



REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WASHINGTON PEACE AGREEMENT: NOVEMBER 2025

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Washington Peace Agreement Implementation Assessment Report

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This report presents the assessment of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, conducted by a group of independent experts, on the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, signed on June 27, 2025, for the period from November 1st to November 30th, 2025.

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is an independent platform dedicated to monitoring, evaluating, and promoting the effective implementation of peace agreements in Africa, starting with the Washington Peace Agreement. Established in August 2025, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is based on the observation that many peace agreements in Africa have failed, not because of their content, but because of a lack of rigorous monitoring of their implementation. In the absence of an objective mechanism to measure compliance with commitments, each party remains free to assert its own compliance with the Agreement or to accuse the other of violating it. Far from replacing the official mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement established by the Agreement itself, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa provides reliable, up-to-date, and factual data on the progress of the peace commitments made by the parties.

Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool (PAIMT), designed and adapted by one of its experts (Dr. Roger-Claude Liwanga, drawing on his previous experience with The Carter Center evaluating peace agreements in Africa), and inspired by a methodology similar to that of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.



ACRONYMS

AFC-M23	Congo River Alliance – March 23 Movement
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
CONOPS	Concept of Operations of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda
EAC	East African Community
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
JOC	Joint Oversight Committee
JSCM	Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo
PAIMT	Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda
SADC	Southern African Development Community
AU	African Union
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area



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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Five months after the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement on June 27, 2025, between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, progress remains fragile and uneven. Monitoring of the November 2025 period highlights a worrying stagnation in the implementation process. **Of the 30 tasks identified in the Agreement, only 19 have begun implementation, for an overall implementation rate of 23.3% (70 out of 300 points). Considering only partially completed tasks, the completion rate is 36.8% (70 out of 190 points),** indicating a continued decline compared with the periods of late October and late August, when the rates were 38% and 41% respectively.

Among the 30 tasks, some must be carried out jointly by both the Congolese and the Rwandan governments; others fall under the exclusive responsibility of each of them; and finally, a few are entrusted to the international community (i.e., the United States, Qatar, the representative of the African Union, as well as some United Nations agencies). Pursuant to the Washington Peace Agreement, the DRC is expected to carry out 26 tasks (out of 30), Rwanda 22, and the international community 7.

Thus, **of the 26 tasks under the DRC's responsibility in the Agreement, only 16 have been partially implemented, for an overall implementation rate of 22.1% (57.5 points out of 260). Considering only the partially implemented tasks, the execution rate reaches 35.9% (57.5 points out of 160).**

As for Rwanda, **of the 22 tasks assigned to it in the Agreement, only 13 have been partially implemented, for an overall implementation rate of 22.7% (50 points out of 220). Considering only the partially implemented tasks, the completion rate reaches 38.4% (50 points out of 130).**

Furthermore, **all seven (7) tasks assigned to the international community in the Agreement have been partially implemented, for an overall implementation rate of 39.2% (27.5 points out of 70).**

The positive and encouraging findings marked in November 2025, are:

- **The signing of the regional economic integration framework** on November 8, 2025, by the DRC and Rwanda in the context of the Washington Peace Agreement, demonstrating that peace is not only envisioned in terms of security, but also as a basis for economic cooperation;
- **The signing of the framework agreement between the Congolese government and the AFC/M23** on November 15, 2025, in Qatar, **aimed at ending the conflict**; and
- **The regular functioning of the JSCM** (Joint Security Coordination Mechanism) and **the JOC** (Joint Oversight Committee), confirming institutional continuity in monitoring the Agreement.

At the same time, the Agreement's most sensitive and high-priority tasks, particularly the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, are experiencing significant delays in their implementation:



- In September 2025, the DRC and Rwanda adopted a joint timetable stipulating that the operations to neutralize the FDLR and lift Rwanda's defensive measures would be carried out between the 1st and 30th of October 2025.¹ Unfortunately, these operations were not fulfilled;
- Although the FARDC launched an awareness-raising campaign aimed at encouraging FDLR elements to lay down their arms and surrender to the Congolese authorities or to MONUSCO,² the FDLR have expressed their intention to maintain their positions and "resist" while awaiting the possible opening of a dialogue with the Rwandan authorities;³
- Moreover, while the joint timetable for the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures implies the simultaneous implementation of both operations, the Rwandan authorities nevertheless condition the withdrawal of their troops from the DRC territories on the prior neutralization of the FDLR;⁴
- Furthermore, armed clashes between the FARDC and the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) are ongoing, despite the signing of the framework agreement between the Congolese government and the representatives of the AFC/M23 on 15 November 2025 in Qatar;⁵
- Additionally, the lack of effective access to humanitarian assistance remains a matter of concern. For example, the reopening of the Goma airport to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid—requested during the Great Lakes Region Peace Conference held in late October 2025 in Paris⁶—is pending, despite the urgent needs of vulnerable populations;
- Finally, the brevity and lack of depth in the JOC and the JSCM's reports are notable. The monthly meetings' reports of both the JOC (the body responsible for receiving and processing complaints related to violations of the Agreement and overseeing the settlement of associated disputes) and JSCM (responsible for the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures) appear relatively succinct.⁷ They do not fully reflect the operational challenges encountered or the corrective

