonize the work of the panel of Facilitators and the experts of the Independent Joint Secretariat.<sup>14</sup>
- While the diplomatic consultations led by Angolan President João Lourenço,<sup>15</sup> aimed at reviving an inclusive political dialogue in the DRC, are of undeniable importance in a context where exclusively security-based or strictly inter-state approaches have struggled to deliver tangible results despite the existence of ongoing agreements, this initiative nonetheless calls for several clarifications. It is necessary to clarify whether this is a separate framework for talks, an initiative intended to be coordinated with the Doha and Washington processes, or, more fundamentally, an approach fully embedded within the new AU mediation architecture.
- In this regard, the Congolese authorities consider that the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is primarily security- and military-driven and, in their view, does not warrant the opening of an inclusive political dialogue with the opposition or other stakeholders. By contrast, certain actors within the political opposition, armed groups such as the AFC/M23, and representatives of civil society and religious organizations maintain that the

<sup>9</sup> Actualite CD, « RDC : les rebelles de l'AFC/M23 attaquent l'armée à Mpombi et Iteya, des agglomérations verrous de la cité de Pinga, » <https://actualite.cd/2026/01/21/rdc-les-rebelles-de-la-fcm23-attaquent-l-armee-mpombi-et-iteya-des-agglomerations-verrous/> ; Actualite CD, « RDC-Walikale : affrontements entre les rebelles de l'AFC/M23 et les FARDC à Buma, près de Munsanga, un autre verrou de la cité de Pinga, » <https://actualite.cd/2026/01/23/rdc-walikale-affrontements-entre-les-rebelles-de-la-fcm23-et-les-fardc-buma-pres-de/> ; TV5 Monde Info, « RDC: le M23 accuse les FARDC d'avoir bombardé Masisi-Centre, Kinshasa dément et accuse à son tour le groupe rebelle, » <https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/video/rd-congo-zones-dombre-apres-lexplosion-masisi-2804623?>

<sup>10</sup> ICGLR, *supra*, note 5.

<sup>11</sup> Jeune Afrique, « Est de la RDC : comment Doha tente de relancer une médiation au point mort ».

<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1760299/politique/est-de-la-rdc-comment-doha-tente-de-relancer-une-mediation-au-point-mort/>

<sup>12</sup> Congo Profond, *supra*, note 4.

<sup>13</sup> Baromètre des Accords de Paix en Afrique, « Vers Une Convergence Africaine des Processus de Paix dans l'est de la RDC : Opportunités et Défis de la Nouvelle Architecture de l'union Africain, »

[https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/fr/\\_files/ugd/ddb61b\\_8664b09a633b43be8ddb10766eedddc2.pdf?index=true](https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/fr/_files/ugd/ddb61b_8664b09a633b43be8ddb10766eedddc2.pdf?index=true)

<sup>14</sup> *Id.*

<sup>15</sup> RFI, *supra*, note 6.



crisis also encompasses political, institutional, and legitimacy-related dimensions that cannot be sustainably addressed without an inclusive political dialogue.

- Finally, the holding of parliamentary hearings by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, devoted to assessing the state of implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement,<sup>16</sup> constitutes a particularly timely initiative, especially given that the Agreement benefits from the direct sponsorship of President Donald Trump. Nevertheless, a key question remains as to the concrete follow-up such hearings may generate: in light of findings of partial or incomplete implementation of the Agreement, would the U.S. Congress, if necessary, be inclined to recommend that the President Donald Trump adopt unilateral coercive measures (particularly in the form of targeted sanctions) against actors identified as responsible for violations, even though the Agreement itself does not explicitly provide for a sanction mechanism?

