



REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WASHINGTON PEACE AGREEMENT: SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2025

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November 2025

Washington Peace Agreement Implementation Assessment Report

September-October 2025



This report presents the assessment of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, conducted by a group of independent experts, on the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, signed on June 27, 2025, for the period from September to the end of October 2025.

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is an independent platform dedicated to monitoring, evaluating, and promoting the effective implementation of peace agreements in Africa, starting with the Washington Peace Agreement. Established in August 2025, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is based on the observation that many peace agreements in Africa have failed, not because of their content, but because of a lack of rigorous monitoring of their implementation. In the absence of an objective mechanism to measure compliance with commitments, each party remains free to assert its own compliance with the Agreement or to accuse the other of violating it. Far from replacing the official mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement established by the Agreement itself, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa provides reliable, up-to-date, and factual data on the progress of the peace commitments made by the parties.

Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool (PAIMT), designed and adapted by one of its experts (Dr. Roger-Claude Liwanga, drawing on his previous experience with The Carter Center evaluating peace agreements in Africa), and inspired by a methodology similar to that of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.



ACRONYMS

AFC-M23	Congo River Alliance – March 23 Movement
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
CONOPS	Concept of Operations of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda
EAC	East African Community
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
JOC	Joint Oversight Committee
JSCM	Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo
PAIMT	Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda
SADC	Southern African Development Community
AU	African Union
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK	4
3. IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS: SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER.....	7
3.1. Implementation Table by Task	7
3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: September-October 2025.....	8
3.3. Overview of Partially Implemented Tasks	9
4. OBSERVATIONS.....	13
4.1. Interpretation of Quantitative Results.....	13
4.2. Progress Made	14
4.3. Delays and Obstacles	14
4.4. Causes of Delays	15
5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS	16
5.1. Recommendations to the DRC Government	16
5.2. Recommendations to the Rwanda Government	16
5.3. Recommendations to the United States.....	16
5.4. Recommendations to Qatar	16
5.5. Recommendations to the African Union Mediator	17



1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Four months after the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement of June 27, 2025, between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, progress remains fragile and uneven. Monitoring of the September–October 2025 period highlights a worrying stagnation in the implementation process. **Of the 30 tasks identified in the Agreement, only 17 (56.6%) have begun implementation, for an overall implementation rate of 21.6% (65 out of 300 points). Considering only partially completed tasks, the completion rate is 38% (65 out of 170 points),** a slight decline from the period ending August 2025, when the rate was 41%.

The positive and encouraging findings marked this period from September to October 2025:

- **The Congolese president's gesture of openness or outstretched hand to his Rwandan counterpart** on October 9, 2025, inviting him to demonstrate political courage and work together to achieve a «peace of the brave»;
- **The convergence between the DRC and Rwanda on setting October 1, 2025, as the launch date for joint operations to neutralize the FDLR and lift Rwandan defensive measures,** endorsed at the meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) on September 17, 2025, and accompanied by a phased implementation schedule;
- **The signing, on October 14, 2025, of an agreement between the Congolese government and the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) on the establishment of a joint ceasefire verification mechanism,** within the framework of the Doha process (an initiative complementary to that of Washington); and
- **The regular functioning of the JSCM and the JOC (Joint Monitoring Committee),** confirming institutional continuity in monitoring the Agreement.

At the same time, the Agreement's most sensitive and priority tasks, particularly the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, are experiencing significant delays, despite the adoption in September 2025 by the DRC and Rwanda of a joint timetable setting the start of the planned operations for October 1, 2025. For example:

- **The preparatory phase for the neutralization of the FDLR** (including analysis of their threat level, location, logistical capabilities, and information sharing), entrusted to the DRC and the JSCM, was to be carried out between October 7 and 15, 2025;
- **The neutralization of the FDLR,** placed under the responsibility of the DRC, was to be carried out between October 20 and 30, 2025;
- **The gradual lifting of defensive measures and the cessation of sporadic cross-border operations,** under Rwanda's responsibility, was to be carried out between October 20 and 30, 2025;
- **The joint assessment of the implementation of the disengagement plan and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures,** entrusted to Rwanda with the support of the JSCM, was to be carried out between October 20 and 30, 2025;
- Despite the signing in Doha of the arrangement between the Congolese government and the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) on the establishment of a joint ceasefire verification mechanism, progress on the ground remains limited, and the planned weekly reports on alleged ceasefire violations have not yet been published.