¹ RFI, « RDC et Rwanda fixent le début de la neutralisation des FDLR et de la levée des mesures « défensives » de Kigali. »

<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250925-rdc-et-rwanda-fixent-le-d%C3%A9but-de-la-neutralisation-des-fdlr-et-de-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-mesures-d%C3%A9fensives-de-kigali>.

² RFI, « RDC: L'armée lance une campagne de sensibilisation pour inciter les FDLR à déposer les armes ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251108-rdc-l-arm%C3%A9e-lance-une-campagne-de-sensibilisation-pour-inciter-les-fdlr-%C3%A0-d%C3%A9poser-les-armes>. Voir aussi : RFI, « RDC: « Nous résisterons jusqu'à ce que Kigali accepte un dialogue », affirment les FDLR ».

<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251110-rdc-nous-%C3%A9sisterons-jusqu-%C3%A0-ce-que-kigali-accepte-un-dialogue-affirment-les-fdlr>.

³ RFI, « RDC: « Nous résisterons jusqu'à ce que Kigali accepte un dialogue », affirment les FDLR ».

<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251110-rdc-nous-%C3%A9sisterons-jusqu-%C3%A0-ce-que-kigali-accepte-un-dialogue-affirment-les-fdlr>.

⁴ Interview du Ministre rwandais des affaires étrangères sur *RFI Grand Invité Afrique*. Voir :

« RDC-Rwanda: Il y a des violations permanentes du cessez-le-feu par l'armée congolaise ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/le-grand-invite%C3%A9-afrique/20251126-rdc-rwanda-il-y-a-des-violations-permanentes-du-cessez-le-feu-par-l-arm%C3%A9e-congolaise>.

⁵ « L'Accord-Cadre de Doha pour un Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo et l'Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 Mars ». https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45656-doc-2025.11.15_-_SIGNED_Framework_Peace_Agreement_FR.pdf. See also: African Union, « African Union Welcomes the Signing of a Ceasefire Verification Mechanism for the Democratic Republic of the Congo », Press Release. <https://au.int/fr/node/45499>

⁶ Jeune Afrique, « RDC : la conférence de Paris lève des fonds humanitaires mais paye son impuissance politique ». <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1736399/politique/rdc-la-conference-de-paris-leve-des-fonds-humanitaires-mais-paye-son-impuissance-politique/>

⁷ See: US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Fourth Joint Oversight Committee for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda and the Initialing of the Regional Economic Integration Framework », November 7, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/joint-statement-on-the-fourth-joint-oversight-committee-for-the-peace-agreement>;

US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Fourth Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda », November 20, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/11/joint-statement-on-the-fourth-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement/>; US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Third Joint Oversight Committee for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda and the Initialing of the Regional Economic Integration Framework », October 2, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/10/joint-statement-on-the-third-joint-oversight-committee-meeting-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda/>; US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Third Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo



measures envisioned to accelerate the implementation of security commitments. This undermines the transparency and clarity of the process of implementing security-related obligations.

Faced with these blockages, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa recommends targeted actions to be undertaken by each stakeholder:

- **To the Government of the DRC:** Accelerate, without further delay, the implementation of operations to neutralize the FDLR, in coordination with the JSCM, while ensuring the strict protection of civilians in conflict zones; operationalize the Joint Ceasefire Verification Mechanism signed in Doha on October 14, 2025, a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Washington Agreement; and develop and implement a national plan for the protection of civilians, in collaboration with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors.
- **To the Government of Rwanda:** Implement, without further delay, the harmonized plan for disengagement and lifting of defensive measures, with measurable objectives and a joint verification mechanism; encourage the AFC/M23 to strengthen the protection of civilian populations in territories under its control; and use its influence over the AFC/M23 to facilitate unimpeded humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations (including the reopening of the Goma airport).
- **To the JOC and the JSCM:** Publish reports providing a more comprehensive and detailed account of all observed violations, delays, instances of non-compliance with agreed commitments, and planned corrective measures. Such an approach would help strengthen transparency and increase public confidence in the implementation process, while replacing the brief joint communiqués currently issued.
- **To the United States:** Continue to exert increased diplomatic pressure on both parties to respect the agreed deadlines (particularly those relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops); provide technical and logistical support for the coordination and verification operations of the JSCM and the JOC; and actively support the mediation between the AFC/M23 and the DRC government to advance the Doha process, while ensuring its strategic alignment with the Washington Agreement;
- **To Qatar:** Continue to work towards greater complementarity between the Doha and Washington processes; support the functioning of the Joint Verification Mechanism agreed on October 14, 2025, by the DRC government and the AFC/M23 and encourage the publication of its initial observations as soon as possible.
- **To the African Union Mediator:** Continue to monitor the harmonization of the Washington and Doha processes in line with continental peace efforts in the Great Lakes region — notably by maintaining the high-level meeting scheduled for January 2026 in Togo, which aims to strengthen the cohesion of peace processes in the DRC and throughout the region. Furthermore, advocate for the allocation of autonomous funding to the continental monitoring mechanism, through the adoption of a dedicated budget within the African Union, guaranteeing its institutional and operational viability.

and the Republic of Rwanda», October 22, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/10/joint-statement-on-the-third-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda/>; US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Second Joint Oversight Committee for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda and the Initialing of the Regional Economic Integration Framework », September 3, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/joint-statement-on-the-second-joint-oversight-committee-meeting-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda/>; US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Second Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda », September 24, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/09/joint-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda/>.



2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the PAIMT (Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool), which is based on a coding methodology, to assess the degree of implementation of each of the tasks of a peace agreement on a scale of 0 to 10 points:

- **0 point** signifies an Uninitiated Execution (E_0): This represents the status quo. The parties have not taken any action or observable measures to begin implementing the task.
- **2.5 points** means an Initiated Execution (E_i): This represents some observable measures of the beginning of the execution of the task, meaning that the parties have established a date for the execution of the task or are having formal or informal discussions on the execution of the task concerned.
- **5 points** signifies Minimal Execution (E_m): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards executing the task, but these efforts are not sufficient for the task to be completed by the established deadline, given the current pace of the process.
- **7.5 points** implies an Intermediate Execution (E_l): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the execution of the task, and there is a likelihood that the task can be completed by the end of the established deadline if the current pace continues.
- **10 points** implies a Complete Execution (E_c): This represents the situation in which the task is nearly or fully executed, as specified in the Peace Agreement.


In short, there are five levels of implementation: E_0 (0 point), E_i (2.5 points), E_m (5 points), E_l (7.5 points) and E_c (10 points).

Based on the PAIMT, the Washington Peace Agreement is structured around 30 specific tasks, covering the fundamental pillars namely: respect for the territorial integrity of the states concerned, cessation of hostilities, disarmament and conditional reintegration of non-state armed groups, regional economic cooperation, protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, as well as the joint security mechanism (See: *Sketch 1-Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement, below*).

Data on the implementation of each task of the Washington Peace Agreement was collected by the research team of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa through: discussions with certain key stakeholders involved in the peace process in the DRC, analyses of official statements or announcements by stakeholders, and the examination of press articles and reports from local and international NGOs during the period from November 1st to November 30th, 2025.



Sketch 1: Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement





The 30 specific tasks listed in the Washington Agreement include:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire,2. Respect for the territorial integrity of each country,3. Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR,4. Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures (CONOPS),5. Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR,6. Neutralization of the FDLR,7. Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC (i.e., disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures),8. Evaluation of the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops,9. Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,10. Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,11. Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,12. Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,13. Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,14. Conditional integration of armed groups (e.g., M23) into the FARDC and PNC,15. Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda, | <ol style="list-style-type: none">16. Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism,17. Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region,18. Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law,19. Return of refugees,20. Return of internally displaced people,21. Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations,22. Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,23. Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement,24. Launch of the regional economic integration framework,25. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu,26. Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,27. Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,28. Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,29. Amicable settlement of disputes and30. Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement. |
|--|---|

Among these 30 tasks, some must be implemented indiscriminately by both the Congolese and Rwandan governments. Other tasks fall under the exclusive responsibility of each government, and a few are assigned to the international community (including the United States, Qatar, the African Union's representative, and the United Nations' agencies).

