



**ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE WASHINGTON PEACE AGREEMENT:
27 JUNE 2025 TO 27 JUNE 2026**

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Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa

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This report presents the assessment of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, conducted by a group of independent experts, on the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, signed on June 27, 2025, covering the period from June 27, 2025, to June 2026.

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is an independent platform dedicated to monitoring, evaluating, and promoting the effective implementation of peace agreements in Africa, starting with the Washington Peace Agreement. Established in August 2025, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is based on the observation that many peace agreements in Africa have failed, not because of their content, but because of a lack of rigorous monitoring of their implementation. In the absence of an objective mechanism to measure compliance with commitments, each party remains free to assert its own compliance with the Agreement or to accuse the other of violating it. Far from replacing the official mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement established by the Agreement itself, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa provides reliable, up-to-date, and factual data on the progress of the peace commitments made by the parties.

Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool (PAIMT), designed and adapted by one of its experts (Dr. Roger-Claude Liwanga, drawing on his previous experience with The Carter Center evaluating peace agreements in Africa), and inspired by a methodology similar to that of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.



ACRONYMS

AFC-M23	Congo River Alliance – March 23 Movement
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
CONOPS	Concept of Operations of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda
EAC	East African Community
EJVM+	Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
JOC	Joint Oversight Committee
JSCM	Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo
PAIMT	Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda
SADC	Southern African Development Community
AU	African Union
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	1
2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK	11
3. IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS: JULY 2025-JUNE 2026.....	14
3.1. Implementation Table by Task	14
3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: July 2025- June 2026.....	15
3.3. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the DRC.....	16
3.4. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by Rwanda.....	16
3.5. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the International Community.....	17
3.6. Overview of Tasks Partially and Fully Implemented.....	17
4. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS	22
4.1. Assessment of the Overall Implementation Rate.....	22
4.2. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the DRC	22
4.3. . Assessment of the Implementation Rate by Rwanda.....	22
4.4. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the International Community.....	22
4.5. Comparative Assessment of Implementation Progress: July 2025 – June 2026.....	22
5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS	25
5.1. Recommendations to the DRC Government	25
5.2. Recommendations to the Rwanda Government	25
5.3. Recommendations to the United States	26
5.4. Recommendations to the JOC and the JSCM	26
5.5. Recommendations to Qatar and Switzerland	26
5.6. Recommendations to the African Union and the AU Mediator	27
5.7. Recommendations to MONUSCO and ICGLR	27
6. ANNEX.....	28



1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The signing of the Washington Peace Agreement on June 27, 2025, between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda generated renewed hope for stabilization in the Great Lakes region, which has for decades been marked by recurring tensions, persistent armed conflicts, and a prolonged humanitarian crisis.

The Agreement constitutes an ambitious framework to address the root causes of instability in eastern DRC, notably by neutralizing armed groups, withdrawing foreign forces, strengthening bilateral security cooperation, and promoting regional economic integration. It notably incorporates the CONOPS (Concept of Operations for the harmonized plan for the neutralization of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the disengagement of forces or the lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda), initially developed in October 2024 within the Luanda peace process facilitated by Angola. The Washington Peace Agreement is also complemented by the Doha process, an interdependent but legally distinct framework led by Qatar and dedicated exclusively to addressing the internal political and military dimensions of the conflict between the Congolese government and the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda), excluding other local armed groups operating in eastern DRC.

One year after the Agreement was signed, progress in its implementation remains generally limited and unevenly distributed. Overall, **of the 30 tasks identified under the Agreement, 22 showed some level of implementation** (initial, minimal, intermediate, or complete), corresponding to **an overall implementation rate of 35% (105 points out of 300)**.

The analysis of trends during the first year of implementation reveals five distinct phases. The first, corresponding to a **start-up phase (July–August 2025)**, was marked by an initial increase in the overall implementation rate, rising from approximately 9% (27.5 points out of 300) at the end of July to 19% (57.5 points out of 300) at the end of August 2025. This was followed by a **phase of moderate progress (September–November 2025)**, during which the overall implementation rate reached 21.6% (65 points out of 300) at the end of October and 23.3% (70 points out of 300) at the end of November 2025. A **prolonged stagnation phase (December 2025–February 2026)** then set in, with key implementation indicators remaining largely unchanged for three consecutive months. From the end of March 2026, a **phase of moderate recovery (March–April 2026)** was observed, bringing the overall implementation rate to 27.5% (82.5 points out of 300). Finally, a **phase of progressive consolidation of gains (May–June 2026)** confirmed this positive momentum, with the overall implementation rate reaching 35%.

Regarding the level of implementation of commitments by each actor, the DRC recorded implementation of **18 of the 26 tasks** falling under its responsibility pursuant to the Agreement, corresponding to **an implementation score of 31.7% (i.e., 82.5 points out of 260)**. As for Rwanda, **15 of the 22 tasks** assigned to it also registered progress, representing **an implementation rate of 30.6% (i.e., 67.5 points out of 220)**. Meanwhile, the international community (including the United States, Qatar, the African Union mediation, as well as other international partners) has initiated the implementation of all seven tasks assigned to it under the Agreement, achieving an implementation rate of **53.5% (37.5 points out of 70)**.

The limited progress observed can be explained by several factors. First, an imbalance in implementation priorities led stakeholders to focus primarily on the institutional and economic dimensions of the Agreement, to the detriment of certain essential security-related commitments. This is compounded by a persistent trust deficit between the parties, which continues to hinder the implementation of several interdependent obligations. Furthermore, the most sensitive and priority commitments, particularly the operations to neutralize the FDLR, only began to be implemented at the end of March 2026. At the same time, the continued hostilities between the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda), coupled with difficulties in operationalizing the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), have constrained the progress anticipated under the implementation of the Agreement. Finally, the persistence of a highly concerning humanitarian situation, continue to affect the overall environment for the implementation of the Agreement.



Several positive developments marked the period from June 27, 2025, to June 27, 2026:

Normative and institutional developments

- *The establishment and relatively regular functioning of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) and the Joint Oversight Committee (JOC), reflecting a certain degree of institutional continuity in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement;*
- *The establishment, in January 2026, of a new African Union (AU) mediation architecture, composed of a mediator, a panel of five facilitators responsible for specific thematic areas, and an independent joint secretariat, aimed at strengthening coherence between the Washington and Doha processes, as well as enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of African-led peace initiatives in the DRC;¹ and*
- *The adoption of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+) relating to the supervision and verification of the ceasefire, involving the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Government of the DRC, and the AFC/M23.²*

Diplomatic developments

- *The conclusion, on September 14, 2025, in Doha, of the Protocol on the detainee release mechanism between the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23;³*
- *The convergence between the DRC and Rwanda on setting October 1, 2025, as the launch date for the joint operations aimed at neutralizing the FDLR and lifting Rwanda's defensive measures, although this timeline was unfortunately not respected;⁴*
- *The signing, on October 14, 2025, of an agreement between the DRC Government and the AFC/M23 establishing a joint ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism within the framework of the Doha process;⁵*
- *The signing, on November 15, 2025, of the Doha Framework Agreement for a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23, providing for the subsequent adoption of eight protocols intended to guide the resolution of the conflict;⁶*
- *The endorsement, on December 4, 2025, by the Presidents of the DRC and Rwanda, of the Washington Peace Agreement⁷ as well as the Regional Economic Integration Framework between the DRC and Rwanda,*

¹ Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, de la Coopération, de l'Intégration Africaine, et des Togolais de l'Extérieur, « Communiqué final de la réunion de haut niveau sur la cohérence et la consolidation du processus de paix en République Démocratique du Congo et dans la région des grands lacs. » <https://diplomatie.gouv.tg/communiqué-final-de-la-reunion-de-haut-niveau-sur-la-coherence-et-la-consolidation-du-processus-de-paix-en-republique-democratique-du-congo-et-dans-la-region-des-grands-lacs/>
Voir aussi : Baromètre des Accords de Paix en Afrique, « Vers Une Convergence Africaine des Processus de Paix dans l'est de la RDC : Opportunités et Défis de la Nouvelle Architecture de l'union Africain ». https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/fr/files/ugd/ddb61b_8664b09a63b43be8ddb10766eedddc2.pdf?index=true

² Protocole d'Accord entre la CIRGL, le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23 (en leur qualité de parties à la Déclaration de Principes de Doha) relatif à l'opérationnalisation du Mécanisme Conjoint de Vérification Élargi Plus (EJVM+) ainsi qu'aux termes de référence du mécanisme de supervision et de vérification du cessez-le-feu. Voir: ICGLR, « Significant Progress in Doha Peace Process between DRC and AFC/M23, » Press Release- https://icglr.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Press-Release-09_MOU-Signing-ICGLR-DRC-AFCM23.pdf?x10169

³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, « The ICRC Receives a Copy of the Mechanism for the Release of Detainees Linked to the Conflict Between the DRC and the Congo River Coalition. » <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2025/09/15/the-icrc-receives-a-copy-of-the-mechanism-for-the-release-of-detainees-linked-to-the-conflict-between-the-drc-and-the-congo-river-coalition>

⁴ La convergence entre la RDC et le Rwanda sur la fixation du 1er octobre 2025 comme date de lancement des opérations conjointes de neutralisation des FDLR et de levée des mesures défensives rwandaises, entérinée lors de la réunion du Mécanisme conjoint de coordination sécuritaire (JSCM) du 17 septembre 2025 et accompagnée d'un calendrier d'exécution par phases. Voir aussi : RFI, « RDC et Rwanda fixent le début de la neutralisation des FDLR et de la levée des mesures « défensives » de Kigali. » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250925-rdc-et-rwanda-fixent-le-debut-de-la-neutralisation-des-fdlr-et-de-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-mesures-d%C3%A9fensives-de-kigali>.