The delays observed in the execution of the tasks mentioned above can be explained, in part, by the following factors:

- **Persistent armed clashes:** The ongoing fighting between the FARDC and the AFC/M23 (despite the signing of several ceasefire and joint verification instruments) prevents the creation of the security and trust conditions necessary for the launch of the joint operations provided for in the Agreement;
- **Lack of mutual trust:** The persistent mistrust between the DRC and Rwanda leads to the selective implementation of commitments, with each party conditioning its actions on those of the other;
- **Hesitation in the planning and execution of preliminary technical tasks:** The failure to carry out preparatory tasks, such as identifying, locating, and assessing the FDLR threat, blocks progress in the operational stages of neutralization and disengagement;
- **Weak operational capacity and a lack of resources on the ground:** Despite the DRC's call for the FDLR to surrender, the country does not have sufficient technical and logistical resources to conduct the planned operations alone. The JSCM and the JOC, although institutionally functional, lack on-the-ground intervention, monitoring, and verification capacities;
- **Ambiguities in coordination among the different peace processes:** The coexistence of the Washington process (DRC–Rwanda) and the Doha process (DRC–AFC/M23, under Qatari mediation) creates a risk of overlapping and fragmentation of diplomatic efforts. Some actions decided within one framework (Doha) are not immediately integrated into the monitoring mechanism of the other framework (Washington);
- **Poor communication in institutional monitoring:** Although the JOC has held several meetings (July, September, and October 2025), no public report on violations of the Agreement or corrective measures has been released. This institutional opacity limits accountability and weakens the international pressure needed to accelerate implementation;
- **Imbalance in implementation priorities:** Progress is focused on institutional and economic aspects to the detriment of essential security components such as the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces.

Faced with these blockages, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa recommends targeted actions to be undertaken by each stakeholder:

- To the Government of the DRC: Accelerate the implementation of operations to neutralize the FDLR, in coordination with the Joint Security and Cooperation Mechanism (JSCM), while ensuring the strict protection of civilians in conflict zones; operationalize the Joint Ceasefire Verification Mechanism signed in Doha on October 14, 2025, a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Washington Agreement; develop and implement a national plan for the protection of civilians, in collaboration with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors; and consider allocating national funding to support the JSCM and/or the Ceasefire Verification Mechanism, to ensure operational continuity and avoid logistical or human resource bottlenecks that could affect the monitoring of the Agreement's implementation, particularly in the event of delays in contributions from facilitators, mediators, or other international partners;



- To the Government of Rwanda: Implement the harmonized plan for disengagement and lifting of defensive measures, with measurable objectives and a joint verification mechanism; encourage the AFC/M23 to strengthen the protection of civilian populations in territories under its control; and use its influence over the AFC/M23 to promote the constructive resumption of discussions within the Doha process, with a view to an effective and lasting ceasefire, an essential condition for the consistent implementation of the Washington Agreement;
- To the United States: Exert increased diplomatic pressure on both parties to respect the agreed deadlines (particularly those relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops); provide technical and logistical support to the JSCM and the JOC to improve coordination and verification; strengthen advocacy with the UN Security Council for increased support for MONUSCO (including through a temporary increase in its resources); and actively support the mediation between the AFC/M23 and the Congolese government to advance the Doha process, while ensuring its strategic alignment with the Washington Agreement;
- To Qatar: Work towards greater complementarity between the Doha and Washington processes, ensuring the integration of the ceasefire clauses into the DRC-Rwanda bilateral roadmap; support the functioning of the Joint Verification Mechanism signed on October 14, 2025; and encourage the publication of its initial observations before the end of November 2025;
- To the African Union Mediator: Ensure the harmonization of the Washington and Doha processes by establishing a continental coordination and monitoring mechanism, ensuring strategic coherence, operational complementarity, and alignment of peace efforts in the Great Lakes region; and advocate for the allocation of autonomous funding to the continental monitoring mechanism, through the adoption of a dedicated budget within the African Union, guaranteeing its institutional and operational viability.