Faced with these blockages, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa recommends specific actions to be undertaken by each stakeholder:

- **To the Government of the DRC:**
  - ✓ **Accelerate, without further delay, the implementation of operations to neutralize the FDLR**, in coordination with the JSCM, while ensuring the strict protection of civilians in conflict zones;
  - ✓ **Consider, within the framework of efforts to neutralize the FDLR, the formal involvement of MONUSCO, with a particular focus on areas hosting FDLR elements but currently under the control of the AFC/M23;**
  - ✓ **Consider providing transparent and verifiable assurance to all stakeholders that no members of the FDLR are integrated into the FARDC**, thereby addressing the persistent allegations, reducing misperceptions, and strengthening mutual trust among the parties;
  - ✓ **Operationalize the Joint Ceasefire Verification Mechanism signed in Doha on October 14, 2025, a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Washington Agreement;**
  - ✓ **Develop and implement a national plan for the protection of civilians in collaboration with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors.**
  - ✓ **Acknowledge that, without prejudice to the security dimension, the crisis in eastern DRC also entails political and institutional challenges** that warrant being addressed through appropriate and inclusive mechanisms;
  - ✓ **Consider, under continental and/or national auspices, the establishment of a structured and inclusive political dialogue format** aimed at achieving sustainable stabilization, without calling into question the constitutional order; and
  - ✓ **Convene, jointly with Rwanda and without delay, the monthly meeting of the JSCM** to address and remedy the lapses observed in December 2025 and January 2026.
- **To the Government of Rwanda:**
  - ✓ **Implement, without further delay, the harmonized plan for disengagement and lifting of defensive measures**, with measurable objectives and a joint verification mechanism;
  - ✓ **Provide security and/or judicial guarantees to FDLR members still present in the DRC who remain reluctant to surrender to facilitate their voluntary repatriation to Rwanda;**
  - ✓ **Encourage the AFC/M23 to cooperate with MONUSCO in operations to neutralize the FDLR present in the territories under their control**, should the Congolese Government make a formal request;
  - ✓ **Persuade the AFC/M23 to strengthen the protection of civilian populations in territories under its control;**
  - ✓ **Use its influence over the AFC/M23 to facilitate unimpeded humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations** (including the reopening of the Goma airport); and
  - ✓ **Convene, jointly with Rwanda and without delay, the monthly meeting of the JSCM** to address and remedy the lapses observed in December 2025 and January 2026.

<sup>16</sup> US Congress, *supra*, note 7.





- To the JOC and the JSCM:
  - ✓ *Resume the holding of monthly meetings and publish reports providing a more comprehensive and detailed account of all observed violations, delays, instances of non-compliance with agreed commitments, and planned corrective measures.*
- To the United States (and the U.S. Congress):
  - ✓ *Maintain and strengthen coordinated diplomatic and political pressure on both parties to ensure compliance with agreed commitments and timelines, particularly regarding the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures in the DRC;*
  - ✓ *Consider a mixed approach that combines diplomatic incentives with, as a measure of last resort, targeted coercive measures* against actors identified as deliberately obstructing the implementation of the Agreement;
  - ✓ *Encourage Rwanda to provide security and/or judicial guarantees to members of the FDLR still present in the DRC* to facilitate their voluntary repatriation to their country;
  - ✓ *Provide technical and logistical support for the coordination and verification operations of the JSCM and the JOC;*
  - ✓ *Convene the monthly meeting of the JOC in February 2026* to address and remedy the shortcomings observed in December 2025 and January 2026;
  - ✓ *Ensure that MONUSCO is provided with the necessary financial resources, as well as adequate technical and logistical support*, to enable it to effectively fulfill its newly reinforced mandate, notably in the areas of civilian protection, neutralization of armed groups, monitoring of the ceasefire surveillance and verification mechanism under the Doha process, and support for DDR programs; and
  - ✓ *Continue to actively support the mediation between the AFC/M23 and the DRC government* to advance the Doha process, while ensuring its strategic alignment with the Washington Agreement.
- Recommendations to the Government of Qatar:
  - ✓ *Encourage the resumption of the Doha peace process, which is currently stalled, as the parties concerned (the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23) have not reconvened for dialogue since mid-November 2025.* Such a resumption would make it possible to conclude the negotiations on the six (6) remaining protocols to be adopted by the parties;
  - ✓ *Continue to work towards greater complementarity between the Doha and Washington processes;* and
  - ✓ *Support the functioning of the Joint Verification Mechanism* agreed on October 14, 2025, by the DRC government and the AFC/M23.
- Recommendations to the African Union and the AU Mediator:
  - ✓ *Consider adopting a formal normative framework defining the complementarity and non-exclusivity of commitments arising from the Washington and Doha processes, as well as the central role of the AU in coordinating these efforts;*
  - ✓ *Finalize the adoption of a standard methodological instrument, along with other operational tools, intended to frame and harmonize the work of the Panel of Facilitators and the experts of the Independent Joint Secretariat;*
  - ✓ *Clarify whether the consultations currently being conducted by Angolan President João Lourenço form part of an autonomous process or constitute a complementary initiative to the Washington and Doha frameworks, within the context of the mediation architecture*, to avoid any perception of competition or fragmentation of peace efforts;
  - ✓ *Ensure that any complementary diplomatic initiative is explicitly aligned with the new mediation architecture;* and
  - ✓ *Advocate for the allocation of independent funding for the Panel of Facilitators and the Independent Joint Secretariat*, through the adoption of a dedicated budget within the African Union, thereby guaranteeing the institutional and operational viability of the architecture, independently of external partner contributions.





