



REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WASHINGTON PEACE AGREEMENT: JULY 2026

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Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa

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This report presents the assessment of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, conducted by a group of independent experts, on the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, signed on June 27, 2025, covering the period from July 1st to 31st, 2026.

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is an independent platform dedicated to monitoring, evaluating, and promoting the effective implementation of peace agreements in Africa, starting with the Washington Peace Agreement. Established in August 2025, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is based on the observation that many peace agreements in Africa have failed, not because of their content, but because of a lack of rigorous monitoring of their implementation. In the absence of an objective mechanism to measure compliance with commitments, each party remains free to assert its own compliance with the Agreement or to accuse the other of violating it. Far from replacing the official mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement established by the Agreement itself, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa provides reliable, up-to-date, and factual data on the progress of the peace commitments made by the parties.

Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool (PAIMT), designed and adapted by one of its experts (Dr. Roger-Claude Liwanga, drawing on his previous experience with The Carter Center evaluating peace agreements in Africa), and inspired by a methodology similar to that of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.



ACRONYMS

AFC-M23	Congo River Alliance – March 23 Movement
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
CONOPS	Concept of Operations of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda
EAC	East African Community
EJVM+	Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
JOC	Joint Oversight Committee
JSCM	Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo
PAIMT	Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda
SADC	Southern African Development Community
AU	African Union
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area



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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The month of July 2026, marking the beginning of the second year of implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement of June 27, 2025, between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, was characterized by the absence of significant progress in implementing the commitments outlined in the Agreement. Although a few limited developments were observed during the reporting period, their scope and magnitude were insufficient to affect the Agreement's overall execution score. Consequently, **the implementation rate at the end of July 2026 remained unchanged from that recorded at the end of June 2026,¹ underscoring a stagnation of the implementation process.**

Of the 30 tasks identified under the Agreement, 22 had already reached some level of execution (initial, minimal, intermediate, or complete) during the previous month. No substantial progress was observed as of July 31, 2026, with the overall score remaining unchanged at 105 points out of 300, corresponding to an implementation rate of 35%.

This *status quo* is also reflected in the extent of commitment to implementation across the different categories of actors. The DRC maintains an implementation rate of 31.7% (82.5 points out of 260). Likewise, Rwanda's implementation rate remains at 30.6% (67.5 points out of 220). The international community (including the United States, Qatar, the African Union (AU) mediation, United Nations entities, and other international partners), also retains a stable implementation rate of 53.5% (37.5 points out of 70).

The stability of the implementation indicators from the end of June and the end of July 2026 raises concerns about the emergence of a new phase of stagnation in the implementation of the Agreement, similar to that observed between December 2025 and February 2026. Indeed, several challenges previously identified in the Barometer's Annual Report² experienced little, if any, significant evolution during the period from July 1 to July 31, 2026. In some respects, differences in interpretation and the parties' respective positions have even intensified, particularly regarding the timeline for the withdrawal of Rwanda's defensive measures and the modalities surrounding the neutralization of the FDLR.

Despite these challenges, some limited developments that took place during July 2026 warrant particular attention, as they present opportunities for advancing peace consolidation while also raising concerns that could affect the effective implementation of the Agreement.

Progress Recorded in July 2026

The progress recorded during the period from July 1 to July 31, 2026, remains modest and primarily reflects the continuation of initiatives undertaken in previous months:

Diplomatic developments

- The political consultations held on July 6–7, 2026, at the initiative of Burundian President and Chairperson of the AU, Évariste Ndayishimiye, with several Congolese political and religious leaders to discuss pathways toward resolving the political and security crisis in the DRC;³
- The convening, on July 15–16, 2026, of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) meeting,⁴ which provided an opportunity for the parties to assess the security situation in eastern DRC and advance a common understanding of the realities on the ground; and
- The AU high-level meeting held in Gaborone, Botswana, from July 25–26, 2026, to harmonize the action plans of the AU Panel of Facilitators for the DRC peace process and the Joint Secretariat.⁵

¹ Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, « Annual Report on the Assessment of the Implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement (June 2025 - 2026) ». https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/files/ugd/ddb61b_a10f02f7fd7d466bbaeee50e9c74cead.pdf?index=true

² Id.

³ RFI, « Crise en RDC : opposants et chefs religieux congolais exposent leurs différences et exigences au Burundi, »

<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260707-crise-en-rdc-opposants-et-chefs-religieux-congolais-exposent-leurs-diff%C3%A9rences-et-exigences-au-burundi>

⁴ US Department of State, « Joint Statement on the Fifth Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the DRC and the Republic of Rwanda of July 16, 2026, » <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/07/joint-statement-on-the-fifth-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>

⁵ SADC, « SADC, AU and Botswana co-host High-Level Harmonisation Meeting to promote peace initiatives in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, » <https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-au-and-botswana-co-host-high-level-harmonisation-meeting-promote-peace-initiatives>



Domestic Political developments

- President Félix Tshisekedi's announcement on July 17, 2026, of the forthcoming organization of an inclusive, peaceful, and republican national dialogue, following consultations with representatives of the country's major religious denominations, including the National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO) and the Church of Christ in Congo (ECC);⁶ and
- Consultations conducted by the CENCO and the ECC with political opposition leaders as part of efforts to promote an inclusive dialogue. These consultations notably contributed to the opposition coalition's postponement of the nationwide protest march initially scheduled for July 22, 2026.⁷