2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the PAIMT (Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool), which is based on a coding methodology, to assess the degree of implementation of each of the tasks of a peace agreement on a scale of 0 to 10 points:

- **0 point** signifies an Uninitiated Execution (E_0): This represents the status quo. The parties have not taken any action or observable measures to begin implementing the task.
- **2.5 points** means an Initiated Execution (E_i): This represents some observable measures of the beginning of the execution of the task, meaning that the parties have established a date for the execution of the task or are having formal or informal discussions on the execution of the task concerned.
- **5 points** signifies Minimal Execution (E_m): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards executing the task, but these efforts are not sufficient for the task to be completed by the established deadline, given the current pace of the process.
- **7.5 points** implies an Intermediate Execution (E_I): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the execution of the task, and there is a likelihood that the task can be completed by the end of the established deadline if the current pace continues.
- **10 points** implies a Complete Execution (E_c): This represents the situation in which the task is nearly or fully executed, as specified in the Peace Agreement.


In short, there are five levels of implementation: E_0 (0 point), E_i (2.5 points), E_m (5 points), E_I (7.5 points) and E_c (10 points).

Based on the PAIMT, the Washington Peace Agreement is structured around 30 specific tasks, covering the fundamental pillars namely: respect for the territorial integrity of the states concerned, cessation of hostilities, disarmament and conditional reintegration of non-state armed groups, regional economic cooperation, protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, as well as the joint security mechanism (See: *Sketch 1-Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement*, below).

Data on the implementation of each task of the Washington Peace Agreement was collected by the research team of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa through: discussions with certain key stakeholders involved in the peace process in the DRC, analyses of official statements or announcements by stakeholders, and the examination of press articles and reports from local and international NGOs during the period from September to the end of October 2025.



Sketch 1: Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement





The 30 specific tasks listed in the Washington Agreement include:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire,2. Respect for the territorial integrity of each country,3. Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR,4. Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures (CONOPS),5. Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR,6. Neutralization of the FDLR,7. Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC (i.e., disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures),8. Evaluation of the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops,9. Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,10. Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,11. Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,12. Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,13. Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,14. Conditional integration of armed groups (e.g., M23) into the FARDC and PNC,15. Implementation: Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda, | <ol style="list-style-type: none">16. Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism,17. Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region,18. Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law,19. Return of refugees,20. Return of internally displaced people,21. Provision of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations,22. Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,23. Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement,24. Launch of the regional economic integration framework,25. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu,26. Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,27. Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,28. Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,29. Amicable settlement of disputes and30. Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement. |
|--|--|

Among these 30 tasks, some must be implemented indiscriminately by both the Congolese and Rwandan governments, such as the prohibition of hostile or aggressive acts and respect for the territorial integrity of each country. Other tasks fall under the exclusive responsibility of the Congolese government, such as the conditional integration of the M23 into the national army and police, or the Rwandan government, including the disengagement of Rwandan forces and the lifting of its defensive measures from the DRC territory. Finally, a few other tasks are assigned to mediators, international partners, or other third parties.

Therefore, the assessment of the level of implementation of the Washington Agreement can be carried out in two ways: collectively, by considering all the signatory parties; and individually, by analyzing the degree of implementation by each party separately.



3. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER


As of October 31, 2025, **only 17 of the 30 tasks** identified in the Washington Agreement have been partially implemented: four (4) tasks have undergone intermediate implementation, one (1) has undergone minimal implementation, and twelve (12) have begun implementation. The other 13 tasks remain unimplemented to date, with no concrete initiatives to initiate them.

3.1. Implementation Scorecard by Task

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	DRC and Rwanda	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	DRC and JSCM	Initiated Execution	2.5
15	Establishment of a joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda	DRC and Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism	DRC and Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	DRC, Rwanda, and MONUSCO	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	DRC, Rwanda, and HCR	Initiated Execution	2.5
20.	Return of internally displaced persons	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	AU, SADC-EAC, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Initiated Execution	2.5
	Other tasks (6-14, 17, 21, 27 et 29)	-----	Non-initiated Execution	0