## 2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the PAIMT (Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool), which is based on a coding methodology, to assess the degree of implementation of each of the tasks of a peace agreement on a scale of 0 to 10 points:

- **0 point** signifies an Uninitiated Execution ( $E_0$ ): This represents the status quo. The parties have not taken any action or observable measures to begin implementing the task.
- **2.5 points** means an Initiated Execution ( $E_i$ ): This represents some observable measures of the beginning of the execution of the task, meaning that the parties have established a date for the execution of the task or are having formal or informal discussions on the execution of the task concerned.
- **5 points** signifies Minimal Execution ( $E_m$ ): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards executing the task, but these efforts are not sufficient for the task to be completed by the established deadline, given the current pace of the process.
- **7.5 points** implies an Intermediate Execution ( $E_l$ ): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the execution of the task, and there is a likelihood that the task can be completed by the end of the established deadline if the current pace continues.
- **10 points** implies a Complete Execution ( $E_c$ ): This represents the situation in which the task is nearly or fully executed, as specified in the Peace Agreement.


In short, there are five levels of implementation:  $E_0$  (0 point),  $E_i$  (2.5 points),  $E_m$  (5 points),  $E_l$  (7.5 points), and  $E_c$  (10 points).

Based on the PAIMT, the Washington Peace Agreement is structured around 30 specific tasks, covering the fundamental pillars namely: respect for the territorial integrity of the states concerned, cessation of hostilities, disarmament and conditional reintegration of non-state armed groups, regional economic cooperation, protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, as well as the joint security mechanism (See: *Sketch 1-Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement, below*).

Data on the implementation of each task of the Washington Peace Agreement was collected by the research team of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa through: discussions with certain key stakeholders involved in the peace process in the DRC, analyses of official statements or announcements by stakeholders, and the examination of press articles and reports from local and international NGOs during the period from January 1<sup>st</sup> to January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2026.



## Sketch 1: Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement





The 30 specific tasks listed in the Washington Agreement include:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire,</li> <li>2. Respect for the territorial integrity of each country,</li> <li>3. Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR,</li> <li>4. Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures (CONOPS),</li> <li>5. Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR,</li> <li>6. Neutralization of the FDLR,</li> <li>7. Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC (i.e., disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures),</li> <li>8. Evaluation of the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops,</li> <li>9. Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,</li> <li>10. Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,</li> <li>11. Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,</li> <li>12. Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,</li> <li>13. Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,</li> <li>14. Conditional integration of armed groups (e.g., M23) into the FARDC and PNC,</li> <li>15. Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda,</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>16. Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism,</li> <li>17. Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region,</li> <li>18. Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law,</li> <li>19. Return of refugees,</li> <li>20. Return of internally displaced people,</li> <li>21. Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations,</li> <li>22. Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,</li> <li>23. Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement,</li> <li>24. Launch of the regional economic integration framework,</li> <li>25. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu,</li> <li>26. Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,</li> <li>27. Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,</li> <li>28. Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,</li> <li>29. Amicable settlement of disputes and</li> <li>30. Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.</li> </ol> |
|--|---|

Among these 30 tasks, some must be implemented indiscriminately by both the Congolese and Rwandan governments. Other tasks fall under the exclusive responsibility of each government, and a few are assigned to the international community (including the United States, Qatar, the African Union's representative, and the United Nations' agencies).