⁵ African Union, « African Union Welcomes the Signing of a Ceasefire Verification Mechanism for the Democratic Republic of the Congo », Press Release. <https://au.int/fr/node/45499>

⁶ Selon l'Accord-Cadre de Doha du 15 novembre 2025 pour un Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23, l'Accord de Paix Global devait comprendre huit Protocoles : le Protocole sur le Mécanisme de libération des détenus (signé 14 septembre 2025), le Protocole sur le Mécanisme de surveillance et de vérification du cessez-le-feu (signé 14 octobre 2025), le Protocole sur l'accès humanitaire et protection judiciaire ; le Protocole sur le rétablissement de l'autorité de l'État, réformes et gouvernance participative nationale ; le Protocole sur les dispositions intérimaires en matière de sécurité, désarmement, démobilisation et réintégration (DDR) des groupes armés locaux, et neutralisation des groupes armés étrangers ; le Protocole sur l'identité et citoyenneté, retour et réinstallation des personnes déplacées internes et des réfugiés ; le Protocole sur la relance économique et sociale ; ainsi que le Protocole sur la justice, vérité et réconciliation. Voir : Accord-Cadre de Doha du 15 novembre 2025, https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45656-doc-2025.11.15_-_SIGNED_Framework_Peace_Agreement_FR.pdf#:~:text=Le%20Gouvernement%20s%27engage%20%C3%A0%20adopter,pour%20la%20mise%20en%20%C5%93uvre

⁷ US State Department, « Joint Declaration by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda on the Occasion of Establishing the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity. » https://www.state.gov/joint-declaration-by-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda-on-the-occasion-of-establishing-the-washington-accords-for-peace-and-prosperity/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery .



demonstrates that peace is envisioned not only from a security perspective but also as a foundation for economic cooperation;⁸

- The adoption, on December 19, 2025, by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 2808 (2025), extending the mandate of MONUSCO, strengthening certain aspects of its ceasefire monitoring and verification mandate, and urging the DRC and Rwanda to implement in good faith their commitments under the Washington Peace Agreement;⁹
- The diplomatic consultations conducted by Angolan President João Lourenço, also serving as Chairperson of the AU, with Congolese authorities, opposition political actors, representatives of the AFC/M23, and religious leaders, with a view to reviving an inclusive political dialogue on the security crisis in eastern DRC;¹⁰ and
- The Montreux consultations held from 13 to 18 April 2026 between representatives of the DRC Government and the AFC/M23, within the framework of the Doha process and under the facilitation of Qatar, the United States, and the African Union, with Switzerland acting as host country, resulted in progress toward the conclusion of the Protocol on humanitarian access and judicial protection.¹¹ These consultations were followed on 26 and 27 May 2026, by evaluation meetings on the protocols already signed in Doha, bringing together the same stakeholders.¹²

Security developments

- Intelligence and information exchanges conducted between the Congolese and Rwandan authorities in September 2025 regarding the security situation on the ground, which served as the basis for the development of the operational plan relating to the neutralization of the FDLR, the disengagement of forces, and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures;¹³
- The confirmed withdrawal of the AFC/M23 from several cities and localities, notably Uvira in January 2026,¹⁴ certain areas around Lubero in North Kivu in March 2026,¹⁵ as well as Sange, Luvungi, and the Uvira–Bukavu axis in mid-May 2026.¹⁶ Several corroborating sources suggest that elements of the Rwandan forces operating alongside the AFC/M23 also withdrew from some of these areas and other concerned localities, although no official statement from the Rwandan authorities has, to date, confirmed this information.
- The proposal for a ceasefire in mid-February 2026 put forward by President Lourenço, which, although unsuccessful, reflected the continuity of diplomatic and security efforts;¹⁷

⁸ US State Department, "Regional Economic Integration Framework Between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda". https://www.state.gov/regional-economic-integration-framework-between-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-government-of-the-republic-of-rwanda/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery.

D'autres accords signés le même jour incluent : l'Accord de Partenariat Stratégique entre la RDC et les Etats Unis ; le Protocole d'Accord relatif au Partenariat Elargi en Matière de Sécurité entre la RDC et les Etats Unis ; ainsi que le Cadre pour une Prospérité Economique Partagée par le Rwanda et les Etats Unis. Voir aussi: US State Department, "Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo." https://www.state.gov/strategic-partnership-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery; US State Department, "Signing of the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda." https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/12/signing-of-the-washington-accords-for-peace-and-prosperity-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery.

⁹ Conseil de Sécurité des Nations, Résolution 2808 (2025) adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité à sa 10075^e Séance, le 19 décembre 2025. Voir aussi: United Nations, « Security Council Renews DR Congo Peacekeeping Mission amid Renewed M23 Offensives in the East ». <https://www.un.org/en/news-media/news/2025/12/114214/security-council-renews-dr-congo-peacekeeping-mission-amid-renewed>.

¹⁰ RFI, « Est de la RDC: Églises, Opposition... Offensive Diplomatique tous Azimuts de l'Angola ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260114-est-de-la-rdc-%C3%A9glises-opposition-offensive-diplomatique-tous-azimuts-de-l-angola>

¹¹ MONUSCO, « MONUSCO welcomes the progress made in Montreux within the framework of the Doha process. » <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/press-releases/la-monusco-salue-les-avancees-enregistrees-a-montreux-dans-le-cadre-du>

¹² RFI, « Est de la RDC: des délégués américains et suisses évaluent le processus entre Kinshasa et l'AFC/M23. » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260528-est-de-la-rdc-des-d%C3%A9l%C3%A9gu%C3%A9s-am%C3%A9ricains-et-suisses-%C3%A9valuent-le-processus-entre-kinshasa-et-l-afc-m23>

¹³ US Department of State, « Joint Statement on the Second Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda ». <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/joint-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>

¹⁴ SABC News, « Army Returns to Strategic East DRC Town after Rebel Withdrawal ». <https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/army-returns-to-strategic-east-drc-town-after-rebel-withdrawal/>

¹⁵ Radio Okapi, « Retrait des troupes AFC/M23 de quelques villages de Lubero : entre espoir de paix et doutes, » <https://www.radiookapi.net/2026/03/27/actualite/securite/retrait-des-troupes-afc-m23-de-quelques-villages-de-lubero-entre-espoir>

¹⁶ RFI, « Est de la RDC: après son retrait d'Uvira, l'AFC/M23 se repositionne à Kamanyola. » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260512-est-de-la-rdc-apr%C3%A8s-son-retrait-d-uvira-l-afc-m23-se-repositionne-%C3%A0-kamanyola>

¹⁷ RFI, « Est de la RDC: le cessez-le-feu annoncé à Luanda reste sans effet ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260218-est-de-la-rdc-le-cessez-le-feu-annonc%C3%A9-%C3%A0-luanda-reste-sans-effet>



- The launch, at the end of March 2026, of the “offensive phase” of operations to neutralize the FDLR by the Congolese military authorities;¹⁸
- The social reintegration in Rwanda of several hundred former FDLR combatants under a reintegration program carried out in March 2026;¹⁹ and
- The announcement, on March 9, 2026, by the AFC/M23 of the forthcoming release of thousands of detained government soldiers,²⁰ was followed, in mid-April 2026, by the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the International Committee of the Red Cross for their transfer.²¹

Humanitarian developments

- The Conference in Support of Peace and Prosperity, held on 30 October 2025 in Paris, aimed to mobilize the international community in response to the urgent humanitarian situation in eastern DRC as well as in neighboring countries;²²
- The regional tour in mid-February 2026 conducted by Hadja Lahbib aimed at promoting the establishment of secure humanitarian corridors,²³ accompanied by the announcement of a humanitarian assistance package of €81.2 million for the region, including approximately €68 million allocated to humanitarian operations in the DRC;²⁴ and
- The visit to Goma in mid-February 2026 by Vivian Van de Perre, Acting Head of MONUSCO, was to consult local stakeholders on civilian protection and humanitarian assistance coordination.²⁵

Developments on strengthening the credibility of the Agreement

- The hearings held in January 2026, by the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee concerning the peace process between the DRC and Rwanda and the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement;²⁶
- The sanctions imposed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury against several actors involved in the conflict, including: (a) the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) and several of its senior officials in early March 2026 for alleged violations of the Washington Peace Agreement;²⁷ (b) former President of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, in late April 2026 for his alleged role in supporting the AFC/M23; (c) several commanders of the FDLR and the AFC/M23 in early June 2026 for undermining peace and stability efforts in the region;²⁸ and (d) a Rwandan gold refinery in late June 2026 for allegedly facilitating the illicit trade in conflict minerals;²⁹ and
- The introduction, on May 7, 2026, before the U.S. House of Representatives, of the bill entitled the STABLE DRC Act (Sanctioning Threats and Aggression to Bolster Lasting Enforcement and Disrupt Regional Conflict

¹⁸ Actualité CD, « Accord de Washington : les FARDC lancent la traque des FDLR ». https://actualite.cd/index.php/2026/03/29/accord-de-washington-les-faradc-lancent-la-traque-des-fdlr#google_vignette

¹⁹ The News Time, « Over 200 ex-FDLR combatants reintegrated back in society ». <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/34521/news/rwanda/over-200-ex-fdlr-combatants-reintegrated-back-in-society>

²⁰ RFI, « RDC : que sait-on de l'annonce de libération de militaires gouvernementaux par les rebelles de l'AFC/M23? » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260309-rdc-ce-que-l-on-sait-de-l-annonce-de-lib%C3%A9ration-de-militaires-faradc-par-l-afc-m23>

²¹ RFI, « RDC : signature d'un protocole d'accord entre l'AFC/M23 et le CICR pour un transfert de militaires ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260415-rdc-signature-d-un-protocole-d-accord-entre-l-afc-m23-et-le-cicr-pour-un-transfert-de-militaires>

²² ONU Info, « RDC : à Paris, l'ONU lance un appel à la solidarité face à la tragédie des Grands Lacs. » <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2025/10/1157775>

²³ RFI, « La Commissaire européenne à l'aide humanitaire débute en RDC sa tournée dans la région des Grands lacs ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260217-la-commissaire-europ%C3%A9enne-%C3%A0-l-aide-humanitaire-d%C3%A9bute-en-rdc-sa-tour%C3%A9e-dans-la-r%C3%A9gion-des-grands-lacs>

²⁴ Le Monde, « L'UE débloque plus de 80 millions d'euros pour répondre à la crise humanitaire dans la région des Grands Lacs ». https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2026/02/18/l-ue-debloque-plus-de-80-millions-d-euros-pour-repondre-a-la-crise-humanitaire-dans-la-region-des-grands-lacs_6667233_3212.html

²⁵ Actualité CD, « RDC : la cheffe par intérim de la MONUSCO se rend à Goma pour préparer la vérification du cessez-le-feu ». https://actualite.cd/2026/02/12/rdc-la-cheffe-par-interim-de-la-monusco-se-rend-goma-pour-preparer-la-verification-du#google_vignette