Therefore, the assessment of the level of implementation of the Washington Agreement can be carried out in two ways: collectively, by considering all the signatory parties; and individually, by analyzing the degree of implementation by each party separately.



3. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: NOVEMBER 2025


As of November 30, 2025, **only 19 of the 30 tasks** identified in the Washington Agreement have been partially implemented: four (4) tasks have undergone intermediate implementation, one (1) has undergone minimal implementation, and fourteen (14) have begun implementation. The other 11 tasks remain unimplemented to date, with no concrete initiatives to initiate them.

3.1. Implementation Scorecard by Task

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	DRC and Rwanda	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	DRC and JSCM	Initiated Execution	2.5
15	Establishment of a joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda	DRC and Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism	DRC and Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	DRC, Rwanda, and MONUSCO	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	DRC, Rwanda, and HCR	Initiated Execution	2.5
20	Return of internally displaced persons	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	DRC and UN agencies	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	AU, SADC-EAC, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Initiated Execution	2.5
	Other tasks (6-14, 27 and 29)	-----	Non-initiated Execution	0



3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: November 2025





3.3. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the DRC

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score / 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
6	Neutralization of the FDLR	Non-initiated Execution	0
8	Evaluation of the FDLR neutralization des FDLR	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
14	Conditional integration of M23 into the FARDC and Police,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism (JSCM)	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Intermediate Execution	7.5
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
20	Return of internally displaced people	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,	Initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,	Intermediate Execution	7.5
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Non-initiated Execution	0

3.4. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by Rwanda

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score / 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Initiated Execution	2.5
7	Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC	Non-initiated Execution	0
8	Evaluation of the withdrawal of Rwandan troops	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM)	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Intermediate Execution	7.5
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects	Initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Intermediate Execution	7.5
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Non-initiated Execution	0



3.5. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the International Community

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	Intermediate Execution	7.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Intermediate Execution	7.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement	Initiated Execution	2.5

3.6. Interpretation of Quantitative Results

3.6.1. Assessment of the Collective Implementation Rate

The combined analysis from the Implementation Table (3.1 above) and the Task-by-Task Implementation Chart (3.2 above) shows that most key commitments remain stalled. Specifically:

- **Of the 30 tasks** set out in the Washington Peace Agreement, **only 19** have begun to be implemented (at an initial, minimal, or intermediate level), representing **63.3% of all tasks**.
- **Considering all 30 tasks**, their **cumulative implementation score amounts to 70 points out of 300** (maximum points if all 30 tasks were fully implemented), representing an **overall implementation rate of 23.36%**. • **When considering only the partially implemented tasks**, the **completion rate stands at 36.8% (70 points out of 190)**, indicating a continued decline compared to the periods of late October and late August, when the rates stood at 38% and 41%, respectively.

3.6.2. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the DRC

The analysis of the DRC Commitments Implementation Table (3.3 above) indicates that:

- **Of the 26 tasks** falling under the DRC's responsibility in the Agreement, **only 16** have seen partial implementation, resulting in an **overall implementation rate of 22.1% (57.5 points out of 260)**.
- **When considering only the partially implemented tasks**, the **completion rate reaches 35.9% (57.5 points out of 160)**.

3.6.3. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by Rwanda

The analysis of the Rwanda Commitments Implementation Table (3.4 above) reveals that:

- **Of the 22 tasks** assigned to Rwanda under the Agreement, **only 13** have begun to be implemented, resulting in an **overall implementation rate of 22.7% (50 points out of 220)**.
- **When considering only the partially implemented tasks**, the **completion rate stands at 38.4% (50 points out of 130)**.

3.6.4. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the International Community


The analysis of the International Community Commitments Implementation Table—which includes the United States, Qatar, the AU representative, and UN agencies (3.5 above)—illustrates that **all seven (7) tasks entrusted to the international community under the Agreement have seen partial implementation**, resulting in an **overall implementation rate of 39.2% (27.5 points out of 70)**.



3.6.5. Comparison of the Implementation Progress: July-November 2025

The comparative graph (below) reveals both encouraging progress and signs of slowdown in the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement between July and November 2025.

Comparative chart on the progress of implementation: July to November 2025



The proportion of tasks completed (at various stages of completion) increased from 26.6% at the end of July to 46.6% at the end of August, to 56.6% at the end of October, and then to 63% at the end of November 2025. This upward trend reflects increased implementation efforts.

The overall cumulative completion scores also improved, rising from 9% at the end of July to 19% at the end of August, to 21.6% at the end of October, and reaching 23.3% at the end of November 2025.