3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: September-October 2025





3.3. Overview of Partially Implemented Tasks

- 1. Prohibition of Hostile Acts/Aggression between the DRC and Rwanda (Score: 5 - Minimal Execution):** Positive signs are observed on the ground, including a decrease in belligerent rhetoric by the authorities of the two states. On October 9, 2025, the President of the DRC, Félix Tshisekedi, sent an open message to his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame, calling on him to show political courage and work together to achieve a « peace of the brave ». ¹ However, this message comes in a context marked by the continuation of clashes between the AFC-M23 (supported by Rwanda) and the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), ² despite the signing, on October 14, 2025, in Doha, of an agreement between the Congolese government and the AFC-M23 on the establishment of a joint ceasefire verification mechanism. ³
- 2. Respect for the territorial integrity of each country (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Official declarations in favor of respecting the territorial integrity of each country were made by both sides after the signing of the Agreement. However, the disengagement of Rwandan forces or the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures (in other words, the withdrawal of Rwandan troops) from Congolese territory has not yet been initiated.
- 3. Implementation of the harmonized plan to neutralize the FDLR (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Convergence between the DRC and Rwanda on setting October 1, 2025, as the date for launching operations to neutralize the FDLR, as endorsed at the JSCM meeting of September 17, 2025. ⁴ However, despite the FARDC's call on October 10, 2025, to invite the FDLR to lay down their arms and surrender to MONUSCO or the Congolese authorities, no operation has yet been launched. ⁵
- 4. Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Convergence between the DRC and Rwanda on setting October 1, 2025, as the launch date for operations to lift Rwanda's defensive measures, as endorsed at the JSCM meeting of September 17, 2025. ⁶ However, no operations have yet been initiated.

¹ RFI, « Est de la RDC: à Bruxelles, le président congolais tend la main à son homologue rwandais pour faire « la paix ». <https://www.rfi.fr/en-bref/20251009-est-de-la-rdc-%C3%A0-bruxelles-le-pr%C3%A9sident-congolais-tend-la-main-%C3%A0-son-homologue-rwandais-pour-faire-la-paix>.

² RFI, « RDC: reprise des combats entre le groupe AFC/M23 et l'armée, malgré la signature du cessez-le-feu ». https://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20250810-rdc-reprise-des-combats-entre-le-groupe-afc-m23-et-l-arm%C3%A9e-malgr%C3%A9-la-signature-du-cessez-le-feu?utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=x&utm_source=shorty&utm_slink=rfi.my%2FBuak

³ African Union, « African Union Welcomes the Signing of a Ceasefire Verification Mechanism for the Democratic Republic of the Congo », Press Release. <https://au.int/fr/node/45499RFI>

⁴ RFI, « RDC et Rwanda fixent le début de la neutralisation des FDLR et de la levée des mesures « défensives » de Kigali. » <https://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20250925-rdc-et-rwanda-fixent-le-d%C3%A9but-de-la-neutralisation-des-fdlr-et-de-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-mesures-d%C3%A9fensives-de-kigali>.

⁵ Radio Okapi, « Les FARDC appellent à la reddition des FDLR ». <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/10/12/actualite/securite/les-fardc-appellent-la-reddition-des-fdlr>

⁶ RFI, « RDC et Rwanda fixent le début de la neutralisation des FDLR et de la levée des mesures « défensives » de Kigali. » <https://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20250925-rdc-et-rwanda-fixent-le-d%C3%A9but-de-la-neutralisation-des-fdlr-et-de-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-mesures-d%C3%A9fensives-de-kigali>.



- **5. Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** A convergence between the DRC and Rwanda emerged around October 1, 2025, to launch operations to neutralize the FDLR, as endorsed at the JSCM meeting of September 17, 2025.⁷ The JSCM estimates that there are between 1,700 and 3,000 members of the FDLR, who continue to recruit, train, and conduct irregular operations in eastern DRC. However, no operation to identify and precisely locate these groups has yet been undertaken.
- **15. Establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda, « JSCM » (Score: 7.5 - Intermediate Execution):** The JSCM held its first meeting on 7 and 8 August 2025, with representatives from the DRC and Rwanda in attendance, during which the terms of reference for future JSCM meetings were adopted.⁸ The JSCM met again in September and October 2025. At the meeting on 17 September 2025, the DRC and Rwanda agreed to set 1 October 2025 as the launch date for joint operations to neutralize the FDLR and to lift Rwandan defensive measures and, adopted a phased implementation schedule.
- **16. Adoption of standard operating procedures to ensure transparency in JSCM operations (Score: 7.5 - Intermediate Execution):** At the first meeting of the JSCM on 7-8 August 2025, representatives of the DRC and Rwanda adopted terms of reference to govern future meetings of the JSCM and began discussions on the implementation of the Peace Agreement.⁹
- **18. Protection of Civilians and Respect for International Humanitarian Law (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** Very few positive signs have been recorded on the ground, particularly thanks to the strengthening of MONUSCO's efforts to protect civilian populations in conflict zones. Major challenges persist.¹⁰ The warring parties, namely the DRC government and the Rwandan-backed AFC-M23, have not yet been able to ensure sufficient protection of civilians in the face of recurring violence. This reality is corroborated by recent reports from UN agencies in the DRC as well as international non-governmental organizations, which document serious human rights violations, resulting in the loss of several hundred civilian lives in the east of the country.¹¹ Nearly a hundred civilians were massacred in September 2025 in the town of Ntoyo, Lubero territory (North Kivu