²⁶ US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, « Advancing Peace in DRC and Rwanda through President Trump's Washington Accords ». <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/advancing-peace-in-drc-and-rwanda-through-president-trump-s-washington-accords>

²⁷ The U.S. Department of the Treasury, « Treasury Sanctions Rwanda Officials, Condemns Blatant Violations of Washington Peace Accords ». <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0411>

²⁸ The U.S. Department of the Treasury, « Treasury Sanctions Former Democratic Republic of the Congo President for Ties to Armed Conflict ». <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0480>; voir aussi : The U.S. Department of the Treasury, « Treasury Sanctions Rebel Commanders Driving Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ». <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0518>

²⁹ The U.S. Department of the Treasury, « Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Gold Refinery and Network Enabling Illicit Conflict Minerals Trade ». <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0543>



Act), aimed at establishing a targeted sanctions regime against individuals and entities undermining the Washington Peace Agreement.³⁰

Conversely, the principal challenges observed between June 27, 2025, and June 27, 2026, relate to the following:

Challenges on the security front

- *Lack of mutual trust and selective implementation of commitments:* Despite several diplomatic gestures and public statements aimed at easing tensions, persistent mistrust between the DRC, Rwanda, and the AFC/M23 (supported by Kigali) continues to undermine the effective implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement and the various protocols concluded under the Doha process. In this context, each party appears to condition the fulfillment of its own obligations on the prior implementation of the other party's commitments, particularly regarding the most sensitive issues related to the neutralization of the FDLR, the withdrawal of the AFC/M23 from certain localities, and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures;
- *Continuation of hostilities and persistent insecurity:* Ongoing clashes between the FARDC and the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) continue to undermine the establishment of a secure environment conducive to the implementation of the commitments provided for under the Agreement. The increasing use of offensive drones, recurrent ceasefire violations,³¹ and continued attacks by other non-state armed groups continue to fuel a climate of widespread insecurity;
- *Difficulties in operationalizing the EJVM+ and divergent interpretations of the ceasefire arrangements:* Although the ICGLR, the Government of the DRC, and the AFC/M23 (as parties to the Doha Declaration of Principles) adopted the protocol agreement relating to the EJVM+,³² its effective deployment and operational capacities remain, at this stage, relatively limited. This situation continues to hinder the effectiveness of ceasefire monitoring, oversight, and verification activities on the ground. At the same time, the parties maintain differing positions regarding the implementation and sequencing of their respective commitments. The Government of the DRC has, in certain instances, viewed military operations conducted against AFC/M23 positions as legitimate defensive measures and as an exercise of its sovereign right to restore state authority and territorial integrity throughout the country. Conversely, the AFC/M23 tends to regard such operations as violations of the ceasefire arrangements agreed upon by the parties;
- *The persistence of armed group activities not covered by ceasefire and verification mechanisms:* The EJVM+ is primarily mandated to monitor compliance with the commitments undertaken by the parties directly involved in the Doha process (namely, the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23). However, several local armed groups continue to operate in certain areas of North Kivu and South Kivu and do not consider themselves bound by the arrangements concluded under the Doha process. Although their capacity to cause harm is generally more limited than that of the AFC/M23, their activities continue to contribute to the persistent insecurity affecting civilian populations and remain capable of undermining stabilization efforts on the ground;
- *Delays in freeing the FARDC soldiers detained by the AFC/M23:* Despite public announcements³³ and the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the transfer of detained government soldiers has been delayed, notably due to logistical constraints;³⁴
- *Excessively ambitious operational timelines for priority security commitments:* The DRC and Rwanda adopted, on September 17, 2025, a joint timetable providing for the implementation of FDLR neutralization operations and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures within a particularly short timeframe, from October 1 to October

³⁰ H.R.8704 - Sanctioning Threats and Aggression to Bolster Lasting Enforcement and Disrupt Regional Conflict Act "STABLE DRC Act". <https://www.congress.gov/bills/119th/congress/house-bill/8704/text>

³¹ ONU Info, « En RDC, la situation reste très tendue malgré les efforts diplomatiques », <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2026/03/1158622>

³² Protocole d'Accord entre la CIRGL, le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23 (en leur qualité de parties à la Déclaration de Principes de Doha) relatif à l'opérationnalisation du Mécanisme Conjoint de Vérification Élargi Plus (EJVM+) ainsi qu'aux termes de référence du mécanisme de supervision et de vérification du cessez-le-feu. Voir: ICGLR, « Significant Progress in Doha Peace Process between DRC and AFC/M23, » Press Release- https://icglr.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Press-Release-09_MOU-Signing-ICGLR-DRC-AFCM23.pdf?x10169

³³ RFI, « RDC: signature d'un protocole d'accord entre l'AFC/M23 et le CICR pour un transfert de militaires », <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260415-rdc-signature-d-un-protocole-d-accord-entre-l-afc-m23-et-le-cicr-pour-un-transfert-de-militaires>

³⁴ Id.



30, 2025.³⁵ However, given the military, logistical, and political complexity of these operations, the timetable ultimately proved difficult to implement in practice.³⁶

- *The delayed commencement of FDLR neutralization operations*, which were effectively launched on March 29, 2026—nearly nine months after the signing of the Agreement—even though this commitment constitutes a central component of the security framework established under the Agreement.³⁷ This delay significantly slowed the implementation of other interdependent commitments, particularly those relating to force disengagement and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures. Furthermore, although the Congolese authorities described the sensitization phase, which encouraged the voluntary surrender of FDLR elements in areas under their control, as successful, neither the exact number of combatants who responded to the call nor the detailed timetable for the offensive phase of neutralization had been officially clarified at this stage;
- *Absence of clearly defined and jointly agreed criteria to assess the success of the FDLR neutralization during the "offensive phase"*: At this stage, no jointly developed framework by the Congolese and Rwandan Governments appears to clearly define the indicators or benchmarks for assessing the outcomes of the FDLR neutralization operations. The absence of measurable thresholds, as well as of an independent and credible verification mechanism, could lead either party to claim full compliance with its obligations or, conversely, to dispute their effective implementation;
- *Limited operational capacity of the Congolese authorities to neutralize FDLR elements entrenched in areas under AFC/M23 control*: The DRC does not appear to possess, on its own, sufficient capacity to effectively conduct the complex operations required to neutralize FDLR elements, a significant number of whom are reportedly located in areas currently under AFC/M23 control; and
- *Limited disengagement of Rwandan forces*: According to certain diplomatic sources, Rwandan elements supporting the AFC/M23 are reported to have withdrawn concurrently with the latter's pullback from several localities previously under their control. However, this withdrawal remains partial and does not entail a full disengagement from Congolese territory. This situation appears to reflect an interpretation in which the withdrawal of Rwandan forces is contingent on the prior neutralization of the FDLR.³⁸ In contrast, the joint timetable of 17 September 2025 provides for the simultaneous implementation of both activities.

Challenges on the humanitarian front

- *Persistence of the humanitarian crisis and access constraints*, characterized by: (a) particularly high levels of forced displacement in eastern DRC (estimated by the International Organization for Migration at approximately 3.59 million internally displaced persons, including 1.23 million in South Kivu and 1.17 million in North Kivu, primarily due to armed conflict);³⁹ (b) a worsening of food insecurity affecting several million people, according to the World Food Programme;⁴⁰ and (c) the prolonged closure of Goma and Bukavu airports. These factors continue to significantly restrict the delivery of humanitarian assistance and increase the vulnerability of conflict-affected civilian populations;

³⁵ The DRC and Rwanda reached a shared understanding to designate 1 October 2025 as the launch date for joint operations to neutralize the FDLR and to lift Rwanda's defensive measures. This decision was endorsed at the JSCM meeting on 17 September 2025 and accompanied by a phased implementation timetable. See : US Department of State, « Joint Statement on the Second Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda ». <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/joint-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>

³⁶ RFI, « RDC et Rwanda fixent le début de la neutralisation des FDLR et de la levée des mesures « défensives » de Kigali. » <https://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20250925-rdc-et-rwanda-fixent-le-d%C3%A9but-de-la-neutralisation-des-fdlr-et-de-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-mesures-d%C3%A9fensives-de-kigali>.

³⁷ Actualité CD, « Accord de Washington : les FARDC lancent la traque des FDLR ». https://actualite.cd/index.php/2026/03/29/accord-de-washington-les-fardc-lancent-la-traque-des-fdlr#google_vignette Voir aussi : Digital Congo, « RDC : L'armée lance les opérations de neutralisation des FDLR ». <https://www.digitalcongo.org/detail14841-rdc-l-armee-lance-les-operations-de-neutralisation-des-fdlr>

³⁸ Interview du Ministre rwandais des affaires étrangères sur RFI *Grand Invité Afrique*. Voir : « RDC-Rwanda: Il y a des Violations Permanentes du Cessez-le-feu par l'Armée Congolaise. » <https://www.rfi.fr/podcasts/le-grand-invite%C3%A9-afrique/20251126-rdc-rwanda-il-y-a-des-violations-permanentes-du-cessez-le-feu-par-l-arm%C3%A9e-congolaise>.

³⁹ OIM, « République Démocratique du Congo : Aperçu du Déplacement Interne 2026. » https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11461/files/reports/DRC_NDO_172026_Final_FR.pdf?iframe=true

⁴⁰ World Food Programme, « Emergency: Democratic Republic of the Congo. » <https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/drc-emergency>. Voir aussi: IPC, « République Démocratique du Congo : Analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire aigue Janvier-Juin 2026. » https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_DRC_Acute_Food_Insecurity_May2026_Report_French.pdf



- The shortages of essential medicines reported by the ICRC in North Kivu and South Kivu continue to further weaken the health system in eastern DRC.⁴¹ This situation is further exacerbated by the ongoing Ebola outbreak affecting the region;⁴² and
- *Insufficient prioritization of humanitarian commitments:* While progress has been observed in certain diplomatic and institutional areas, commitments relating to civilian protection, humanitarian access, the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and assistance to vulnerable populations remain weakly implemented.