Conversely, the score for partially completed tasks continues to decline, falling from 41% at the end of August to 38% at the end of October, and then to 36.8% at the end of November 2025. These trends underscore the need to strengthen the continuity and quality of implementation to ensure the sustainability of the progress achieved.



4. OBSERVATIONS

4.1. Progress Made

The positive findings during the period from November 1st to November 30th, 2025, are:

- **The signing of the Regional Economic Integration Framework** on November 8, 2025, by the DRC and Rwanda in the context of the Washington Peace Agreement, demonstrating that peace is not only envisioned in terms of security, but also as a basis for economic cooperation;
- **The signing of the framework agreement between the Congolese government and the AFC/M23** on November 15, 2025, in Qatar, **aimed at ending the conflict**; and
- **The regular functioning of the JSCM** (Joint Security Coordination Mechanism) and **the JOC** (Joint Oversight Committee), confirming institutional continuity in monitoring the Agreement.

4.2. Delays and Obstacles

The most sensitive and priority tasks of the Agreement, in particular the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, are experiencing significant delays, despite the adoption on September 17, 2025, by the DRC and Rwanda of a joint timetable stipulating that the operations to neutralize the FDLR and lift the Rwandan defensive measures would be carried out between October 1 and October 30, 2025.

For instance:

- **The preparatory phase of the FDLR neutralization** (covering the assessment of their threat level, location, logistical capacities, and information-sharing) was assigned to the DRC and was to be conducted between 7 and 15 October 2025, while **the actual neutralization operation** was scheduled to take place between 20 and 30 October 2025. Although the FARDC launched an awareness campaign to encourage FDLR members to lay down their arms and surrender to the Congolese authorities or MONUSCO,⁸ they have expressed their intention to maintain their positions and “resist” while awaiting a possible opening of dialogue with the Rwandan authorities.⁹
- **The gradual lifting of defensive measures and the cessation of sporadic cross-border operations**, which fall under Rwanda’s responsibility, were to be carried out between 20 and 30 October 2025. Although the joint timetable for the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures—validated by both the DRC and Rwanda—provides for the simultaneous implementation of the two operations, the Rwandan authorities nevertheless condition the lifting of these “defensive measures” on the prior neutralization of the FDLR.¹⁰
- **The joint assessment of the implementation of the disengagement plan and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures**, entrusted to Rwanda with support from the JSCM, was scheduled between 20 and 30 October 2025.
- **The ceasefire.** Armed clashes between the FARDC and the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) continue, despite the signing—on 14 October 2025, with Qatari facilitation—of an agreement between the DRC government and the AFC/M23 establishing a joint ceasefire verification mechanism,¹¹ as well as the conclusion, on 15 November 2025, of a framework agreement aimed at resolving the crisis.¹²

⁸ See : RFI, *supra*, note 2.

⁹ See : RFI, *supra*, note 3.

¹⁰ Interview du Ministre rwandais des affaires étrangères sur *RFI Grand Invité Afrique*. See :

« RDC-Rwanda: Il y a des violations permanentes du cessez-le-feu par l’armée congolaise ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/le-grand-invite%C3%A9-afrique/20251126-rdc-rwanda-il-y-a-des-violations-permanentes-du-cessez-le-feu-par-l-arm%C3%A9e-congolaise>.

¹¹ See : African Union, *supra*, note 5.

¹² « L’Accord-Cadre de Doha pour un Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo et l’Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 Mars ». https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45656-doc-2025.11.15_-_SIGNED_Framework_Peace_Agreement_FR.pdf



- **Effective access to humanitarian assistance has become critical.** The reopening of Goma airport, intended to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid (a measure recommended during the Great Lakes Region Peace Conference held in Paris at the end of October 2025), remains pending despite the urgent needs of vulnerable populations. The Rwandan authorities condition this reopening on the involvement of the AFC/M23—currently exercising de facto control over the area—in discussions on the matter.¹³
- **The brevity and lack of depth observed in the reports produced by the monitoring mechanisms remain a source of concern.** The monthly meetings' reports of both the JOC (the body responsible for receiving and processing complaints related to violations of the Agreement and overseeing the settlement of associated disputes) and the JSCM (responsible for the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures) appear relatively succinct. They do not fully reflect the operational challenges encountered or the corrective measures envisaged to accelerate the implementation of security commitments.¹⁴ This undermines the transparency and clarity of the process of implementing security-related obligations.