⁷ RFI, « RDC et Rwanda fixent le début de la neutralisation des FDLR et de la levée des mesures «défensives» de Kigali». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250925-rdc-et-rwanda-fixent-le-d%C3%A9but-de-la-neutralisation-des-fdlr-et-de-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-mesures-d%C3%A9fensives-de-kigali>.

⁸ Joint Statement on the Inaugural Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) Meeting for the Peace Agreement Between the DRC and Rwanda of August 8, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/joint-statement-on-the-inaugural-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-jscm-meeting-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ « Déclaration à la presse faite par le Conseil de sécurité sur la situation en République démocratique du Congo, » SC/16139, 7 août 2025. <https://press.un.org/fr/2025/sc16139.doc.htm>. See also : ONU Info, « RDC : après un massacre en Ituri, la Mission de paix de l'ONU intensifie ses patrouilles ». <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2025/07/1157203>

¹¹ UN Office in Geneva, « Ceasefire in doubt as Rwanda-backed rebels kill hundreds in eastern DR Congo ». https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/08/109293/ceasefire-doubt-rwanda-backed-rebels-kill-hundreds-eastern-dr-congo?utm_source=chatgpt.com. See also: Reuters, « Rebels armed with machetes kill at least 52 in eastern Congo ». <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rebels-armed-with-machetes-kill-least-52-eastern-congo-2025-08-18/>; OCHA, « RD Congo : Situation Humanitaire dans la Province du Sud-Kivu », Rapport de Situation #6, 21 juillet 2025.



province),¹² and around twenty others in mid-October 2025 in the village of Mukondo, by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) militia.¹³

- **19. Return of refugees (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** The tripartite agreement between the DRC, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Rwanda established the principles of voluntary repatriation for refugees. A joint communiqué was signed on July 24, 2025, in Addis Ababa between the DRC and Rwanda.¹⁴ With UNHCR support, more than 800 Rwandan refugees who had settled in the DRC have returned to their country of origin since August 2025, including more than 200 in October alone.¹⁵
- **20. Return of internally displaced persons (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** Representatives of the DRC government and the AFC-M23 (supported by Rwanda) committed, through the Declaration of Principles signed in Doha on July 19, 2025, to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons to their areas of origin. However, no date for the start of the return has been set, nor has any infrastructure or reintegration plan been put in place.
- **22. Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** There are positive signs of cooperation between MONUSCO and the belligerents. This is illustrated by the suspension of the roadmap for MONUSCO's withdrawal (initially planned for March 2024),¹⁶ which allows this UN mission to continue its peacekeeping mandate in conflict zones.
- **23. Support from the regional and international community for the signatories of the agreement (Score: 7.5 - Intermediate Execution):** Tangible signs of support from the international community were recorded during the period. On October 14, 2025, under Qatar's facilitation, the DRC government and the AFC-M23 (supported by Rwanda) signed an agreement in Doha to establish a joint ceasefire verification mechanism.¹⁷ Furthermore, Qatar, alongside the African Union and the United States, actively participated in the JSCM and JOC meetings, demonstrating a sustained diplomatic commitment to consolidating the peace process.
- **24. Launch of the regional economic integration framework based on the AfCFTA, the ICGLR, and the EAC (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** A positive sign from the parties concerned regarding the formalization of the regional economic integration process has been observed. The

¹² Le Monde Afrique, « En RDC, le bilan des dernières attaques des Forces démocratiques alliées passe à 89 morts ».

https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/09/11/en-rdc-le-bilan-des-dernieres-attaques-des-forces-democratiques-alliees-passe-a-89-morts_6640396_3212.html?search-type=classic&ise_click_rank=1

¹³ Le Monde Afrique, « En RDC, une nouvelle attaque des Forces démocratiques alliées fait au moins 19 morts. »

https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/10/14/en-rdc-une-nouvelle-attaque-des-forces-democratiques-alliees-fait-au-moins-19-morts_6646329_3212.html

¹⁴ Radio Okapi, « La RDC, le Rwanda et le HCR s'accordent sur les principes de rapatriement volontaire des réfugiés ».