Challenges on the diplomatic front

- *Imbalance in the implementation of priority tasks:* Stakeholders have primarily focused their efforts on the institutional, diplomatic, and economic dimensions of the Agreement, which have recorded some progress. By contrast, the most sensitive and priority security commitments—particularly the neutralization of the FDLR, the disengagement of forces, and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures—have experienced more limited and delayed progress;
- *Ambiguities in the coordination between the different peace processes:* The coexistence of the Washington process (DRC–Rwanda), the Doha process (DRC–AFC/M23 under Qatari mediation), and African-led initiatives under the auspices of the AU creates risks of overlap, diplomatic fragmentation, and dilution of responsibilities. Decisions taken within one framework are not systematically integrated or harmonized with the other monitoring mechanisms;
- *Slow progress in negotiations between the Congolese Government and the AFC/M23:* Of the eight protocols envisaged under the Doha Framework Agreement of November 15, 2025, only two had been concluded to date, and neither had yet been fully implemented. The remaining six protocols were still under negotiation.⁴³ This limited progress continues to delay the advancement of the internal politico-military track essential to the sustainable stabilization of eastern DRC;
- *Lack of international convergence on pressure and coercive mechanisms:* While the United States adopted an approach relying notably on targeted sanctions against alleged violators of the Agreement, other international partners (including the AU and France⁴⁴) have favored political dialogue and mediation. In this context, the absence of a fully harmonized approach among the main international partners tends to reduce the deterrent effect of coercive measures and to limit their potential impact on the behavior of the parties concerned.

Challenges on the normative and institutional front

- *Wait-and-see approach and limited visibility of African initiatives:* Since the January 2026 Lomé meeting on the coherence between the Washington and Doha peace processes,⁴⁵ little official information has been published regarding the regional tours conducted by the AU Mediator and Facilitators,⁴⁶ who did not reconvene until early

⁴¹ ICRC, « RD Congo : Soins de santé de plus en plus inaccessibles dans les Kivu », <https://www.icrc.org/fr/communiqu-de-presse/rd-congo-soins-sante-plus-inaccessibles-kivu>

⁴² World Health Organization, « Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus - Democratic Republic of the Congo », <https://www.who.int/india/home/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON603>

⁴³ Selon l'Accord-Cadre de Doha du 15 novembre 2025 pour un Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23, l'Accord de Paix Global devait comprendre huit Protocoles. Deux d'entre eux avaient déjà été signés : le Protocole sur le Mécanisme de libération des détenus (14 septembre 2025) et le Protocole sur le Mécanisme de surveillance et de vérification du cessez-le-feu (14 octobre 2025).

Les six Protocoles restants devaient encore être négociés par les parties, couvrant les domaines suivants : Accès humanitaire et protection judiciaire ; Rétablissement de l'autorité de l'État, réformes et gouvernance participative nationale ; Dispositions intérimaires en matière de sécurité, désarmement, démobilisation et réintégration (DDR) des groupes armés locaux, et neutralisation des groupes armés étrangers ; Identité et citoyenneté, retour et réinstallation des personnes déplacées internes et des réfugiés ; Relance économique et sociale ; et Justice, vérité et réconciliation.

Voir : Accord-Cadre de Doha du 15 novembre 2025. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45656-doc-2025_11_15_-_SIGNED_Framework_Peace_Agreement_FR.pdf#:~:text=Le%20Gouvernement%20s%27engage%20%C3%A0%20adopter,pour%20la%20mise%20en%20%C5%93

⁴⁴ RFI, « L'opposition d'Emmanuel Macron aux sanctions contre le Rwanda n'émeut pas la présidence congolaise », <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260513-l-opposition-d-emmanuel-macron-aux-sanctions-contre-le-rwanda-n-%C3%A9meut-pas-la-pr%C3%A9sidence-congolaise>

⁴⁵ Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, de la Coopération, de l'Intégration Africaine, et des Togolais de l'Extérieur, « Communiqué final de la réunion de haut niveau sur la cohérence et la consolidation du processus de paix en République Démocratique du Congo et dans la région des grands lacs. » <https://diplomatie.gouv.tg/communiqu-final-de-la-reunion-de-haut-niveau-sur-la-coherence-et-la-consolidation-du-processus-de-paix-en-republique-democratique-du-congo-et-dans-la-region-des-grands-lacs/>

⁴⁶ Congo Profond, « Crise à l'Est de la RDC : Après Kinshasa, les facilitateurs de l'UA à Kigali, un rapport très attendu à Addis-Abeba », <https://congofond.net/crise-a-lest-de-la-rdc-apres-kinshasa-les-facilitateurs-de-lua-a-kigali-un-rapport-tres-attendu-a-addis-abeba/>



June 2026.⁴⁷ In a particularly complex environment, prolonged intervals between coordination meetings of the AU mediation team, coupled with the absence of regular mechanisms for strategic assessment and public communication, tend to diminish the visibility of the AU's efforts, constrain its ability to anticipate and address obstacles in the peace process, and weaken its political influence among the parties concerned as well as within broader continental public opinion;

- *Angolan frustration over the lack of concrete progress in the inter-Congolese dialogue: Mandated in January 2026 by the AU Mediator to conduct preparatory consultations for an inclusive inter-Congolese dialogue, Angolan President João Lourenço intensified engagements with key Congolese political, religious, and social stakeholders.⁴⁸ However, these efforts have encountered persistent divergences regarding the format and modalities of the dialogue. While the Government of the DRC favors a process conducted within the country under the authority of national institutions and in accordance with the constitutional order, a significant segment of the non-armed opposition advocates for a dialogue facilitated by the coalition of Catholic and Protestant churches, to be held outside the DRC in order to enhance guarantees of neutrality and trust. These divergences have slowed down the preparatory process and appear to have generated a degree of frustration within the Angolan mediation.⁴⁹*
- *Insufficient and delayed African funding for peace efforts:* Despite the allocation of substantial resources by the African Union Peace Fund in April 2026, operational needs remain far greater than available resources. Budgetary constraints and dependence on external partners continue to affect the continuity and effectiveness of mediation, deployment, and verification mechanisms;
- *Limited communication by the JSCM and the JOC:* Reports issued following meetings of the JSCM, and the JOC remain relatively brief and do not comprehensively address the operational difficulties encountered or the corrective measures envisaged. This institutional opacity limits stakeholders' accountability and reduces the diplomatic pressure needed to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement; and
- *Risks of polarization linked to certain internal institutional reform initiatives:* While the Congolese people remain fully sovereign in debating, adopting, or reforming their laws and institutions in accordance with their Constitution, it is also important to recall that the Washington and Doha peace processes are grounded in essential principles such as the strengthening of trust between parties, political inclusivity, and institutional credibility. In this context, any legislative or constitutional reform that does not benefit from broad national consensus could be perceived as a source of political polarization, with the risk of weakening national cohesion and further complicating ongoing efforts toward peace and stability.

In light of these constraints, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa recommends the following actions for each stakeholder at the outset of the second year of implementation of the Agreement:

- **To the Government of the DRC:**
 - ✓ Accelerate and structure the FDLR neutralization operations by publishing an indicative timetable, accompanied by periodic information on the number of FDLR members who have voluntarily laid down their arms or been militarily neutralized, to enhance the transparency and credibility of the process;
 - ✓ Ensure that operations aimed at neutralizing the FDLR are conducted in compliance with international humanitarian law, while facilitating humanitarian access to affected populations in the concerned areas;
 - ✓ Jointly define and adopt, together with the Rwandan authorities, clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria for assessing the success of the “offensive phase” of the FDLR neutralization process. This aims to prevent one party from claiming full performance of the obligation while the other contests its effective implementation;

⁴⁷ Présidence du Conseil, « Grands Lacs : Lomé consolide la centralité de la médiation africaine ». <https://presidenceconseil.gouv.tg/2026/06/08/grands-lacs-lome-consolide-la-centralite-de-la-mediation-africaine/>

⁴⁸ Actualité CD, « RDC : l'Angola officiellement mandaté pour conduire des consultations en vue d'un dialogue intercongolais ». https://actualite.cd/2026/02/09/rdc-langola-officiellement-mandate-pour-conduire-des-consultations-en-vue-dun-dialogue#google_vignette

⁴⁹ Actualité CD « Luanda a fait savoir à Kinshasa sa position en rapport avec le dialogue national en RDC ». <https://actualite.cd/2026/05/22/luanda-fait-savoir-kinshasa-sa-position-en-rapport-avec-le-dialogue-national-en-rdc>



- ✓ Strengthen civilian protection mechanisms, particularly in response to the growing use of offensive drones and documented human rights violations;
 - ✓ Define, in coordination with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the practical and security arrangements relating to the reception of thousands of FARDC soldiers detained by the AFC/M23, as well as the release of AFC/M23 combatants whose possible liberation has been announced;
 - ✓ Activate the operationalization of the EJVM+;
 - ✓ Continue negotiations within the Doha process with increased commitment toward concluding and implementing the six remaining protocols, while giving priority attention to the protocol on humanitarian access; and
 - ✓ Foster an environment conducive to inclusive political dialogue within the framework of consultations supported by the African Union.
- **To the Government of Rwanda:**
 - ✓ Continue de-escalation measures and use its influence to encourage the AFC/M23 to cooperate in the operationalization of the EJVM+ fully;
 - ✓ Clarify, in a spirit of transparency and mutual confidence, the modalities governing the withdrawal of armed elements and Rwandan defensive measures;
 - ✓ Maintain reintegration programs for former FDLR combatants and strengthen the security and/or judicial guarantees offered to FDLR members still present in the DRC but reluctant to surrender, to encourage their disarmament and facilitate their voluntary repatriation to Rwanda;
 - ✓ Jointly define and adopt, together with the Congolese authorities, clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria for assessing the success of the “offensive phase” of the FDLR neutralization process; and
 - ✓ Use its influence over the AFC/M23 to facilitate safe, rapid, and unhindered humanitarian access for vulnerable populations, including by supporting the reopening of Goma Airport.
 - **To the Government of the United States:**
 - ✓ *Maintain and strengthen coordinated diplomatic and political pressure on both parties to ensure compliance with agreed commitments and timelines, particularly about the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures;*
 - ✓ *Support efforts aimed at strengthening transparency in the implementation of FDLR neutralization operations and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures;*
 - ✓ *Continue considering, as a measure of last resort, the adoption of targeted coercive measures against actors identified as deliberately obstructing the implementation of the Agreement;*
 - ✓ *Ensure that MONUSCO receives the necessary financial resources, as well as adequate technical and logistical support, to carry out its newly strengthened mandate effectively;*
 - ✓ *Further support humanitarian initiatives and community stabilization programs in conflict-affected areas;*
 - ✓ *Encourage stronger coordination between the Washington and Doha processes to avoid overlapping and diplomatic inconsistencies; and*
 - ✓ *Use its diplomatic influence to encourage an inclusive, constructive, and consensus-based political dialogue among Congolese political stakeholders regarding any major institutional or legislative reform that may affect the climate of trust, national cohesion, and the political environment necessary for the effective implementation of the Washington and Doha peace processes, while fully respecting the sovereignty of the DRC.*
 - **To the Governments of Qatar and Switzerland:**
 - ✓ *Intensify facilitation efforts within the framework of the Doha process to accelerate the conclusion of the six protocols still under negotiation between the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23, while giving priority attention to the protocol on humanitarian access;*
 - ✓ *Encourage the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23 to effectively implement the protocols already concluded, particularly those relating to the release of detainees and the operationalization of the EJVM+;*