Security developments

- The designation, on July 2, 2026, by the Congolese Government of its three officers and representatives appointed to serve within the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+);⁸
- The visit to Goma by the Deputy Special Representative of MONUSCO, Vivian van de Perre, accompanied by the three FARDC officers designated to represent the Congolese side within the EJVM+;⁹
- The effective establishment of the EJVM+ on July 16, 2026, marked by a preliminary meeting bringing together FARDC officers, military representatives of the AFC/M23, and observers from the AU, MONUSCO, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR);
- The withdrawal of AFC/M23 combatants from several localities in the Ikobo area of the Wanianga sector (North Kivu);¹⁰ and
- The signing of a Protocol of Understanding between the Congolese Government and the FDLR concerning the demilitarization, demobilization, cantonment, and dissolution of the FDLR, which Congolese authorities have presented as being part of the implementation framework of the Washington Peace Agreement and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS)¹¹

Developments on strengthening the credibility of the Agreement

- On July 14, 2026, the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee listed six individuals and two entities linked to the crisis in the DRC on the sanctions list.¹² The designated individuals include, among others, the leader of the AFC/M23, its intelligence chief, two FDLR commanders, an ADF commander, and a military official from Twirwaneho. The two designated entities are AFC (*Alliance Fleuve Congo*) and Twirwaneho.¹³

Main Challenges Observed in July 2026

The main obstacles observed during the period from July 1 to July 31, 2026, largely reflect the continuation of challenges already identified in previous months. Nevertheless, some of these challenges have intensified, particularly those related to security commitments, whose implementation continues to be hindered by persistent divergences between the parties.

⁶ Actualité DC, « RDC : Tshisekedi annonce un « dialogue national inclusif », les confessions religieuses chargées de l'accompagne, » https://actualite.cd/2026/07/17/rdc-tshisekedi-annonce-un-dialogue-national-inclusif-les-confessions-religieuses#google_vignette

⁷ RFI, « RDC: les premiers enseignements des consultations entre l'opposition et les Églises, » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260719-rdc-les-premiers-enseignements-des-consultations-entre-l-opposition-et-les-%C3%A9glises>

⁸ RFI, « La RDC envoie trois officiers pour le mécanisme de cessez-le-feu dans l'Est où armée et AFC/M23 s'accusent de violations, » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260714-la-rdc-envoie-trois-officiers-pour-le-m%C3%A9canisme-de-cessez-le-feu-dans-l-est-o%C3%B9-arm%C3%A9-et-afc-m23-s-accusent-de-violations>

⁹ Id.

¹⁰ Actualité CD, « Walikale : après le retrait annoncé de l'AFC/M23 d'Ikobo, la société civile appelle au déploiement urgent des FARDC et met en garde contre un possible repositionnement des rebelles, » <https://actualite.cd/2026/07/14/walikale-apres-le-retrait-annonce-de-lafcm23-dikobo-la-societe-civile-appelle-au>

¹¹ Ministère de la Communication et Médias/RDC, « Special Briefing Presse-Focus sur l'Evolution de Processus de Paix, » X (formerly Twitter), July 29, 2026 <https://x.com/broadcasts/1nxelLpDYgEjX>

Voir aussi : Jeune Afrique, « Neutralisation des FDLR en RDC : les discrètes manœuvres diplomatiques de Kinshasa, » <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1826581/politique/neutralisation-des-fdlr-en-rdc-les-discretes-manoeuvres-diplomatiques-de-kinshasa/>

¹² United Nations, « Security Council 1533 Sanctions Committee Adds Six Individuals and Two Entities to Its Sanctions List, » <https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16416.doc.htm>

¹³ Id.



Security-related Challenges

- *Persistent divergences over the interpretation of the timeline for lifting Rwanda's defensive measures.* While U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio indicated in early June 2026 that the beginning and/or completion of the withdrawal of the RDF was expected around July 15, 2026,¹⁴ Rwanda's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olivier Nduhugirehe, clarified that this date did not constitute a deadline imposed by the United States, but rather reflected Kigali's own projections as part of its efforts to accelerate the implementation of this commitment.¹⁵ In the absence of an actual withdrawal observed by mid-July 2026, this divergence in interpretation has contributed to continued uncertainty regarding the operational timeline for implementation. Although Rwandan authorities indicated that July 15 did not constitute a formal deadline or ultimatum, no new specific public timeline has been communicated to date.
- *Lack of convergence regarding the interpretation of the concept of "neutralization of the FDLR."* The absence of a shared understanding between the parties regarding the meaning and scope of the "neutralization" of the FDLR remains a significant concern. During a press briefing on July 29, 2026, regarding the Protocol of Understanding concluded between the Congolese Government and the FDLR, the DRC Minister of Communication and Media, Patrick Muyaya, stated that « "neutralization of FDLR" should be understood as "a commitment aimed at reducing the group's capacity to cause harm, given that it is considered a threat to Rwanda, without necessarily implying "the physical elimination" of its members. »¹⁶ In response, Rwandan Government spokesperson Yolande Makolo argued that, under the provisions of the Washington Peace Agreement, the neutralization of the FDLR could not be interpreted as involving the conclusion of a negotiated protocol with the armed group.¹⁷
- *Conditionality of RDF withdrawal upon the prior neutralization of the FDLR.* Rwandan authorities maintain that the withdrawal of RDF forces remains conditional upon the prior neutralization of the FDLR. Conversely, Congolese authorities argue that effectively neutralizing the armed group remains difficult under current circumstances, particularly because a significant number of FDLR elements are reportedly located in areas under AFC/M23 control, where the presence of RDF forces has been alleged.
- *Divergent assessments regarding the estimated number of FDLR members present in the DRC* further compound this security narrative dispute. On July 29, 2026, Congolese Government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya restated this position by referring to statements made before the resurgence of the M23 in November 2021 by Vincent Karega, former Rwandan Ambassador to the DRC.¹⁸ In a video interview, the former ambassador asserted that the "FDLR had become merely a residual force, having been significantly weakened by joint FARDC-RDF military operations against the group".¹⁹
- *Absence of clearly defined criteria to assess the success of FDLR neutralization.* At this stage, no jointly developed framework by the Congolese and Rwandan Governments appears to establish sufficiently clear indicators or benchmarks for assessing the outcomes of FDLR neutralization operations. Given the persistent disagreement regarding the estimated number of FDLR members present in the DRC, a fundamental question remains unresolved: how many FDLR elements must be demilitarized, demobilized, cantoned, or repatriated to Rwanda before the commitment relating to the "neutralization of the FDLR" can be considered fully implemented? The absence of measurable thresholds, combined with the lack of an independent and credible verification mechanism, could allow either party to claim full compliance with its obligations or, contrariwise, to challenge the effective implementation of those commitments.