<https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/07/24/actualite/securite/la-rdc-le-rwanda-et-le-hcr-saccordent-sur-les-principes-de>

¹⁵ RFI, « RDC-Rwanda: plus de 200 réfugiés rwandais ont regagné leur pays ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251023-rdc-rwanda-plus-de-200-r%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9s-rwandais-ont-regagn%C3%A9-leur-pays>

¹⁶ Congo Quotidien, « Retrait de la MONUSCO en RDC : le plan suspendu face à l'insécurité dans l'Est ».

<https://www.congoquotidien.com/2025/07/02/monusco-retrait-pause-securite-est-rdc/>

¹⁷ RFI, « Est de la RDC: Kinshasa et l'AFC/M23 s'accordent sur le mécanisme de vérification du cessez-le-feu ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251014-est-de-la-rdc-kinshasa-et-l-afc-m23-saccordent-sur-le-m%C3%A9canisme-de-v%C3%A9rification-du-cessez-le-feu>



Congolese and Rwandan governments adopted the Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework on August 1, 2025.¹⁸

- **25. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** A positive sign from the parties concerned regarding the formalization of the regional economic integration process has been observed. The Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework of August 1, 2025,¹⁹ highlights bilateral cooperation in the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu.
- **26. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** A positive sign from the parties concerned was observed regarding the formalization of the regional economic integration process. The Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework also highpoints bilateral cooperation in the sectors of mining, infrastructure, energy, and industrial development.²⁰
- **28. Creation of the Joint Oversight Committee, JOC » (Score: 7.5 - Intermediate Execution):** The JOC was officially announced and its members appointed. Its first meeting was held on July 31, 2025, with representatives from the DRC, Rwanda, the African Union, the United States, and Qatar in attendance.²¹
- **30. Monitoring of the Effective Implementation of the Agreement by the Joint Oversight Committee (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** Following its inaugural meeting on 31 July 2025, the JOC met again in September and October 2025 to continue monitoring the implementation of the Peace Agreement.²² However, no reports were issued regarding violations of the agreement or measures adopted to address them.

¹⁸ US State Department, « Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework ». <https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-african-affairs/2025/08/statement-of-tenets-for-the-regional-economic-integration-framework/>

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Inaugural Joint Oversight Committee Meeting for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda ». <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/joint-statement-on-the-inaugural-joint-oversight-committee-meeting-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>

²² *Id.*



4. OBSERVATIONS


4.1. Quantitative Interpretation of Results

The combined analysis of data from the Implementation by Task Table (section 3.1 above) and the Implementation by Task Chart (section 3.2 above) reveals a low overall level of implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement commitments.

While a few tasks have shown moderate progress, most key commitments remain at a standstill. In fact:

- **Of the 30 tasks** set out in the Washington Peace Agreement, **only 17** have begun to be implemented (at an initial, minimal, or intermediate level), representing **56.6% of the tasks**.
- **Considering all 30 tasks, their cumulative implementation score reaches 65 points out of 300** (maximum points if all 30 tasks were fully implemented), representing an **overall implementation rate of 21.6%**.
- **Considering only the 17 partially completed tasks, their cumulative completion score corresponds to 65 points out of 170**, representing a **completion rate of 38%**.
- **Three new tasks were launched during the period from September to October and have begun to be implemented**, namely: the implementation of the harmonized plan for the neutralization of the FDLR; the implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures; as well as the preparation, identification, and localization of FDLR elements. Each of these tasks obtained a score of 2.5 out of 10.

Comparative chart on the progress of implementation: July to October 2025



The comparative graph (above) reveals both encouraging progress and signs of slowdown in the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement between July and October 2025.

The proportion of completed tasks increased steadily throughout the period, indicating a tangible acceleration in implementation efforts. Specifically, the share of tasks completed (at various stages of completion)



increased from 26.6% at the end of July to 46.6% at the end of August, and then to 56.6% at the end of October 2025. This upward trajectory reflects the gradual activation of coordination mechanisms and the growing commitment of key stakeholders.