- ✓ Strengthen diplomatic coordination with the African Union, the United States, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and other partners involved in the peace processes; and
 - ✓ *Examine, in consultation with the relevant parties, the modalities for adopting a Voluntary Subsequent Accession Protocol that would allow certain Congolese armed groups not directly covered by the Doha process to subscribe to selected provisions of the future Comprehensive Peace Agreement, particularly those relating to the ceasefire, civilian protection, humanitarian access, and monitoring, verification, and reporting mechanisms, without prejudice to the special status or prerogatives of the signatory parties. Such an approach could facilitate the gradual extension of the peace process gains to other armed actors operating in eastern DRC, contribute to reducing residual violence, strengthen the effectiveness of the EJVM+, and prevent the emergence of destabilizing factors likely to undermine the implementation of the peace agreements. It would also help limit the need for future separate negotiation frameworks with these armed groups. To this end, a draft Subsequent Accession Protocol is attached as an annex to this report.*
- **To the JOC and the JSCM:**
 - ✓ Continue holding monthly meetings and publish reports providing a more comprehensive and detailed account of observed violations, delays, and envisaged corrective measures; and
 - ✓ Support the parties in defining and adopting clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria to objectively and credibly assess the success of the “offensive phase” of the FDLR neutralization process.
 - **To the African Union and the AU Mediator:**
 - ✓ *Strengthen strategic preparedness and demonstrate greater proactivity in addressing the blockages and delays observed in the implementation of peace commitments.* In this regard, the AU would also benefit from improving its communication, both with the conflict parties and with affected populations and regional public opinion, to enhance transparency, clarity, and confidence in mediation efforts;
 - ✓ *Establish more regular meetings between the AU Mediator, the Panel of Facilitators, and key partners involved in the peace processes, at a frequency exceeding the current semi-annual schedule, with a view to strengthening strategic follow-up, timely assessment of African initiatives, and the swift adoption of corrective measures in response to emerging challenges in eastern DRC;*
 - ✓ *Support the Government of the DRC, opposition groups, and civil society actors in a constructive process grounded in consensus-building, with a view to the holding of an inclusive inter-Congolese dialogue. This support should also facilitate consultation among the various parties on any major institutional or legislative reforms, to preserve trust and national cohesion, which are essential conditions for the effective implementation of commitments arising from the Washington and Doha processes; and*
 - ✓ *Anticipate and ensure the continuity of funding for peace-related activities, including mediation and associated institutional support, by establishing a sustainable mechanism to mobilize the Peace Fund, preventing resource disruptions that could hinder the continuation of mediation.*
 - **To MONUSCO and the ICGLR:**
 - ✓ *Accelerate the full operationalization of the EJVM+ to enable the effective deployment of monitoring, verification, and reporting missions;*
 - ✓ *Strengthen the technical, logistical, and analytical capacities of verification teams;*
 - ✓ *Intensify civilian protection efforts in areas most affected by hostilities;*
 - ✓ *Continue documenting and impartially reporting violations of the ceasefire and international humanitarian law; and*
 - ✓ *Facilitate, in coordination with national authorities and humanitarian partners, humanitarian access and medical evacuation operations.*



2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the PAIMT (Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool), which is based on a coding methodology, to assess the degree of implementation of each of the tasks of a peace agreement on a scale of 0 to 10 points:

- **0 point** signifies an Uninitiated Execution (E_0): This represents the status quo. The parties have not taken any action or observable measures to begin implementing the task.
- **2.5 points** means an Initiated Execution (E_i): This represents some observable measures of the beginning of the execution of the task, meaning that the parties have established a date for the execution of the task or are having formal or informal discussions on the execution of the task concerned.
- **5 points** signifies Minimal Execution (E_m): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards executing the task, but these efforts are not sufficient for the task to be completed by the established deadline, given the current pace of the process.
- **7.5 points** implies an Intermediate Execution (E_I): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the execution of the task, and there is a likelihood that the task can be completed by the end of the established deadline if the current pace continues.
- **10 points** implies a Complete Execution (E_c): This represents the situation in which the task is nearly or fully executed, as specified in the Peace Agreement.


In short, there are five levels of implementation: E_0 (0 point), E_i (2.5 points), E_m (5 points), E_I (7.5 points), and E_c (10 points).

Based on the PAIMT, the Washington Peace Agreement is structured around 30 specific tasks, covering the fundamental pillars namely: respect for the territorial integrity of the states concerned, cessation of hostilities, disarmament and conditional reintegration of non-state armed groups, regional economic cooperation, protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, as well as the joint security mechanism (See: *Sketch 1-Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement*, below).

Data on the implementation of each task of the Washington Peace Agreement was collected by the research team of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa through: discussions with certain key stakeholders involved in the peace process in the DRC, analyses of official statements or announcements by stakeholders, and the examination of press articles and reports from local and international NGOs during the period from June 27, 2025, to June 27, 2026.



Sketch 1: Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement





The 30 specific tasks listed in the Washington Agreement include:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire, 2. Respect for the territorial integrity of each country, 3. Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR, 4. Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures (CONOPS), 5. Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR, 6. Neutralization of the FDLR, 7. Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC (i.e., disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures), 8. Evaluation of the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, 9. Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country, 10. Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups, 11. Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups, 12. Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups, 13. Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups, 14. Conditional integration of armed groups (e.g., M23) into the FARDC and PNC, 15. Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda, | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 16. Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism, 17. Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region, 18. Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, 19. Return of refugees, 20. Return of internally displaced people, 21. Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations, 22. Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces, 23. Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement, 24. Launch of the regional economic integration framework, 25. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu, 26. Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains, 27. Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects, 28. Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee, 29. Amicable settlement of disputes and 30. Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement. |
|--|---|

Among these 30 tasks, some must be implemented indiscriminately by both the Congolese and Rwandan governments. Other tasks fall under the exclusive responsibility of each government, and a few are assigned to the international community (including the United States, Qatar, the African Union's representative, and the United Nations' agencies).

Therefore, the assessment of the level of implementation of the Washington Agreement can be carried out in two ways: collectively, by considering all the signatory parties; and individually, by analyzing the degree of implementation by each party separately.



3. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: JULY 2025-JUNE 2026


As of the end of June 2026, **22 of the 30 tasks** identified in the Washington Peace Agreement had been partially or fully implemented: three (3) tasks had been fully completed, four (4) had reached an intermediate level of implementation, three (3) had achieved minimal implementation, and twelve (12) had recorded an initial stage of implementation. The remaining eight (8) tasks have not yet been implemented to date, as no concrete initiatives have been observed toward their launch.

3.1. Implementation Scorecard by Task

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	DRC and Rwanda	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	DRC	Intermediate Execution	7.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	DRC and JSCM	Intermediate Execution	7.5
6	Neutralization of FDLR	DRC	Minimal Execution	5
7	Disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures)	Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
15	Establishment of a joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda	DRC and Rwanda	Complete Execution	10
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism	DRC and Rwanda	Complete Execution	10
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	DRC, Rwanda, and MONUSCO	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	DRC, Rwanda, and HCR	Initiated Execution	2.5
20.	Return of internally displaced persons	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	DRC and UN agencies	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	AU, SADC-EAC, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Complete Execution	10
29	Amicable settlement of disputes on the Accord's implementation	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Minimal Execution	5
	Other tasks (8-14 and 27)	-----	Non-initiated Execution	0
Total				105/300



3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: July 2025-June 2026





3.3. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the DRC

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	Intermediate Execution	7.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Intermediate Execution	7.5
6	Neutralization of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	5
8	Evaluation of the FDLR neutralization des FDLR	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
14	Conditional integration of M23 into the FARDC and Police,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism (JSCM)	Complete Execution	10
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Complete Execution	10
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
20	Return of internally displaced people	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,	Non-initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,	Complete Execution	10
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Initiated Execution	2.5
Total			82.5/260

3.4. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by Rwanda

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Intermediate Execution	7.5
7	Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC	Non-initiated Execution	2.5
8	Evaluation of the withdrawal of Rwandan troops	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM)	Complete Execution	10
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Complete Execution	10
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects	Non-initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Complete Execution	10
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Initiated Execution	2.5
Total			67.5/220



3.5. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the International Community

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Intermediate Execution	7.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	Intermediate Execution	7.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Complete Execution	10
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement	Minimal Execution	5
Total			37.5/70

3.6. Overview of Tasks Partially and Fully Implemented

- **1. Prohibition of Hostile Acts/Aggression between the DRC and Rwanda (Score: 5 – Minimal Execution):** Some positive developments have been observed on the ground, particularly a reduction in hostile rhetoric between the authorities of the two States. Nevertheless, tensions persist⁵⁰ despite several diplomatic initiatives, including: the conciliatory message addressed on October 9, 2025, by the Congolese President to his Rwandan counterpart, calling for a “peace of the brave”.⁵¹ Furthermore, the disengagement of forces and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures remain unimplemented.
- **2. Respect for the Territorial Integrity of Each Country (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Official statements supporting respect for the territorial integrity of each country were made by both parties following the signing of the Washington Agreement. However, the disengagement of Rwandan forces or the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures from Congolese territory has not yet become effective.
- **3. Implementation of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR (Score: 7.5 – Intermediate Execution):** Convergence was reached between the DRC and Rwanda regarding October 1, 2025, as the launch date for operations to neutralize the FDLR, in accordance with the conclusions of the JSCM meeting of September 17, 2025.⁵² However, this timeline was unfortunately not respected. It was only at the end of March 2026 that the Congolese military authorities officially announced the beginning of the “offensive phase” of the FDLR neutralization operations.⁵³
- **4. Implementation of the Harmonized Plan for Force Disengagement/Lifting of Rwanda’s Defensive Measures (Score: 7.5 – Intermediate Execution):** The DRC and Rwanda agreed on October 1, 2025, as the launch date for operations related to the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures, in accordance with the conclusions of the JSCM meeting of September 17, 2025.⁵⁴ However, the actual force disengagement operations and lifting of defensive measures have only been initiated, without significant operational progress at this stage.
- **5. Preparation, Identification, and Localization of the FDLR (Score: 7.5 – Intermediate Execution):** The DRC and Rwanda reached convergence on the presumed areas of FDLR presence. Based on this identification, the parties not only initially set October 1, 2025, as the date for launching FDLR neutralization operations.⁵⁵ Additionally, the Congolese military authorities also announced the beginning of the “offensive phase” of these operations.⁵⁶
- **6. Neutralization of the FDLR (Score: 5 – Minimal Implementation):** On March 29, 2026, the Congolese authorities announced the launch of the “offensive phase” of operations to neutralize the FDLR operating in territories under their control, following a voluntary surrender sensitization phase reportedly carried out