Therefore, the assessment of the level of implementation of the Washington Agreement can be carried out in two ways: collectively, by considering all the signatory parties; and individually, by analyzing the degree of implementation by each party separately.



### 3. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: JANUARY 2026


As of January 31, 2026, **only 19 of the 30 tasks** identified in the Washington Agreement have been partially implemented: four (4) tasks have undergone intermediate implementation, one (1) has undergone minimal implementation, and fourteen (14) have begun implementation. The other 11 tasks remain unimplemented to date, with no concrete initiatives to initiate them.

#### 3.1. Implementation Scorecard by Task

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	DRC and Rwanda	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	DRC and JSCM	Initiated Execution	2.5
15	Establishment of a joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda	DRC and Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism	DRC and Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	DRC, Rwanda, and MONUSCO	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	DRC, Rwanda, and HCR	Initiated Execution	2.5
20.	Return of internally displaced persons	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	DRC and UN agencies	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	AU, SADC-EAC, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Initiated Execution	2.5
	Other tasks (6-14, 27 and 29)	-----	Non-initiated Execution	0



### 3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: January 2026





### 3.3. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the DRC

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score / 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
6	Neutralization of the FDLR	Non-initiated Execution	0
8	Evaluation of the FDLR neutralization des FDLR	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
14	Conditional integration of M23 into the FARDC and Police,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism (JSCM)	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Intermediate Execution	7.5
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
20	Return of internally displaced people	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,	Initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,	Intermediate Execution	7.5
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Non-initiated Execution	0

### 3.4. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by Rwanda

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score / 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Initiated Execution	2.5
7	Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC	Non-initiated Execution	0
8	Evaluation of the withdrawal of Rwandan troops	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM)	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Intermediate Execution	7.5
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects	Initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Intermediate Execution	7.5
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Non-initiated Execution	0





### 3.5. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the International Community

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	Intermediate Execution	7.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Intermediate Execution	7.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement	Initiated Execution	2.5

### 3.6. Interpretation of Quantitative Results

#### **3.6.1. Assessment of the Collective Implementation Rate**

The combined analysis from the Implementation Table (3.1 above) and the Task-by-Task Implementation Chart (3.2 above) shows that most key commitments remain stalled. Specifically:

- **Of the 30 tasks** set out in the Washington Peace Agreement, **only 19** have begun to be implemented (at an initial, minimal, or intermediate level), representing **63.3% of all tasks**.
- **Considering all 30 tasks**, their **cumulative implementation score amounts to 70 points out of 300** (maximum points if all 30 tasks were fully implemented), representing an **overall implementation rate of 23.36%**.
- **When considering only the partially implemented tasks**, the **completion rate stands at 36.8% (70 points out of 190)**, corresponding to the performance scores recorded in November and December 2025.

#### **3.6.2. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the DRC**

The analysis of the DRC Commitments Implementation Table (3.3 above) indicates that:

- **Of the 26 tasks** falling under the DRC's responsibility in the Agreement, **only 16** have seen partial implementation, resulting in an **overall implementation rate of 22.1% (57.5 points out of 260)**.
- **When considering only the partially implemented tasks**, the **completion rate reaches 35.9% (57.5 points out of 160)**.

#### **3.6.3. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by Rwanda**

The analysis of the Rwanda Commitments Implementation Table (3.4 above) reveals that:

- **Of the 22 tasks** assigned to Rwanda under the Agreement, **only 13** have begun to be implemented, resulting in an **overall implementation rate of 22.7% (50 points out of 220)**.
- **When considering only the partially implemented tasks**, the **completion rate stands at 38.4% (50 points out of 130)**.

#### **3.6.4. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the International Community**


The analysis of the International Community Commitments Implementation Table—which includes the United States, Qatar, the AU representative, and UN agencies (3.5 above)—illustrates **that all seven (7) tasks entrusted to the international community under the Agreement have seen partial implementation, resulting in an overall implementation rate of 39.2% (27.5 points out of 70)**.



### **3.6.5. Comparison of the Implementation Progress: July 2025-January 2026**

The comparative chart (below) shows that the proportion of tasks completed (at various stages of completion) stagnated in January 2026, following a sustained increase from 26.6% at the end of July to 46.6% at the end of August, then to 56.6% at the end of October, reaching 63% at the end of November 2025 and remaining at this level in December 2025 and January 2026.