The overall cumulative implementation score also improved, rising from 9% at the end of July to 19% at the end of August, reaching 21.6% at the end of October. Although the growth rate slowed in September-October, this sustained upward trend highlights a continued, albeit moderate, commitment to translating the Peace Agreement into concrete actions.

Conversely, the score for partially completed tasks reveals a slight decline: after rising from 34% at the end of July to 41% at the end of August, it fell back to 38% at the end of October. This decrease suggests that, while new tasks were initiated, the implementation of ongoing tasks did not progress at the same pace. These trends underscore the need to strengthen the continuity and quality of implementation to ensure the sustainability of the progress achieved.

4.2. Progress Made

Despite persistent tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, some notable progress has been made, primarily in terms of institutions and cooperation:

- **Strong gesture in favor of the cessation of violence in the eastern DRC, reflected in the opening message of October 9, 2025, addressed by President Félix Tshisekedi to his counterpart, President Paul Kagame**, inviting him to show political courage and work together to achieve a « peace of the brave»;²³
- **Convergence between the DRC and Rwanda on setting October 1, 2025, as the date for the launch of joint operations to neutralize the FDLR and lift Rwandan defensive measures**, as endorsed at the JSCM meeting of September 17, 2025;²⁴
- **Establishment of a joint ceasefire verification mechanism on October 14, 2025, between the Congolese government and the AFC/M23** (supported by Rwanda) within the framework of the Doha process, an initiative complementary to that of Washington;²⁵ and
- **The ongoing monthly meetings of the JSCM and the JOC** confirm institutional continuity in monitoring the Agreement.

4.3. Delays and Obstacles

The Agreement's most sensitive and priority tasks, particularly the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, are experiencing significant delays, despite the adoption in September 2025 by the DRC and Rwanda of a joint timetable setting the start of the planned operations on 1 October 2025. For example:

- **The preparatory phase for the neutralization of the FDLR** (including analysis of their threat level, location, logistical capabilities, and information sharing), entrusted to the DRC and the JSCM, was to be carried out between 7 and 15 October 2025;

²³ RFI, « Est de la RDC: à Bruxelles, le président congolais tend la main à son homologue rwandais pour faire «la paix». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/en-bref/20251009-est-de-la-rdc-%C3%A0-bruxelles-le-pr%C3%A9sident-congolais-tend-la-main-%C3%A0-son-homologue-rwandais-pour-faire-la-paix>.

²⁴ RFI, « RDC et Rwanda fixent le début de la neutralisation des FDLR et de la levée des mesures «défensives» de Kigali. » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250925-rdc-et-rwanda-fixent-le-d%C3%A9but-de-la-neutralisation-des-fdlr-et-de-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-mesures-d%C3%A9fensives-de-kigali>.

²⁵ African Union, « African Union Welcomes the Signing of a Ceasefire Verification Mechanism for the Democratic Republic of the Congo », Press Release. <https://au.int/fr/node/45499>.



- **The neutralization of the FDLR**, placed under the responsibility of the DRC, was to be carried out between 20 and 30 October 2025;
- **The gradual lifting of defensive measures and the cessation of sporadic cross-border operations**, under Rwanda's responsibility, were to be carried out between 20 and 30 October 2025;
- **The joint assessment of the implementation of the disengagement plan and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures**, entrusted to Rwanda with the support of the JSCM, was to be carried out between 20 and 30 October 2025; and
- Despite the signing in Doha of the accord between the Congolese government and the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) on the establishment of a joint ceasefire verification mechanism, progress on the ground remains limited, and the planned weekly reports on alleged ceasefire violations have not yet been published.

4.4. Causes of Delays

The delays observed in the execution of the tasks mentioned above can be explained, in part, by the following factors:

- **Persistence of armed clashes on the ground:** Despite the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement (DRC-Rwanda), the Declaration of Principles on the ceasefire of July 19, 2025, and the agreement on the establishment of a joint ceasefire verification mechanism of October 14, 2025, between the DRC government and the AFC-M23 (supported by Rwanda), hostilities continue between the FARDC and the AFC-M23. This persistence of fighting prevents the creation of the minimum security and trust conditions necessary to launch joint operations to neutralize the FDLR and disengage Rwandan forces;
- **Lack of mutual trust and selective implementation of commitments:** Although the DRC and Rwanda have demonstrated political or diplomatic will (President Tshisekedi's opening message on October 9, 2025, and regular meetings of the JSCM and JOC), mutual mistrust remains high. Each party conditions its actions on the other's;
- **Hesitation in planning and executing preliminary technical tasks:** The preparatory steps (such as identifying, locating, and assessing the FDLR threat) were to be carried out from October 7 to 15, 2025, but no concrete operations have been undertaken. This hesitation compromises the implementation of other steps (such as neutralization and disengagement);
- **Weak operational capacity and a lack of resources on the ground:** Despite the DRC's call for the FDLR to surrender (on October 10, 2025), the country lacks sufficient technical and logistical resources to conduct the planned operations alone. The JSCM and the JOC, although institutionally functional, lack on-the-ground intervention, monitoring, and verification capacities;
- **Ambiguities in coordination among the different peace processes:** The coexistence of the Washington process (DRC-Rwanda) and the Doha process (DRC-M23, under Qatari mediation) risks overlapping and fragmenting of diplomatic efforts. Some actions decided within one framework (Doha) are not immediately integrated into the monitoring mechanism of the other framework (Washington);
- **Poor communication and transparency in institutional monitoring:** Although the JOC held several meetings (in July, September, and October 2025), no public reports on violations of the agreement or corrective measures have been released. This institutional opacity limits accountability and weakens the international pressure needed to accelerate implementation;
- **Uneven prioritization between political, security, and economic components:** The most visible progress concerns the institutional and economic components (JSCM, JOC, regional economic integration framework), while urgent military and security tasks (such as neutralization, disengagement, protection of civilians) have remained at a standstill.



5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Four months after its signing, the Washington Peace Agreement has enabled structural progress in institutional cooperation. However, it remains weakened by the lack of improvement in the most crucial security measures. The continued fighting between the Congolese army and the Rwandan-backed AFC-M23, as well as the delay in implementing clauses relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces or the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, risk compromising the credibility of the process. In this regard, the following recommendations are proposed:

5.1. Recommendations to the DRC Government:

- **Accelerate the implementation of operations to neutralize the FDLR, in coordination with the JSCM**, while ensuring the strict protection of civilians in conflict zones;
- **Operationalize the Joint Ceasefire Verification Mechanism signed in Doha on October 14, 2025**, a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Washington Agreement;
- **Implement a plan to protect civilians in conflict zones**, in collaboration with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors; and
- **Consider allocating national funding to support the JSCM and/or the Ceasefire Verification Mechanism**, to ensure operational continuity and avoid logistical or human resource bottlenecks that could affect the monitoring of the Agreement's implementation, particularly in the event of delays in contributions from facilitators, mediators, or other international partners.

5.2. Recommendations to the Government of Rwanda:

- **Implement the harmonized plan for disengagement and lifting of defensive measures**, with measurable objectives and a joint verification mechanism;
- **Pressure the AFC-M23 to increase the protection of civilian populations in territories under its occupation**; and
- **Use its influence on the AFC-M23 to encourage constructive resumption of discussions within the framework of the Doha process**, with a view to an effective and lasting ceasefire, which is an absolute necessity for the full and coherent implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement.

5.3. Recommendations to the United States:

- **Increase diplomatic pressure on the DRC and Rwanda to respect the agreed deadlines**, particularly those relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops;
- **Provide technical and logistical support for the coordination and verification operations of the JSCM and the JOC**;
- **Support MONUSCO in its mission to protect civilian populations**, through advocacy at the UN Security Council for a provisional increase in its resources; and
- **Encourage active mediation between the AFC-M23 and the Congolese government to advance the Doha process**, while ensuring its strategic alignment with the Washington Peace Agreement.

5.4. Recommendations to Qatar:

- **Work towards greater complementarity between the Doha and Washington processes** by ensuring the integration of the ceasefire clauses into the DRC-Rwanda bilateral roadmap; and
- **Support the functioning of the Joint Verification Mechanism signed on October 14, 2025**, and encourage the publication of its initial observations before the end of November 2025.



5.5. Recommendations to the African Union Mediator:

- **Ensure the harmonization of the Washington and Doha processes by establishing continental coordination and monitoring mechanisms** to ensure strategic coherence, operational complementarity, and alignment of peace efforts in the Great Lakes region; and
- **Advocate for the allocation of autonomous funding to the continental monitoring mechanism** through the adoption of a dedicated budget within the African Union, guaranteeing its institutional and operational viability.