⁵⁰ RFI, « RDC: reprise des combats entre le groupe AFC/M23 et l’armée, malgré la signature du cessez-le-feu ». https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250810-rdc-reprise-des-combats-entre-le-groupe-afc-m23-et-l-arm%C3%A9e-malgr%C3%A9-la-signature-du-cessez-le-feu?utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=x&utm_source=shorty&utm_slink=rfi.my%2FBuak

⁵¹ RFI, « Est de la RDC: à Bruxelles, le président congolais tend la main à son homologue rwandais pour faire «la paix». <https://www.rfi.fr/en-bref/20251009-est-de-la-rdc-%C3%A0-bruxelles-le-pr%C3%A9sident-congolais-tend-la-main-%C3%A0-son-homologue-rwandais-pour-faire-la-paix>.

⁵² RFI, « RDC et Rwanda fixent le début de la neutralisation des FDLR et de la levée des mesures «défensives» de Kigali. » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250925-rdc-et-rwanda-fixent-le-d%C3%A9but-de-la-neutralisation-des-fdlr-et-de-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-mesures-d%C3%A9fensives-de-kigali>.

⁵³ Actualité CD, *supra*, note 37.

⁵⁴ RFI, *supra*, note 52.

⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁶ Actualité CD, *supra*, note 37.



successfully as the FDLR members who surrendered were expected to be cantonized in Kisangani, according to the DRC authorities.⁵⁷ Although this initiative represents a positive step toward implementation of the Peace Agreement, the exact number of FDLR combatants who voluntarily responded to the surrender appeal, as well as the operational timeline for the offensive phase, have not been specified. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the operation, enhanced transparency is recommended to strengthen confidence in the process and ensure effective monitoring.

- **7. Force Disengagement/Lifting of Rwanda's Defensive Measures (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The Congolese and Rwandan Governments had agreed on October 1, 2025, as the date for the launch of operations for force disengagement and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures.⁵⁸ Several converging sources suggest that a limited disengagement of Rwandan elements may have occurred during the withdrawal of the AFC/M23 from certain towns and localities previously under their control, although no official statement from the Rwandan authorities has, to date, confirmed these reports. Nevertheless, no significant progress has yet been observed on the ground regarding the effective implementation of this commitment.
- **8. Assessment of the Neutralization of the FDLR and the Withdrawal of Rwandan Troops (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** This commitment has not yet been implemented, as operations related to the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops remain at a preliminary stage of execution.
- **9. Prohibition of State Support to Other Non-State Armed Groups to Attack Either Country (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** The Congolese and Rwandan Governments appear to focus primarily on the FDLR and the AFC/M23, with respect to which they have committed not to provide support for attacks against either State. However, at this stage, no concrete measures or clear operational mechanisms appear to have been established to ensure the effective implementation of this commitment regarding all other non-state armed groups active in eastern DRC.
- **10. Prevention of Hostilities by Other Non-State Armed Groups (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** The Congolese and Rwandan Governments appear to focus most of their attention on the FDLR and the AFC/M23, regarding which they have expressed a willingness to prevent attacks against either State. However, at this stage, no concrete measures or clearly defined operational mechanisms appear to have been established to prevent or contain attacks that may be carried out by other non-state armed groups active in eastern DRC.
- **11. Coordination of the Disengagement of Other Non-State Armed Groups (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** The Congolese and Rwandan governments appear to be focusing primarily on the FDLR and the AFC/M23. At this stage, no concrete measures or clearly defined operational mechanisms appear to have been established for the disengagement of other non-state armed groups active in eastern DRC.
- **12. Coordination of the Disarmament of Other Non-State Armed Groups (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** The Congolese and Rwandan governments appear to be focusing primarily on the FDLR and the AFC/M23. At this stage, no concrete measures or clearly defined operational mechanisms appear to have been established for the disarmament of other non-state armed groups operating in eastern DRC.
- **13. Coordination of the Integration of Other Non-State Armed Groups (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** At this stage, initiatives undertaken by the Congolese and Rwandan governments appear to focus mainly on the FDLR and the AFC/M23. However, no concrete framework appears to have been established yet regarding other non-state armed groups operating in eastern DRC, particularly with respect to their identification, assessment of their status, or the establishment of specific criteria governing their potential integration into the national defense and security forces.
- **14. Conditional Integration of the AFC/M23 into the FARDC and the Congolese National Police (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** Although the spokesperson of the Congolese Government, Patrick Muyaya, acknowledged in March 2026 the principle of the conditional and individualized integration of certain AFC/M23 members into the Congolese security forces,⁵⁹ no concrete or visible measures have, at this stage, been

⁵⁷Id.

⁵⁸ RFI, « RDC et Rwanda fixent le début de la neutralisation des FDLR et de la levée des mesures « défensives » de Kigali. » <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250925-rdc-et-rwanda-fixent-le-d%C3%A9but-de-la-neutralisation-des-fdlr-et-de-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-mesures-d%C3%A9fensives-de-kigali>.

⁵⁹ « Résistance de l'AFC/M23 au P-DDRCS: "les discussions de Doha ont pour objectif de mettre fin à l'existence de l'AFC/M23 dans sa forme actuelle" (Patrick Muyaya) » <https://actualite.cd/2026/03/11/resistance-de-lafcm23-au-p-ddrcs-les-discussions-de-doha-ont-pour-objectif-de-mettre-fin>



- undertaken to identify or integrate the concerned combatants. No legal framework, eligibility criteria, or clearly defined operational mechanism appears to have been established to govern this conditional integration process.
- **15. Establishment of the JSCM (Score: 10 – Complete Execution):** The JSCM is fully operational. It is composed of representatives from the DRC and Rwanda, has a clearly defined mandate, and operates under established procedures. The mechanism holds near-regular meetings and issues joint communiqués, reflecting institutional continuity in security coordination between the two States.
 - **16. Adoption of Common Operational Procedures to Ensure Transparency in JSCM Operations (Score: 10 – Complete Execution):** During the first JSCM meeting held on August 7–8, 2025, representatives of the DRC and Rwanda adopted terms of reference to guide future JSCM meetings and initiated discussions on the implementation of the Peace Agreement.⁶⁰
 - **17. Promotion of Stability, Security, and Development in the Region (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** At the conclusion of the ICGLR Summit held on 15 November in Kinshasa, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening peace, security, and development in the region. However, this political commitment has not yet been translated into the adoption or implementation of a concrete action plan or program.⁶¹
 - **18. Protection of Civilians and Respect for International Humanitarian Law (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Some limited progress has been observed, notably through strengthened efforts by MONUSCO in protecting civilians in conflict-affected areas.⁶² Nevertheless, major challenges remain. The Congolese Government and the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) have not yet succeeded in ensuring effective protection for civilian populations amid continuing violence. Several United Nations and international human rights reports document serious violations resulting in the deaths of several hundred civilians across various localities in eastern DRC.⁶³ The continuation of hostilities between the FARDC and the AFC/M23, marked by the increasing use of offensive drones, has also been highlighted in a MONUSCO report.⁶⁴
 - **19. Return of Refugees (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The tripartite framework involving the DRC, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Rwanda agreed on the principles governing the voluntary repatriation of refugees. A joint communiqué was signed on July 24, 2025, in Addis Ababa between the DRC and Rwanda.⁶⁵ With UNHCR support, more than 800 Rwandan refugees residing in the DRC have returned to their country of origin since August 2025, including more than 200 in October 2025 alone.⁶⁶
 - **20. Return of Internally Displaced Persons (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** According to IOM displacement data from April 2026, eastern DRC hosts approximately 3.59 million internally displaced persons, primarily because of the advance of the AFC/M23 towards Goma and other localities in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces in 2025 and 2026.⁶⁷ Most of these displaced people live within host communities.⁶⁸ Under the Declaration of Principles signed in Doha on 19 July 2025, representatives of the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) committed to facilitating the return of internally displaced persons to their areas

⁶⁰ Déclaration conjointe sur la réunion inaugurale du Mécanisme conjoint de coordination sécuritaire (JSCM) dans le cadre de l'accord de paix entre la RDC et le Rwanda du 7 au 8 Août 2025. <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/joint-statement-on-the-inaugural-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-jscm-meeting-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>

⁶¹ Radio Okapi, « Ouverture à Kinshasa du IX^e sommet de la CIRGL sous le signe de la paix et de la sécurité dans la région ». <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/11/16/actualite/politique/ouverture-kinshasa-du-ix-sommet-de-la-cirgl-sous-le-signe-de-la-paix>

⁶² « Déclaration à la presse faite par le Conseil de sécurité sur la situation en République démocratique du Congo », SC/16139, 7 août 2025.

<https://press.un.org/fr/2025/sc16139.doc.htm>. Voir aussi : ONU Info, « RDC : après un massacre en Ituri, la Mission de paix de l'ONU intensifie ses patrouilles ». <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2025/07/1157203>.

⁶³ UN Office in Geneva, « Ceasefire in doubt as Rwanda-backed rebels kill hundreds in eastern DR Congo ». https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/08/109293/ceasefire-doubt-rwanda-backed-rebels-kill-hundreds-eastern-dr-congo?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Voir aussi: Reuters, « Rebels armed with machetes kill at least 52 in eastern Congo ». <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rebels-armed-with-machetes-kill-at-least-52-eastern-congo-2025-08-18/>; OCHA, « RD Congo : Situation Humanitaire dans la Province du Sud-Kivu », Rapport de Situation #6, 21 juillet 2025.