¹⁴ France 24, « Retrait des troupes rwandaises de l'Est de la RDC : l'ultimatum américain ignoré ? »

<https://www.france24.com/fr/%C3%A9missions/journal-de-l-afrique/20260715-retrait-des-troupes-rwandaises-de-l-est-de-la-rdc-l-ultimatum-am%C3%A9ricain-ignor%C3%A9>

¹⁵ « Retrait rwandais : l'ultimatum américain du 15 juillet n'a jamais existé, » <https://beto.cd/retrait-rwandais-ultimatum-americain-rubio-15-juillet-fabrique/>

¹⁶ Ministère de la Communication et Médias/RDC, « Special Briefing Presse-Focus sur l'Evolution de Processus de Paix, » X (formerly Twitter), July 29, 2026 <https://x.com/i/broadcasts/1nxeLLpDYgEJX>

¹⁷ Yolande Makolo, "The Washington Agreement calls for the neutralisation of the FDLR — not a negotiated protocol," X (formerly Twitter), July 29, 2026. <https://x.com/yolandemakolo/status/2082593078628495827?s=46>

¹⁸ Ministère de la Communication et Médias/RDC, « Special Briefing Presse-Focus sur l'Evolution de Processus de Paix, » X (formerly Twitter), July 29, 2026 <https://x.com/i/broadcasts/1nxeLLpDYgEJX>

¹⁹ Id.



- *Divergent views regarding the legal basis of the Protocol concluded between the DRC Government and the FDLR concerning their demilitarization, demobilization, and cantonment.* While Kinshasa considers that this Protocol forms part of the implementation framework of the Washington Peace Agreement and the CONOPS,²⁰ Kigali maintains that the Protocol lacks a legal basis under the provisions of the Agreement.²¹ Furthermore, although the DRC has indicated its intention to involve regional and international partners in monitoring implementation, the operational plan, monitoring mechanisms, and implementation timeline have not yet been defined or publicly disclosed.
- *Risk of partial or simulated implementation of security commitments.* There remains a risk that the disengagement of RDF forces could, in practice, result not in a genuine withdrawal but rather in a mere change of uniform through incorporation into AFC/M23 forces. Similarly, without adequate safeguards, the neutralization of the FDLR could result in their integration into the FARDC and/or their alignment with other local armed groups rather than their effective dismantling and disarmament in accordance with the commitments undertaken. In this context, transparency in both FDLR neutralization operations and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures constitutes a critical safeguard against risks of simulation, circumvention, or partial implementation of security commitments.
- *Continuation of hostilities and persistent insecurity.* Fighting between the FARDC and AFC/M23 continued throughout July 2026, confirming the fragility of the ceasefire and broader de-escalation commitments. In South Kivu, AFC/M23 reportedly continued offensive operations while consolidating control over Point Zéro, a position considered strategic by several security sources due to its potential role as an operational launching point toward other areas of interest, including Maniema and Tanganyika provinces.²²
- *Finalization of the operationalization of the EJVM+.* Although the EJVM+ was established in mid-July 2026 after the parties concerned designated representatives, the mechanism is not yet fully operational. It has not yet issued its first activity or verification reports.²³

Humanitarian Challenges

- *Continued humanitarian crisis and access constraints.* The humanitarian situation remains characterized by extremely high levels of forced displacement in eastern DRC,²⁴ worsening food insecurity affecting several million people,²⁵ the continued closure of Goma and Bukavu airports (which significantly restricts humanitarian access and aid delivery), and growing shortages of essential medicines in North and South Kivu,²⁶ compounded by the ongoing Ebola outbreak in the region.²⁷

Diplomatic Challenges

- *Multiplication of mediation frameworks.* At the beginning of July 2026, the President of Burundi and current Chairperson of the AU, Évariste Ndayishimiye, received a delegation of Congolese political and religious leaders

²⁰ Ministère de la Communication et Médias/RDC, « Special Briefing Presse-Focus sur l'Evolution de Processus de Paix, » X (formerly Twitter), July 29, 2026 <https://x.com/i/broadcasts/1nxeLLpDYgEJX>

²¹ Olivier J.P. Nduhugirehe, "La signature de ce prétendu "protocole" entre le père (gouvernement congolais), le fils (FDLR) ," X (formerly Twitter), July 29, 2026. <https://x.com/onduhugirehe/status/2082338451840442645?s=46>

²² Radio Okapi, « Pendant que les négociations piétinent, l'AFC/M23 consolide son emprise dans l'Est de la RDC, » <https://www.radiookapi.net/2026/07/13/actualite/securite/pendant-que-les-negociations-pietinent-lafcm23-consolide-son-emprise>

²³ RFI, « La RDC envoie trois officiers pour le mécanisme de cessez-le-feu dans l'Est où armée et AFC/M23 s'accusent de violations, » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260714-la-rdc-envoie-trois-officiers-pour-le-m%C3%A9canisme-de-cessez-le-feu-dans-l-est-o%C3%B9-arm%C3%A9-et-afc-m23-s-accusent-de-violations>