**Comparative chart on the progress of implementation: July 2025 to January 2026**



Similarly, the overall cumulative completion scores showed no improvement in January 2026, despite the progress observed in previous months, rising from 9% at the end of July to 19% at the end of August, then to 21.6% at the end of October, and reaching 23.3% at the end of November 2025 and remaining at this level in December 2025 and January 2026.

A similar observation applies to the score for partially completed tasks, which remained strictly unchanged in January 2026.

This stagnation observed in the implementation process at the end of January 2026 highlights limitations in the effective fulfillment of commitments undertaken by the parties and underscores the need for mediation actors and relevant partners to intensify their efforts to enhance the quality of implementation, foster a good-faith dynamic, and safeguard the sustainability of the progress, still fragile, achieved to date.



## 4. OBSERVATIONS

### 4.1. Progress Made

The positive findings during the period from January 1<sup>st</sup> to January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2026, are:

- The convening of a high-level meeting on the coherence and consolidation of peace processes in the DRC and the Great Lakes region, held in Lomé (Togo) on 16–17 January 2026, at the conclusion of which a new AU mediation architecture was adopted;<sup>17</sup>
- The regional tour undertaken by the AU Mediator and the Panel of Facilitators, launched in late January 2026 and conducted notably in the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi, to render the new AU mediation architecture fully operational;<sup>18</sup>
- The extraordinary meeting of the Specialized Committee of Defense Experts, held in Livingstone (Zambia) from 8 to 10 January 2026 under the auspices of the ICGLR, devoted to examining the worsening security situation in eastern DRC;<sup>19</sup>
- The diplomatic consultations conducted by Angolan President João Lourenço (also serving as the AU Chairperson) with Congolese authorities, opposition political forces, representatives of the AFC/M23, and religious leaders, with a view to relaunching an inclusive political dialogue aimed at addressing the persistent security crisis in the eastern part of the country;<sup>20</sup>
- The hearing held on 22 January 2026 by the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Congress, focused on the state of the peace process between the DRC and Rwanda and on the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement;<sup>21</sup> and
- The confirmed withdrawal of the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) from the city of Uvira.<sup>22</sup>

### 4.2. Delays and Obstacles

The security and priority commitments of the Agreement are experiencing significant delays, in particular:

- **The neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures**, which remain unimplemented, despite the endorsement on December 4, 2025, by the Congolese and Rwandan Presidents of the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement, as well as the adoption on September 17, 2025, by the DRC and Rwanda of a joint timetable stipulating that the operations to neutralize the FDLR and lift the Rwandan defensive measures would be carried out between October 1 and October 30, 2025.
- **The ceasefire:** Although the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) ultimately withdrew from the city of Uvira in accordance with the requirements of the international community, clashes between this movement and the FARDC and their allies continued throughout January 2026 in several areas of North Kivu (such as Mpombi, Itaya, Buma, and Masisi-Centre), as well as in South Kivu (Uvira and its surrounding areas).<sup>23</sup> Hostilities persist despite the parties' adoption, on 10 January 2026, of the ICGLR Protocol of Agreement on the operationalization of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), as well as the terms of reference for the ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Communiqué Final de la Réunion de Haut Niveau sur la Cohérence et la Consolidation des processus de Paix en RDC et dans la Région des Grands Lacs, *supra*, note 3.

<sup>18</sup> Congo Profond, *supra*, note 4.

<sup>19</sup> ICGLR, *supra*, note 5.

<sup>20</sup> RFI, *supra*, note 6.

<sup>21</sup> US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *supra*, note 7.

<sup>22</sup> SABC News, *supra*, note 8.

<sup>23</sup> Actualité CD, *supra*, note 9.

<sup>24</sup> ICGLR, *supra*, note 5.



- **Effective access to humanitarian aid is becoming imperative:** the intensification of fighting continues exacerbating the already precarious conditions of the civilian population.<sup>25</sup> The reopening of Goma airport (requested at the Conference on Peace in the Great Lakes Region, held at the end of October 2025 in Paris)<sup>26</sup> to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance is still pending, despite the urgent needs of vulnerable populations.