⁶⁴ ONU Info, « En RDC, la situation reste très tendue malgré les efforts diplomatiques ». <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2026/03/1158622>

⁶⁵ Radio Okapi, « La RDC, le Rwanda et le HCR s'accordent sur les principes de rapatriement volontaire des réfugiés ».

<https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/07/24/actualite/securite/la-rdc-le-rwanda-et-le-hcr-saccordent-sur-les-principes-de>

⁶⁶ RFI, « RDC-Rwanda: plus de 200 réfugiés rwandais ont regagné leur pays ». <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251023-rdc-rwanda-plus-de-200-r%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9s-rwandais-ont-regagn%C3%A9-leur-pays>

⁶⁷ OIM République Démocratique du Congo : Aperçu du Déplacement Interne 2026, p.2.

https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1461/files/reports/DRC_NDO_172026_Final_FR.pdf?iframe=true

⁶⁸ IPC, « République Démocratique du Congo : Analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire aigue Janvier-Juin 2026, » p.4.

https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_DRC_Acute_Food_Insecurity_May2026_Report_French.pdf



of origin.⁶⁹ However, at this stage, no concrete reintegration mechanism or adequate infrastructure appears to have been effectively established to support this process.

- **21. Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to Vulnerable Populations (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Some progress has been recorded in humanitarian assistance. The European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid advocated establishing secure humanitarian corridors in eastern DRC and announced a €81.2 million package for the region, of which nearly €68 million is allocated to humanitarian operations in the DRC.⁷⁰ In addition, MONUSCO conducted consultations with local stakeholders on civilian protection and humanitarian coordination.⁷¹ However, the effective delivery of assistance in AFC/M23-controlled areas continues to face significant challenges, notably due to the absence of finalization and signing of the Protocol on Humanitarian Access, in line with the spirit of the Doha Framework Agreement of 15 November 2025.⁷²
- **22. Support by the DRC and Rwanda to MONUSCO and Other Multilateral Peacekeeping Forces (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Encouraging signs of cooperation have been observed between MONUSCO, the Government of the DRC, and the AFC/M23 supported by Rwanda, particularly following the adoption on 19 December 2025 by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 2808 (2025), which extended MONUSCO's mandate and strengthened certain aspects of its monitoring and ceasefire verification functions.⁷³
- **23. Support from the Regional and International Community to the Signatories of the Agreement (Score: 7.5 – intermediate Execution):** Tangible signs of support from the international community were observed during the period under review, both within the Washington and Doha processes and through African-led initiatives aimed at consolidating peace efforts. These developments reflect sustained engagement by international and regional actors in support of stability and durable peace in eastern DRC.
- **24. Launch of the Regional Economic Integration Framework based on AfCFTA, ICGLR, and EAC (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Only limited progress has been recorded at the normative level, notably with the signing on 4 December 2025 of the Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) between the DRC and Rwanda.⁷⁴ However, despite this normative advancement, no concrete implementation measures appear to have been initiated at this stage.
- **25. Launch or Expansion of Bilateral Cooperation on National Parks Management and Lake Kivu Resources (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Only limited progress has been recorded at the normative level, notably with the signing on 4 December 2025 of the REIF,⁷⁵ which places particular emphasis on bilateral cooperation in the management of national parks and Lake Kivu resources. However, despite this normative advancement, no concrete implementation measures appear to have been initiated at this stage.
- **26. Launch or Expansion of Bilateral Cooperation on Hydropower Development and De-risking of Mineral Supply Chains (Score: 2.5 – implementation initiated):** Only limited progress has been recorded at the

⁶⁹ L'Accord-Cadre de Doha pour un Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45656-doc-2025.11.15_-_SIGNED_Framework_Peace_Agreement_FR.pdf

⁷⁰ Le Monde, « L'UE débloque plus de 80 millions d'euros pour répondre à la crise humanitaire dans la région des Grands Lacs ». https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2026/02/18/l-ue-debloque-plus-de-80-millions-d-euros-pour-repondre-a-la-crise-humanitaire-dans-la-region-des-grands-lacs_6667233_3212.html

⁷¹ Actualité CD, « RDC : la cheffe par intérim de la MONUSCO se rend à Goma pour préparer la vérification du cessez-le-feu ». https://actualite.cd/2026/02/12/rdc-la-cheffe-par-interim-de-la-monusco-se-rend-goma-pour-preparer-la-verification-du-google_vignette

⁷² Selon l'Accord-Cadre de Doha du 15 novembre 2025 pour un Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23, l'Accord de Paix Global devait comprendre huit Protocoles. Deux d'entre eux avaient déjà été signés : le Protocole sur le Mécanisme de libération des détenus (14 septembre 2025) et le Protocole sur le Mécanisme de surveillance et de vérification du cessez-le-feu (14 octobre 2025).

Les six Protocoles restants devaient encore être négociés par les parties, couvrant les domaines suivants : Accès humanitaire et protection judiciaire ; Rétablissement de l'autorité de l'État, réformes et gouvernance participative nationale ; Dispositions intérimaires en matière de sécurité, désarmement, démobilisation et réintégration (DDR) des groupes armés locaux, et neutralisation des groupes armés étrangers ; Identité et citoyenneté, retour et réinstallation des personnes déplacées internes et des réfugiés ; Relance économique et sociale ; et Justice, vérité et réconciliation.

Voir : Accord-Cadre de Doha du 15 novembre 2025. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45656-doc-2025.11.15_-_SIGNED_Framework_Peace_Agreement_FR.pdf#:~:text=Le%20Gouvernement%20s%27engage%20%C3%A0%20adopter,pour%20la%20mise%20en%20%C5%93

[uvre](https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45656-doc-2025.11.15_-_SIGNED_Framework_Peace_Agreement_FR.pdf#:~:text=Le%20Gouvernement%20s%27engage%20%C3%A0%20adopter,pour%20la%20mise%20en%20%C5%93)

⁷³ Conseil de Sécurité des Nations, Résolution 2808 (2025) adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité à sa 10075^e Séance, le 19 décembre 2025. Voir aussi : United Nations, « Security Council Renews DR Congo Peacekeeping Mission amid Renewed M23 Offensives in the East ». <https://www.un.org/en/news-media/news/2025/12/19/2808-security-council-renews-dr-congo-peacekeeping-mission-amid-renewed>

⁷⁴ US State Department, "Regional Economic Integration Framework Between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda". https://www.state.gov/regional-economic-integration-framework-between-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-government-of-the-republic-of-rwanda/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery

⁷⁵ Id.



normative level, notably with the signing on 4 December 2025 of the REIF,⁷⁶ which places particular emphasis on hydropower development and the de-risking of mineral supply chains. However, despite this normative advancement, no concrete implementation measures appear to have been initiated at this stage.

- **27. Economic Monitoring and Anti-Corruption in Mineral Supply Chains and Infrastructure Projects (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** No concrete mechanism for economic monitoring or anti-corruption appears to have been established at this stage. Overall, there is little evidence of a clear institutional commitment to strengthening transparency, traceability, and accountability in these strategic sectors.
- **28. Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee (JOC) (Score: 10 – Complete Execution):** The JOC was officially announced and its members appointed. Its inaugural meeting took place on 31 July 2025, with representatives from the DRC, Rwanda, the AU, the United States, and Qatar in attendance.⁷⁷
- **29. Amicable Settlement of Disputes (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Encouraging progress has been recorded in the amicable settlement of disputes. Representatives of the Congolese and Rwandan governments are reported to have referred their divergences to the JOC regarding the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures.
- **30. Monitoring of the Effective Implementation of the Agreement by the Joint Oversight Committee (Score: 5 – Minimal Execution):** Following its inaugural meeting on 31 July 2025, the JOC has continued to meet regularly to monitor implementation of the peace agreement. However, no public report has been issued to date regarding violations of the Agreement or any corrective measures adopted in response.

⁷⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁷ US State Department, «Joint Statement on the Inaugural Joint Oversight Committee Meeting for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda». <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/joint-statement-on-the-inaugural-joint-oversight-committee-meeting-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>



4. QUANTITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

4.1. Assessment of the Overall Implementation Rate

The combined analysis of the data presented in Table (3.1) and the monitoring Graph (3.2) by task indicates that several commitments have recorded limited progress. Specifically, out of the **30 tasks** set out under the Washington Peace Agreement, **22** have begun implementation (at an initial, minimal, or intermediate level), representing **73.3%** of the total tasks. Considering **all 30 tasks**, the cumulative implementation score reaches **105 points out of 300** (maximum score if all tasks were fully implemented), corresponding to **an overall implementation rate of 35%**.

Regarding security-related commitments concerning the dismantling of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, implementation remains particularly limited. The execution of FDLR neutralization operations scores only 5 out of 10, while the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures scores even lower at 2.5 out of 10.

As for humanitarian commitments (notably the protection of civilians, assistance to vulnerable populations, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees), implementation remains extremely weak, with each task maintaining a score of 2.5 out of 10.

Conversely, only certain institutional commitments, in particular the establishment of the JOC and the JSCM, have reached full implementation.

4.2. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the DRC

The analysis of the implementation table for commitments attributable to the DRC (3.3 above) indicates that out of the **26 tasks** assigned to the DRC under the Agreement, **only 18** have reached varying levels of implementation (initial, minimal, intermediate or complete), resulting in an **overall implementation rate of 31.7% (82.5 points out of 260)**.

4.3. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by Rwanda

The analysis of the implementation table for commitments attributable to Rwanda (3.4 above) shows that out of the **22 tasks** assigned to Rwanda under the Agreement, **only 15** have reached varying levels of implementation (initial, minimal, intermediate or complete), corresponding to an **overall implementation rate of 30.6% (67.5 points out of 220)**.

4.4. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the International Community


The analysis of the implementation table for commitments attributed to the International Community, including the United States, Qatar, the AU representative, and United Nations agencies (3.5 above), shows that **all 7 tasks** assigned to international actors under the Agreement have been partially implemented, corresponding to an **overall implementation rate of 53.5% (37.5 points out of 70)**.

4.5. Comparative Assessment of Implementation Progress: July 2025 – June 2026

The comparative chart below presents the evolution of the implementation status of the tasks envisaged under the Agreement and identifies the key phases that characterized its implementation during the first year after its signing.