²⁴ OIM, « République Démocratique du Congo : Aperçu du Déplacement Interne 2026. » https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1461/files/reports/DRC_NDO_172026_Final_FR.pdf?iframe=true

²⁵ World Food Programme, « Emergency: Democratic Republic of Congo. » <https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/drc-emergency>. Voir aussi : IPC, « République Démocratique du Congo : Analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire aigue Janvier-Juin 2026. »

https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_DRC_Acute_Food_Insecurity_May2026_Report_French.pdf

²⁶ CICR, « RD Congo : Soins de santé de plus en plus inaccessibles dans les Kivu. » <https://www.icrc.org/fr/communique-de-presse/rd-congo-soins-sante-plus-inaccessibles-kivu>

²⁷ World Health Organization, « Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus - Democratic Republic of the Congo. » <https://www.who.int/india/home/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON603>



to discuss the political crisis in the DRC.²⁸ This initiative took place within a diplomatic context characterized by the coexistence of several parallel efforts, including the mandate previously entrusted by the AU Mediator, President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé of Togo, to Angolan President João Lourenço to conduct consultations with the Congolese authorities, political opposition groups, AFC/M23 representatives, and religious leaders, to facilitate an inclusive Inter-Congolese political dialogue;²⁹ as well as the continued pursuit of the Washington and Doha peace processes. While this mobilization demonstrates sustained commitment by regional and international actors toward achieving a durable resolution of the conflict, it also highlights the need for stronger coordination and greater harmonization among the various initiatives. Without such coordination, the coexistence of multiple mediation frameworks risks generating overlapping mandates, fragmented diplomatic efforts, and inconsistent messages that could undermine the coherence and effectiveness of collective peace efforts. Closer alignment among these mechanisms is therefore essential to ensure complementarity and maximize their contribution to stabilizing the DRC.

- *Delays in the Doha process between the Congolese Government and AFC/M23.* Although discussions resumed in April 2026 after several months of interruption, progress remains modest. No official meeting between representatives of both parties was reported during July 2026. Furthermore, of the eight protocols envisaged under the Doha Framework Agreement of November 15, 2025, only two have been concluded, neither of which has yet been fully implemented. The remaining six protocols remain under negotiation.
- *International divergence regarding instruments of pressure.* In mid-July 2026, the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee listed six individuals and two entities linked to the crisis in the DRC.³⁰ These measures followed previous targeted sanctions adopted by the United States against actors allegedly involved in violations of commitments undertaken under the Peace Agreement.³¹ At the same time, certain international partners, particularly the AU and France, continue to emphasize approaches centered on political dialogue, mediation, and diplomatic engagement. This diversity of approaches reflects the complexity of the context and underscores the need to use the various available conflict prevention and resolution instruments in a complementary way. However, the absence of stronger strategic coordination among key international actors could undermine the overall effectiveness of these initiatives by limiting the incentive effect of pressure measures and weakening the coherence of messages conveyed to the parties to the conflict.
- *Perception of limited AU engagement.* Some African diplomatic actors have expressed concerns regarding the level of the AU's operational involvement in the Washington and Doha peace processes. According to these actors, although the AU is regularly referenced in official statements relating to peace efforts in the DRC, its role in certain monitoring and decision-making mechanisms remains limited. This perception raises questions about the effective part and influence accorded to the continental organization in efforts to resolve the crisis, particularly given that its mandates it at the center of conflict prevention, management, and resolution efforts across Africa. Undoubtedly, stronger AU engagement could contribute to greater regional ownership of the peace processes, improved coherence among the various diplomatic initiatives, and enhanced coordination among the actors involved in seeking a lasting solution to the crisis. However, it should also be acknowledged that, before the involvement of U.S.- and Qatari-led mediation efforts, the Nairobi and Luanda processes under African leadership had experienced significant slowdowns, with limited progress in implementing their respective commitments.

²⁸ RFI, « Crise en RDC : opposants et chefs religieux congolais exposent leurs différences et exigences au Burundi, »

<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260707-crise-en-rdc-opposants-et-chefs-religieux-congolais-exposent-leurs-diff%C3%A9rences-et-exigences-au-burundi>

²⁹ RFI, « Est de la RDC : Églises, opposition... offensive diplomatique tous azimuts de l'Angola, » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260114-est-de-la-rdc-%C3%A9glises-opposition-offensive-diplomatique-tous-azimuts-de-l-angola>

³⁰ United Nations, Security Council 1533 Sanctions Committee Adds Six Individuals and Two Entities to Its Sanctions List, »

<https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16416.doc.htm>

³¹ The U.S. Department of the Treasury, « Treasury Sanctions Rwanda Officials, Condemns Blatant Violations of Washington Peace Accords».

<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0411> ; The U.S. Department of the Treasury, « Treasury Sanctions Former Democratic Republic of the Congo President for Ties to Armed Conflict». <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0480>; The U.S. Department of the Treasury, « Treasury Sanctions Rebel Commanders Driving Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo». <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0518>; The U.S. Department of the Treasury, « Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Gold Refinery and Network Enabling Illicit Conflict Minerals Trade». <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0543>



Domestic Political Challenges

- *Persistent disagreements over the format and scope of an inter-Congolese political dialogue.* Although President Félix Tshisekedi announced the organization of an inclusive national dialogue, disagreements remain unresolved regarding its format, location, composition of participants, and modalities of organization. According to the Congolese government spokesperson, the announced dialogue will primarily aim to strengthen a domestic front in response to what Kinshasa describes as Rwanda's aggression and the territorial occupation by the AFC/M23.³² He further stated that any entity or individual that has not explicitly condemned this aggression would not participate in the dialogue.³³ Conversely, several religious organizations, including CENCO and ECC, as well as segments of the political opposition, advocate for a broader dialogue involving all stakeholders to the crisis, including AFC/M23.³⁴