4.3. Causes of Delays

As highlighted in previous reports, the delays observed in the execution of the tasks can be explained, in part, by the following factors:

- **Lack of mutual trust and selective implementation of commitments:** Although the DRC and Rwanda have demonstrated political or diplomatic will, mutual mistrust remains high. Each party conditions its actions on the other's;
- **Uneven prioritization between political, security, and economic components:** The most visible progress concerns the institutional and economic components (JSCM, JOC, regional economic integration framework), while urgent military and security tasks (such as neutralization, disengagement, protection of civilians) have remained at a standstill.
- **Weak operational capacity and a lack of resources on the ground:** Despite the DRC's call for the FDLR to surrender, the country lacks sufficient technical and logistical resources to conduct the planned operations alone. At the same time, the JSCM and the JOC, although institutionally functional, lack on-the-ground intervention, monitoring, and verification capacities;
- **Ambiguities in coordination among the different peace processes:** The coexistence of the Washington process (DRC–Rwanda) and the Doha process (DRC–M23, under Qatari mediation) risks overlapping and fragmenting diplomatic efforts. Some actions decided within one framework (Doha) are not immediately integrated into the monitoring mechanism of the other framework (Washington); and
- **Poor communication and transparency in institutional monitoring:** The reports of the monthly meetings of the JOC and the JSCM remain relatively succinct and do not provide a comprehensive account of the operational difficulties encountered or the corrective measures planned to accelerate the implementation of security commitments. This institutional opacity limits accountability and weakens the international pressure needed to accelerate implementation.

¹³ Mount Kigali University Magazine, "Minister Amb. Nduhungirehe rejects decisions on M23 in their absence". <https://magazine.mkur.ac.rw/minister-amb-nduhungirehe-rejects-decisions-on-m23-in-their-absence/>

¹⁴ See: US State Department, *supra*, note 7.



5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Five months after its signing, the Washington Peace Agreement enabled structural progress in institutional cooperation. However, it remains weakened by the lack of improvement in the most crucial security measures. The continued fighting between the Congolese army and the Rwandan-backed AFC-M23, as well as the delay in implementing clauses relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces or the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, risk compromising the credibility of the process. In this regard, the following recommendations are proposed:

5.1. Recommendations to the DRC Government:

- **Accelerate, without further delay, the implementation of operations to neutralize the FDLR, in coordination with the JSCM**, while ensuring the strict protection of civilians in conflict zones;
- **Operationalize the Joint Ceasefire Verification Mechanism agreed in Doha on October 14, 2025**, a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Washington Agreement; and
- **Develop and implement a plan to protect civilians in conflict zones**, in collaboration with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors.

5.2. Recommendations to the Government of Rwanda:

- **Implement, without further delay, the harmonized plan for disengagement and lifting of defensive measures**, with measurable objectives and a joint verification mechanism;
- **Pressure the AFC-M23 to increase the protection of civilian populations in territories under its occupation**; and
- **Use its influence on the AFC-M23 to facilitate unimpeded humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations (including the reopening of the Goma airport).**

5.3. Recommendations to the JOC and the JSCM:

- **Publish reports that provide a more comprehensive and detailed account of all observed violations, delays, instances of non-compliance with agreed commitments, and planned corrective measures.** Such an approach would help strengthen transparency and increase public confidence in the implementation process, replacing the brief joint communiqués currently issued.

5.4. Recommendations to the United States:

- **Continue to increase diplomatic pressure on the DRC and Rwanda to respect the agreed deadlines**, particularly those relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops;
- **Provide technical and logistical support for the coordination and verification operations of the JSCM and the JOC**; and
- **Encourage active mediation between the AFC-M23 and the Congolese government to advance the Doha process**, while ensuring its strategic alignment with the Washington Peace Agreement.

5.5. Recommendations to Qatar:

- **Continue to work towards greater complementarity between the Doha and Washington processes**; and
- **Support the functioning of the Joint Verification Mechanism agreed to on October 14, 2025, by the DRC government and the AFC/M23 and encourage the publication of its initial observations as soon as possible.**



5.6. Recommendations to the African Union Mediator:

- **Continue to ensure the harmonization of the Washington and Doha processes in line with continental peace efforts in the Great Lakes region** — notably by maintaining the high-level meeting scheduled for January 2026 in Togo, which aims to strengthen the cohesion of peace processes in the DRC and throughout the region; and
- **Advocate for the allocation of autonomous funding to the continental monitoring mechanism** through the adoption of a dedicated budget within the African Union, guaranteeing its institutional and operational viability.