#### 4.3. Causes of Delays

As highlighted in previous reports,<sup>27</sup> the delays observed in the execution of the tasks can be explained, in part, by the following factors:

- **The lack of mutual trust between the parties, and the selective and bad-faith implementation:** Although the DRC and Rwanda have repeatedly demonstrated a political and diplomatic willingness to implement the Agreement, mutual distrust remains high. In this context, some obligations appear to be enforced selectively, conditionally, or with delays, with each party making its actions contingent on the other's. This dynamic, in several cases, amounts to a bad-faith execution of the commitments made, undermining the credibility of the process and contributing to the stagnation of its implementation;
- **Uneven prioritization between political, security, and economic components:** The most visible progress concerns the institutional and economic components (JSCM, JOC, regional economic integration framework), while urgent military and security tasks (such as neutralization, disengagement, and protection of civilians) have remained at a standstill;
- **Weak operational capacity and a lack of resources on the ground:** Despite the DRC's call for the FDLR to surrender, the country lacks sufficient technical and logistical resources to conduct the planned operations alone, and
- **Ambiguities in coordination among the different peace processes:** The coexistence of the Washington process (DRC–Rwanda) and the Doha process (DRC–M23, under Qatari mediation) risks overlapping and fragmenting diplomatic efforts. While the AU's new mediation architecture (comprising a mediator, a panel of five facilitators each responsible for a specific thematic area, and an independent joint secretariat), adopted on 17 January 2026, constitutes an institutional innovation aimed at strengthening the coherence of peace processes, legitimacy, and effectiveness of African-led efforts in support of peace in the DRC,<sup>28</sup> it nevertheless exhibits certain structural limitations. These relate in particular to the absence of a clear normative framework defining the principles of complementarity and non-exclusivity between the commitments arising from the Washington and Doha processes, as well as clarifying the coordination role entrusted to the AU. This is compounded by the lack of a common methodological instrument intended to guide and harmonize the work of the panel of facilitators and the experts of the independent joint secretariat.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> RFI, "RDC: au Sud-Kivu, l'AFC/M23 Annonce son Retrait Sous Conditions de la ville d'Uvira." <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251216-rdc-au-sud-kivu-l-afc-m23-annonce-son-retrait-de-la-ville-d-uvira-sous-conditions>.

<sup>26</sup> Jeune Afrique, "RDC : la conférence de Paris Lève des Fonds Humanitaires mais Paye son Impuissance Politique." <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1736399/politique/rdc-la-conference-de-paris-leve-des-fonds-humanitaires-mais-paye-son-impuissance-politique/>.

<sup>27</sup> Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, *supra*, note 1.

<sup>28</sup> Baromètre des Accords de Paix en Afrique, *supra*, note 13.

<sup>29</sup> *Id.*



## 5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Seven months after its signing, the Washington Peace Agreement enabled structural progress in institutional cooperation. However, it remains weakened by the lack of improvement in the most crucial security measures. The continued fighting between the Congolese army and the Rwandan-backed AFC-M23, as well as the delay in implementing clauses relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces or the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, risk compromising the credibility of the process. In this regard, the following recommendations are proposed:

### 5.1. Recommendations to the Government of the DRC:

- **Accelerate, without further delay, the implementation of operations to neutralize the FDLR**, in coordination with the JSCM, while ensuring the strict protection of civilians in conflict zones;
- **Consider, within the framework of efforts to neutralize the FDLR, the formal involvement of MONUSCO, with a particular focus on areas hosting FDLR elements but currently under the control of the AFC/M23;**
- **Consider providing transparent and verifiable assurance to all stakeholders that no members of the FDLR are integrated into the FARDC**, thereby addressing the persistent allegations, reducing misperceptions, and strengthening mutual trust among the parties;
- **Operationalize the Joint Ceasefire Verification Mechanism signed in Doha on October 14, 2025, a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Washington Agreement;**
- **Develop and implement a national plan for the protection of civilians, in collaboration with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors;**
- **Acknowledge that, without prejudice to the security dimension, the crisis in eastern DRC also entails political and institutional challenges** that warrant being addressed through appropriate and inclusive mechanisms;
- **Consider, under continental and/or national auspices, the establishment of a structured and inclusive political dialogue format** aimed at achieving sustainable stabilization, without calling into question the constitutional order; and
- **Convene, jointly with Rwanda and without delay, the monthly meeting of the JSCM** to address and remedy the lapses observed in December 2025 and January 2026.