Institutional Challenges

- *Limited communication by monitoring and verification mechanisms.* Institutional communication by the JSCM and JOC remains insufficient in light of expectations regarding transparency, monitoring, and accountability. Joint statements issued following meetings of these mechanisms remain relatively brief and do not always provide a comprehensive assessment of implementation progress, operational challenges, or envisaged corrective measures. For example, the joint communiqué issued following the fifth JSCM meeting held on July 15–16, 2026, largely repeated previous formulations, stating that “*the DRC and Rwanda reaffirmed their commitment to rapidly implement the Washington Agreements, particularly by accelerating efforts toward the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces and lifting of defensive measures.*”³⁵ However, to strengthen trust between the parties and improve public understanding of the process, JSCM and JOC should provide more detailed information regarding actual progress achieved, obstacles encountered, possible deviations from agreed timelines, and corrective actions adopted.
- *Delay in adjusting the EJVM+ mandate to monitor the security commitments under the Washington Peace Agreement.* Although the DRC and Rwanda requested, during the JOC meeting held in June 2026, an adjustment of the EJVM+ Terms of Reference to incorporate the verification of security commitments arising from the Washington Peace Agreement (particularly those relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures),³⁶ the completion of this adjustment remains unknown to date. In a context marked by growing divergences in the interpretation and positions of the parties regarding security commitments during July 2026, it is essential to accelerate the finalization of these adjustments to enable the EJVM+ to fully exercise its verification mandate and contribute to strengthening confidence-building between the parties.

In light of these constraints, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa recommends the following actions for each stakeholder:

- **To the Government of the DRC:**
 - ✓ *Accelerate and structure the FDLR neutralization operations by promptly publishing the operational implementation plan for the Protocol of Understanding concluded with the FDLR, along with an indicative timeline and monitoring mechanisms, and by maintaining regular communication on progress achieved, particularly regarding the number of combatants demobilized, cantoned, repatriated, or otherwise militarily neutralized;*

³² Ministère de la Communication et Médias/RDC, « Special Briefing Presse-Focus sur l'Evolution de Processus de Paix, » X (formerly Twitter), July 29, 2026 <https://x.com/i/broadcasts/1xeLLpDYgEJX>

³³ Id.

³⁴ Media Congo, « Le dialogue ne sera pas inclusif sans Kabila et le M23, » https://www.mediacongo.net/article-actualite-166092_le_dialogue_ne_sera_pas_inclusif_sans_kabila_et_le_m23_olenghankoy.html

³⁵ US Department of State, « Joint Statement on the Fifth Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda of July 16, 2026, » <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/07/joint-statement-on-the-fifth-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda/>

³⁶ US Department of State, « Joint Statement on the Sixth Joint Oversight Committee for the Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda of June 24, 2026, » <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/joint-statement-on-the-sixth-joint-oversight-committee-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>



- ✓ *(Should the mediator succeed in clarifying the legal linkage between the Protocol concluded with the FDLR and the Washington Peace Agreement), develop and submit to EJVM+ a detailed implementation timeline to facilitate the monitoring and verification of the relevant commitments;*
 - ✓ *Continue de-escalation measures and fully cooperate with the EJVM+;*
 - ✓ *Jointly define, with Rwandan authorities, clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria to assess the success of the FDLR neutralization process;*
 - ✓ *Define, in coordination with the ICRC, practical and security arrangements for the reception of FARDC soldiers detained by AFC/M23, as well as the release of AFC/M23 members covered by the commitments undertaken by the parties;*
 - ✓ *Strengthen civilian protection mechanisms, specifically in response to the increasing use of offensive drones and documented human rights violations; and*
 - ✓ *Continue efforts to effectively promote an inclusive political dialogue.*
- **To the Government of Rwanda:**
 - ✓ *Clarify, in a spirit of transparency and mutual trust, the modalities for the withdrawal of armed elements and Rwanda's defensive measures by establishing a revised and detailed timeline with indicative milestones, accompanied by credible verification mechanisms;*
 - ✓ *Continue de-escalation measures and fully cooperate with the EJVM+;*
 - ✓ *Jointly define, with the Congolese authorities, clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria to assess the success of the FDLR neutralization operations and the lifting of defensive measures; and*
 - ✓ *Use its influence over AFC/M23 to promote de-escalation measures and facilitate safe, rapid, and unhindered humanitarian access.*
- **To the Government of the United States:**
 - ✓ *Maintain and strengthen coordinated diplomatic and political pressure on the parties to encourage compliance with commitments undertaken under the Washington Peace Agreement;*
 - ✓ *Promote greater involvement of the AU in the Washington and Doha processes, particularly through enhanced participation in decision-making mechanisms and strategic consultations;*
 - ✓ *Encourage the parties to reach a common understanding regarding the timelines for the neutralization operations against the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures;*
 - ✓ *Facilitate convergence between the parties' positions regarding the legal basis of the Protocol concluded between the Congolese Government and the FDLR;*
 - ✓ *Organize, in August 2026, a joint meeting bringing together the key stakeholders of the Doha and Washington peace processes, as well as representatives of the EJVM+, to finalize the adjustment of the EJVM+ Terms of Reference and explicitly incorporate the verification of commitments arising from the Washington Peace Agreement;*
 - ✓ *Encourage the EJVM+ and JSCM to establish joint procedures to prevent any risk of combatant reclassification, change of affiliation, or any other practice that could undermine the integrity of the commitments undertaken;*
 - ✓ *Support the establishment of a permanent strategic coordination framework involving the AU, Qatar, and key relevant partners to strengthen complementarity among peace initiatives; and*
 - ✓ *Use its diplomatic influence to encourage an inclusive, constructive, and consensus-based political dialogue among Congolese political stakeholders regarding any major institutional or legislative reform that may affect the climate of trust, national cohesion, and the political environment necessary for the effective implementation of the Washington and Doha peace processes, while fully respecting the sovereignty of the DRC.*
- **To the Government of Qatar:**
 - ✓ *Intensify facilitation efforts to accelerate the conclusion of the remaining protocols under negotiation within the Doha process, with particular attention to humanitarian issues;*
 - ✓ *Strengthen diplomatic coordination with the AU, the United States, the ICGLR, and other relevant partners;*
 - ✓ *Encourage the effective implementation of already concluded protocols, especially those relating to the release of detainees; and*
 - ✓ *Support the establishment of a permanent strategic coordination framework among the principal actors involved in the Washington and Doha processes.*



- **To the JOC and JSCM and EJVM+:**
 - ✓ Continue holding regular meetings and publishing more detailed reports on identified violations, observed delays, and proposed corrective measures;
 - ✓ Assist the parties in clarifying and narrowing their divergent positions regarding the scale of FDLR forces present on Congolese territory;
 - ✓ Support the parties in establishing objective criteria to assess the implementation of commitments relating to FDLR neutralization;
 - ✓ Regularly publish activity reports, field findings, and recommendations to strengthen transparency, credibility, and stakeholder confidence; and
 - ✓ Develop joint procedures to prevent practices that could undermine the traceability of commitments, particularly regarding combatant reclassification and changes of affiliation.
- **To the African Union and the AU Mediator:**
 - ✓ Strengthen strategic preparedness and demonstrate greater proactivity in addressing obstacles affecting the implementation of peace commitments;
 - ✓ Improve communication with stakeholders, affected populations, and regional public opinion to enhance transparency and confidence in mediation efforts;
 - ✓ Institutionalize periodic high-level meetings bringing together the parties, agreement guarantors, and key international partners to assess progress in peace processes and identify necessary corrective measures;
 - ✓ Continue supporting political, religious, and civil society actors in their efforts to promote an inclusive inter-Congolese dialogue; and
 - ✓ Ensure continued financing of peace-related activities, particularly by strengthening resource mobilization mechanisms for the AU Peace Fund.
- **To MONUSCO and the ICGLR:**
 - ✓ Continue efforts toward the full operationalization of the EJVM+ to enable the effective deployment of monitoring, verification, and reporting missions;
 - ✓ Strengthen the technical, logistical, and analytical capacities of verification teams;
 - ✓ Intensify civilian protection efforts in areas most affected by hostilities;
 - ✓ Continue documenting and reporting impartially violations of the ceasefire and international humanitarian law; and
 - ✓ Facilitate, in coordination with national authorities and humanitarian partners, humanitarian access to affected civilian populations, particularly in conflict-affected areas;



2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the PAIMT (Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool), which is based on a coding methodology, to assess the degree of implementation of each of the tasks of a peace agreement on a scale of 0 to 10 points:

- **0 point** signifies an Uninitiated Execution (E_0): This represents the status quo. The parties have not taken any action or observable measures to begin implementing the task.
- **2.5 points** means an Initiated Execution (E_i): This represents some observable measures of the beginning of the execution of the task, meaning that the parties have established a date for the execution of the task or are having formal or informal discussions on the execution of the task concerned.
- **5 points** signifies Minimal Execution (E_m): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards executing the task, but these efforts are not sufficient for the task to be completed by the established deadline, given the current pace of the process.
- **7.5 points** implies an Intermediate Execution (E_I): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the execution of the task, and there is a likelihood that the task can be completed by the end of the established deadline if the current pace continues.
- **10 points** implies a Complete Execution (E_c): This represents the situation in which the task is nearly or fully executed, as specified in the Peace Agreement.


In short, there are five levels of implementation: E_0 (0 point), E_i (2.5 points), E_m (5 points), E_I (7.5 points), and E_c (10 points).

Based on the PAIMT, the Washington Peace Agreement is structured around 30 specific tasks, covering the fundamental pillars namely: respect for the territorial integrity of the states concerned, cessation of hostilities, disarmament and conditional reintegration of non-state armed groups, regional economic cooperation, protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, as well as the joint security mechanism (See: *Sketch 1-Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement, below*).

Data on the implementation of each task of the Washington Peace Agreement was collected by the research team of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa through discussions with certain key stakeholders involved in the peace process in the DRC, analyses of official statements or announcements by stakeholders, and the examination of press articles and reports from local and international NGOs during the period from July 1st to 31st, 2026.



Sketch 1: Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement





The 30 specific tasks listed in the Washington Agreement include:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire, 2. Respect for the territorial integrity of each country, 3. Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR, 4. Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures (CONOPS), 5. Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR, 6. Neutralization of the FDLR, 7. Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC (i.e., disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures), 8. Evaluation of the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, 9. Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country, 10. Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups, 11. Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups, 12. Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups, 13. Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups, 14. Conditional integration of armed groups (e.g., M23) into the FARDC and PNC, 15. Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda, | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 16. Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism, 17. Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region, 18. Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, 19. Return of refugees, 20. Return of internally displaced people, 21. Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations, 22. Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces, 23. Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement, 24. Launch of the regional economic integration framework, 25. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu, 26. Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains, 27. Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects, 28. Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee, 29. Amicable settlement of disputes and 30. Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement. |
|--|---|

Among these 30 tasks, some must be implemented indiscriminately by both the Congolese and Rwandan governments. Other tasks fall under the exclusive responsibility of each government, and a few are assigned to the international community (including the United States, Qatar, the African Union's representative, and the United Nations' agencies).