### 5.2. Recommendations to the Government of Rwanda:

- **Implement, without further delay, the harmonized plan for disengagement and lifting of defensive measures**, with measurable objectives and a joint verification mechanism;
- **Provide security and/or judicial guarantees to FDLR members still present in the DRC who remain reluctant to surrender, to facilitate their voluntary repatriation to Rwanda;**
- **Encourage the AFC/M23 to cooperate with MONUSCO in operations to neutralize the FDLR present in the territories under their control**, should the Congolese Government make a formal request;
- **Persuade the AFC/M23 to strengthen the protection of civilian populations in territories under its control;**
- **Use its influence over the AFC/M23 to facilitate unimpeded humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations** (including the reopening of the Goma airport); and
- **Convene, jointly with Rwanda and without delay, the monthly meeting of the JSCM** to address and remedy the lapses observed in December 2025 and January 2026.

### 5.3. Recommendations to the JOC and the JSCM:

- **Resume the holding of monthly meetings and publish reports providing a more comprehensive and detailed account of all observed violations, delays, instances of non-compliance with agreed commitments, and planned corrective measures.**



#### 5.4. Recommendations to the United States (and the U.S. Congress):

- **Maintain and strengthen coordinated diplomatic and political pressure on both parties to ensure compliance with agreed commitments and timelines, particularly regarding the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures in the DRC;**
- **Consider a mixed approach that combines diplomatic incentives with, as a measure of last resort, targeted coercive measures** against actors identified as deliberately obstructing the implementation of the Agreement;
- **Encourage Rwanda to provide security and/or judicial guarantees to members of the FDLR still present in the DRC** to facilitate their voluntary repatriation to their country;
- **Provide technical and logistical support for the coordination and verification operations of the JSCM and the JOC;**
- **Convene the monthly meeting of the JOC in February 2026** to address and remedy the shortcomings observed in December 2025 and January 2026;
- **Ensure that MONUSCO is provided with the necessary financial resources, as well as adequate technical and logistical support**, to enable it to effectively fulfill its newly reinforced mandate, notably in the areas of civilian protection, neutralization of armed groups, monitoring of the ceasefire surveillance and verification mechanism under the Doha process, and support for DDR programs; and
- **Continue to actively support the mediation between the AFC/M23 and the DRC government** to advance the Doha process, while ensuring its strategic alignment with the Washington Agreement.

#### 5.5. Recommendations to the Government of Qatar:

- **Encourage the resumption of the Doha peace process, which is currently stalled, as the concerned parties (the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23) have not reconvened for dialogue since mid-November 2025** Such a resumption would make it possible to conclude the negotiations on the six (6) remaining protocols to be adopted by the parties;
- **Continue to work towards greater complementarity between the Doha and Washington processes;** and
- **Support the functioning of the Joint Verification Mechanism agreed on October 14, 2025,** by the DRC government and the AFC/M23.

#### 5.6. Recommendations to the African Union and the AU Mediator:

- **Consider adopting a formal normative framework defining the complementarity and non-exclusivity of commitments arising from the Washington and Doha processes, as well as the central role of the AU in coordinating these efforts;**
- **Finalize the adoption of a standard methodological instrument, along with other operational tools, intended to frame and harmonize the work of the Panel of Facilitators and the experts of the Independent Joint Secretariat;**
- **Clarify whether the consultations currently being conducted by Angolan President João Lourenço form part of an autonomous process or constitute a complementary initiative to the Washington and Doha frameworks, within the context of the mediation architecture,** to avoid any perception of competition or fragmentation of peace efforts;
- **Ensure that any complementary diplomatic initiative is explicitly aligned with the new mediation architecture;** and
- **Advocate for the allocation of independent funding for the Panel of Facilitators and the Independent Joint Secretariat,** through the adoption of a dedicated budget within the AU, thereby guaranteeing the institutional and operational viability of the architecture, independently of external partner contributions.

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