Therefore, the assessment of the level of implementation of the Washington Agreement can be carried out in two ways: collectively, by considering all the signatory parties; and individually, by analyzing the degree of implementation by each party separately.



3. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: JULY 2026


As of the end of July 2026, **22 of the 30 tasks** identified in the Washington Peace Agreement had been partially or fully implemented: three (3) tasks had been fully completed, four (4) had reached an intermediate level of implementation, three (3) had achieved minimal implementation, and twelve (12) had recorded an initial stage of implementation. The remaining eight (8) tasks have not yet been implemented to date, as no concrete initiatives have been observed toward their launch.

3.1. Implementation Scorecard by Task

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	DRC and Rwanda	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	DRC	Intermediate Execution	7.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	DRC and JSCM	Intermediate Execution	7.5
6	Neutralization of FDLR	DRC	Minimal Execution	5
7	Disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures)	Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
15	Establishment of a joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda	DRC and Rwanda	Complete Execution	10
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism	DRC and Rwanda	Complete Execution	10
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	DRC, Rwanda, and MONUSCO	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	DRC, Rwanda, and HCR	Initiated Execution	2.5
20.	Return of internally displaced persons	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	DRC and UN agencies	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	AU, SADC-EAC, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Complete Execution	10
29	Amicable settlement of disputes on the Accord's implementation	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Minimal Execution	5
	Other tasks (8-14 and 27)	-----	Non-initiated Execution	0
Total				105/300



3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: July 2026





3.3. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the DRC

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	Intermediate Execution	7.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Intermediate Execution	7.5
6	Neutralization of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	5
8	Evaluation of the FDLR neutralization des FDLR	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
14	Conditional integration of M23 into the FARDC and Police,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism (JSCM)	Complete Execution	10
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Complete Execution	10
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
20	Return of internally displaced people	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,	Non-initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,	Complete Execution	10
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Initiated Execution	2.5
Total			82.5/260

3.4. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by Rwanda

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Intermediate Execution	7.5
7	Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC	Non-initiated Execution	2.5
8	Evaluation of the withdrawal of Rwandan troops	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM)	Complete Execution	10
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Complete Execution	10
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects	Non-initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Complete Execution	10
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Initiated Execution	2.5
Total			67.5/220



3.5. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the International Community

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Intermediate Execution	7.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	Intermediate Execution	7.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Complete Execution	10
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement	Minimal Execution	5
Total			37.5/70

4. QUANTITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

4.1. Assessment of the Overall Implementation Rate

The analysis of the data presented in Table (3.1) and Graph (3.2) highlights the continued stability of the implementation level of the Washington Peace Agreement between June 30 and July 31, 2026. Of the **30 tasks** set out under the Agreement, **22** had reached an initial, minimal, intermediate, or complete level of implementation, representing **73.3%** of the identified tasks. However, no additional progress was recorded during the reporting period.

The cumulative implementation score therefore remains unchanged at **105 points out of 300, corresponding to an overall implementation rate of 35%**. The stability of these indicators confirms the persistence of a status quo in the execution of commitments undertaken by the parties. It raises the risk that this trend may continue if the key identified obstacles are not addressed.

Security-related commitments concerning the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures continue to show limited levels of implementation. The neutralization of the FDLR maintains a score of 5 points out of 10. In comparison, the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures remains at 2.5 points out of 10, reflecting the parties' persistent differences regarding the interpretation and modalities of implementation of these commitments.

Similarly, humanitarian commitments, particularly those related to the protection of civilians, assistance to vulnerable populations, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, remain at a particularly low level, with each of these tasks maintaining an unchanged score of 2.5 points out of 10.

By contrast, certain institutional commitments, particularly the establishment of the JOC and the JSCM, continue to reflect a complete level of implementation. However, their full operationalization remains an important challenge for the continuation of the peace process.

4.2. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the DRC

The analysis of the commitments assigned to the DRC indicates that implementation results remained unchanged during July 2026. Of the **26 tasks** falling under responsibility, **18** have reached varying levels of implementation (initial, minimal, intermediate, or complete), resulting in an unchanged **overall score of 82.5 points out of 260, corresponding to an implementation rate of 31.7%**.

This lack of progress reflects the persistent challenges facing the Congolese authorities, particularly regarding the neutralization of the FDLR, the protection of civilian populations, and humanitarian access.

4.3. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by Rwanda

Regarding the commitments assigned to Rwanda, the indicators also remained unchanged. Of the **22 tasks** attributed to Rwanda under the Agreement, **15** have undergone partial implementation at varying levels (initial, minimal, intermediate, or complete), corresponding to **an overall score of 67.5 points out of 220, or an implementation rate of 30.6%**.



The maintenance of this level of implementation primarily reflects the absence of observable progress regarding the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures, the timeline of which continues to be subject to divergent interpretations by the parties.

4.4. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the International Community

The analysis of commitments assigned to the international community also indicates no change during July 2026. The **seven tasks** entrusted to the international community under the Agreement continue to show partial implementation, with an unchanged **overall score of 37.5 points out of 70, corresponding to an implementation rate of 53.5%.**

Although the international community remains the actor with the highest level of implementation, several challenges persist, particularly regarding the coordination of diplomatic initiatives, support for implementation mechanisms, and assistance to stabilization efforts on the ground.



5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Taken together, the findings for July 2026 confirm that the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement has entered a period of sustained stagnation. Although a few limited developments were observed during the reporting period, their scope and significance were insufficient to improve the Agreement's overall implementation score. The persistence of divergences between the parties, the incomplete operationalization of verification mechanisms, and the continued deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation prevented meaningful implementation gains. As the Agreement enters its second year of implementation, its credibility will increasingly depend on the ability of the parties and their international partners to translate political commitments into concrete, verifiable, and sustainable results on the ground.

In this regard, the following specific recommendations are formulated:

5.1. Recommendations to the Government of the DRC:

- Accelerate and structure the FDLR neutralization operations by promptly publishing the operational implementation plan for the Protocol of Understanding concluded with the FDLR, along with an indicative timeline and monitoring mechanisms, and by maintaining regular communication on progress achieved, particularly regarding the number of combatants demobilized, cantoned, repatriated, or otherwise militarily neutralized;
- (Should the mediator succeed in clarifying the legal linkage between the Protocol concluded with the FDLR and the Washington Peace Agreement), develop and submit to EJVM+ a detailed implementation timeline to facilitate the monitoring and verification of the relevant commitments;
- Continue de-escalation measures and fully cooperate with the EJVM+;
- Jointly define, with Rwandan authorities, clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria to assess the success of the FDLR neutralization process;
- Define, in coordination with the ICRC, practical and security arrangements for the reception of FARDC soldiers detained by AFC/M23, as well as the release of AFC/M23 members covered by the commitments undertaken by the parties;
- Strengthen civilian protection mechanisms, specifically in response to the increasing use of offensive drones and documented human rights violations; and
- Continue efforts to effectively promote an inclusive political dialogue.

5.2. Recommendations to the Government of Rwanda:

- Clarify, in a spirit of transparency and mutual trust, the modalities for the withdrawal of armed elements and Rwanda's defensive measures by establishing a revised and detailed timeline with indicative milestones, accompanied by credible verification mechanisms
- Continue de-escalation measures and fully cooperate with the EJVM+;
- Jointly define, with Congolese authorities, clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria to assess the success of the offensive phase of the FDLR neutralization process; and
- Use its influence over AFC/M23 to promote de-escalation measures and facilitate safe, rapid, and unhindered humanitarian access.

5.3. Recommendations to the United States:

- Maintain and strengthen coordinated diplomatic and political pressure on the parties to encourage compliance with commitments undertaken under the Washington Peace Agreement;
- Promote greater involvement of the AU in the Washington and Doha processes, particularly through enhanced participation in decision-making mechanisms and strategic consultations;
- Encourage the parties to reach a common understanding regarding the timelines for the neutralization operations against the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures;
- Facilitate convergence between the parties' positions regarding the legal basis of the Protocol concluded between the Congolese Government and the FDLR;
- Organize, in August 2026, a joint meeting bringing together the key stakeholders of the Doha and Washington peace processes, as well as representatives of the EJVM+, to finalize the adjustment of the EJVM+ Terms of



Reference and explicitly incorporate the verification of commitments arising from the Washington Peace Agreement;

- Encourage the EJVM+ and JSCM to establish joint procedures to prevent any risk of combatant reclassification, change of affiliation, or any other practice that could undermine the integrity of the commitments undertaken;
- Support the establishment of a permanent strategic coordination framework involving the AU, Qatar, and key relevant partners to strengthen complementarity among peace initiatives; and
- Use its diplomatic influence to encourage an inclusive, constructive, and consensus-based political dialogue among Congolese political stakeholders regarding any major institutional or legislative reform that may affect the climate of trust, national cohesion, and the political environment necessary for the effective implementation of the Washington and Doha peace processes, while fully respecting the sovereignty of the DRC.

5.4. Recommendations to the JOC, the JSCM and EJVM+:

- Continue holding regular meetings and publishing more detailed reports on identified violations, observed delays, and proposed corrective measures;
- Assist the parties in clarifying and narrowing their divergent positions regarding the scale of FDLR forces present on Congolese territory;
- Support the parties in establishing objective criteria to assess the implementation of commitments relating to FDLR neutralization;
- Regularly publish activity reports, field findings, and recommendations to strengthen transparency, credibility, and stakeholder confidence; and
- Develop joint procedures to prevent practices that could undermine the traceability of commitments, particularly regarding combatant reclassification and changes of affiliation.

5.5. Recommendations to Qatar:

- Intensify facilitation efforts to accelerate the conclusion of the remaining protocols under negotiation within the Doha process, with particular attention to humanitarian issues;
- Encourage the effective implementation of already concluded protocols, especially those relating to the release of detainees;
- Strengthen diplomatic coordination with the AU, the United States, the ICGLR, and other relevant partners; and
- Support the establishment of a permanent strategic coordination framework among the principal actors involved in the Washington and Doha processes.

5.6. Recommendations to the African Union and the AU Mediator:

- Strengthen strategic preparedness and demonstrate greater proactivity in addressing obstacles affecting the implementation of peace commitments;
- Improve communication with stakeholders, affected populations, and regional public opinion to enhance transparency and confidence in mediation efforts;
- Institutionalize periodic high-level meetings bringing together the parties, agreement guarantors, and key international partners to assess progress in peace processes and identify necessary corrective measures;
- Continue supporting political, religious, and civil society actors in their efforts to promote an inclusive inter-Congolese dialogue; and
- Ensure continued financing of peace-related activities, particularly by strengthening resource mobilization mechanisms for the AU Peace Fund.

5.7. Recommendations to MONUSCO and ICGLR:

- Continue efforts toward the full operationalization of the EJVM+ to enable the effective deployment of monitoring, verification, and reporting missions;
- Strengthen the technical, logistical, and analytical capacities of verification teams;
- Intensify civilian protection efforts in areas most affected by hostilities;



- *Continue documenting and reporting impartially violations of the ceasefire and international humanitarian law; and*
- *Facilitate, in coordination with national authorities and humanitarian partners, humanitarian access and medical evacuation operations.*