Comparative Chart on the Progress of Implementation: July 2025 to June 2026



The analysis of implementation trends makes it possible to identify five distinct phases:

- Start-up Phase (July–August 2025):** The first two months following the signing of the Agreement were characterized by a cautious and gradual implementation process. By the end of July 2025, the overall implementation rate stood at approximately 9% (27.5 points out of 300), while only 26.6% of the tasks envisaged under the Agreement (8 out of 30 tasks) had been initiated. By the end of August 2025, the overall implementation rate had increased to 19% (57.5 points out of 300), while the proportion of tasks that had entered implementation rose to 46.6% (14 out of 30 tasks). Progress during this period was primarily reflected in the establishment of joint monitoring mechanisms, notably the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) and the Joint Oversight Committee (JOC), as well as the mobilization of regional and international partners. However, the absence of a binding operational timetable and the limitations of the security coordination framework quickly exposed the process's initial vulnerabilities.
- Moderate Progression Phase (September–November 2025):** This period was marked by a gradual expansion in the number of commitments under implementation. The overall implementation rate increased to approximately 21.6% (65 points out of 300) by the end of October 2025 and reached 23.3% (70 points out of 300) by the end of November 2025. At the same time, the number of initiated tasks rose to 17 out of 30 (56.6%) by the end of October and to 19 out of 30 (63.3%) by the end of November. Notable developments included progress achieved within the framework of the Doha Process and the adoption of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+). Nevertheless, the Agreement's most sensitive commitments—particularly the neutralization of the FDLR, the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures, and the protection of civilians—remained largely stalled despite the adoption of a joint timetable providing for the launch of operations as early as 1 October 2025.
- Prolonged Stagnation Phase (December 2025–February 2026):** During this three-month period, the main implementation indicators remained virtually unchanged. The number of initiated tasks remained stable at 19 out of 30, while the overall implementation rate remained fixed at 23.3%. No significant progress was recorded by any of the principal stakeholders. This stagnation, however, contrasted with several important political and normative developments, notably the formal endorsement of the



Washington Peace Agreement by the Presidents of the DRC and Rwanda on 4 December 2025, as well as the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2808 (2025) on 19 December 2025. However, just days after this endorsement, new offensives by the AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) in eastern DRC resulted in the capture of several localities, including the city of Uvira, illustrating persistent security fragilities and the challenges of consolidating diplomatic gains on the ground.

- **Moderate Recovery Phase (March–April 2026):** A more favorable trend emerged beginning in late March 2026. The overall implementation rate improved to approximately 27.5% (82.5 points out of 300). Simultaneously, the proportion of tasks that had entered implementation increased to 70% (21 out of 30 tasks). This recovery was primarily driven by the launch, on 29 March 2026, of the offensive phase of FDLR neutralization operations by the Congolese authorities, the reintegration in Rwanda of several hundred former FDLR combatants, and the withdrawal of the AFC/M23 from certain localities in eastern DRC. This period was also marked by intensified diplomatic engagement, including the DRC–Rwanda–United States trilateral consultations held on 17 and 18 March 2026 and the imposition of targeted sanctions by the United States against several individuals accused of undermining the peace process.
- **Phase of Progressive Consolidation of Gains (May–June 2026):** The months of May and June 2026 confirmed the recovery momentum that had begun in the preceding period. The overall implementation rate increased further to approximately 35% (105 points out of 300), while the proportion of tasks that had entered implementation reached 73.3% (22 out of 30 tasks). This progress was primarily attributable to developments within the Doha Process, particularly following the Montreux consultations held in mid-April 2026 between representatives of the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23, facilitated by Qatar, the United States, and the African Union, with Switzerland serving as host country. Other assessment meetings held at the end of May 2026 helped bring the parties' positions closer on several sensitive issues and advance discussions on the Protocol on humanitarian access and judicial protection.

This gradual evolution underscores the importance, for mediation actors and relevant partners, of sustaining efforts to consolidate the progress achieved, which remains fragile at the end of the first year of the Agreement's implementation.



5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

The annual assessment of the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement for the period from 27 June 2025 to 27 June 2026 highlights real, though still limited, progress in consolidating peace between the DRC and Rwanda. Despite a gradual improvement observed since late March 2026, the overall level of implementation remains modest, and the gains achieved are still fragile.

Encouraging developments include the continued functioning of joint monitoring mechanisms, the adoption of instruments to strengthen ceasefire verification, the establishment of the African Union's new mediation architecture, and progress achieved under the Doha process.

However, several critical commitments essential to the durable stabilization of eastern DRC remain insufficiently implemented, including the effective neutralization of the FDLR, the disengagement of forces and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, the consolidation of the ceasefire between the FARDC and the AFC/M23, the full operationalization of the EJVM+, and improved humanitarian access.

In this regard, the following specific recommendations are formulated:

5.1. Recommendations to the Government of the DRC:

- Accelerate and structure the FDLR neutralization operations by publishing an indicative timetable, accompanied by periodic information on the number of FDLR members who have voluntarily laid down their arms or been militarily neutralized, to enhance the transparency and credibility of the process;
- Ensure that operations aimed at neutralizing the FDLR are conducted in compliance with international humanitarian law, while facilitating humanitarian access to affected populations in the concerned areas;
- Jointly define and adopt, together with the Rwandan authorities, clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria for assessing the success of the "offensive phase" of the FDLR neutralization process. This aims to prevent one party from claiming full performance of the obligation while the other contests its effective implementation;
- Strengthen civilian protection mechanisms, particularly in response to the growing use of offensive drones and documented human rights violations;
- Define, in coordination with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the practical and security arrangements relating to the reception of thousands of FARDC soldiers detained by the AFC/M23, as well as the release of AFC/M23 combatants whose possible liberation has been announced;
- Activate the operationalization of the EJVM+;
- Continue negotiations within the Doha process with increased commitment toward concluding and implementing the six remaining protocols, while giving priority attention to the protocol on humanitarian access; and
- Foster an environment conducive to inclusive political dialogue within the framework of consultations supported by the AU.

5.2. Recommendations to the Government of Rwanda:

- Continue de-escalation measures and use its influence to encourage the AFC/M23 to cooperate in the operationalization of the EJVM+ fully;
- Clarify, in a spirit of transparency and mutual confidence, the modalities governing the withdrawal of armed elements and Rwandan defensive measures;
- Maintain reintegration programs for former FDLR combatants and strengthen the security and/or judicial guarantees offered to FDLR members still present in the DRC but reluctant to surrender, to encourage their disarmament and facilitate their voluntary repatriation to Rwanda;
- Jointly define and adopt, together with the Congolese authorities, clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria for assessing the success of the "offensive phase" of the FDLR neutralization process; and



- Use its influence over the AFC/M23 to facilitate safe, rapid, and unhindered humanitarian access for vulnerable populations, including by supporting the reopening of Goma Airport.

5.3. Recommendations to the United States:

- *Maintain and strengthen coordinated diplomatic and political pressure on both parties to ensure compliance with agreed commitments and timelines, particularly about the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures;*
- *Support efforts aimed at strengthening transparency in the implementation of FDLR neutralization operations and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures;*
- *Continue considering, as a measure of last resort, the adoption of targeted coercive measures against actors identified as deliberately obstructing the implementation of the Agreement;*
- *Ensure that MONUSCO receives the necessary financial resources, as well as adequate technical and logistical support, to carry out its newly strengthened mandate effectively;*
- *Further support humanitarian initiatives and community stabilization programs in conflict-affected areas;*
- *Encourage stronger coordination between the Washington and Doha processes to avoid overlapping and diplomatic inconsistencies; and*
- *Use its diplomatic influence to encourage an inclusive, constructive, and consensus-based political dialogue among Congolese political stakeholders regarding any major institutional or legislative reform that may affect the climate of trust, national cohesion, and the political environment necessary for the effective implementation of the Washington and Doha peace processes, while fully respecting the sovereignty of the DRC.*

5.4. Recommendations to the JOC and the JSCM:

- *Continue holding monthly meetings and publish reports providing a more comprehensive and detailed account of observed violations, delays, and envisaged corrective measures; and*
- *Support the parties in defining and adopting clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria to objectively and credibly assess the success of the "offensive phase" of the FDLR neutralization process.*

5.5. Recommendations to Qatar and Switzerland:

- *Intensify facilitation efforts within the framework of the Doha process to accelerate the conclusion of the six protocols still under negotiation between the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23, while giving priority attention to the protocol on humanitarian access;*
- *Encourage the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23 to effectively implement the protocols already concluded, particularly those relating to the release of detainees and the operationalization of the EJVM+;*
- *Strengthen diplomatic coordination with the African Union, the United States, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and other partners involved in the peace processes; and*
- *Examine, in consultation with the relevant parties, the modalities for adopting a Voluntary Subsequent Accession Protocol that would allow certain Congolese armed groups not directly covered by the Doha process to subscribe to selected provisions of the future Comprehensive Peace Agreement, particularly those relating to the ceasefire, civilian protection, humanitarian access, and monitoring, verification, and reporting mechanisms, without prejudice to the special status or prerogatives of the signatory parties. Such an approach could facilitate the gradual extension of the peace process gains to other armed actors operating in eastern DRC, contribute to reducing residual violence, strengthen the effectiveness of the EJVM+, and prevent the emergence of destabilizing factors likely to undermine the implementation of the peace agreements. It would also help limit the need for future separate negotiation frameworks with these armed groups. To this end, a draft Subsequent Accession Protocol is attached as an annex to this report.*



5.6. Recommendations to the African Union and the AU Mediator:

- *Strengthen strategic preparedness and demonstrate greater proactivity in responding to setbacks, bottlenecks, and delays encountered in implementing peace commitments. In this regard, the African Union would also benefit from improving its communication, not only with the parties to the conflict but also with affected populations and regional public opinion, to reinforce transparency and confidence in its mediation efforts. In this perspective, it would be particularly appropriate to publish the Mediation Framework document developed based on the assessment and analysis of peace process dynamics resulting from the regional tour conducted in January and February 2026 by the AU Mediator and the Panel of Facilitators;*
- *Communicate regularly and transparently on the consultations conducted in preparation for an inter-Congolese dialogue, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to Angolan President João Lourenço by the AU Mediator;*
- *Support the Government of the DRC, opposition groups, and civil society actors in a constructive and consensus-oriented approach. Such support should facilitate the convening of an inclusive inter-Congolese dialogue, particularly on any major institutional or legislative reforms, to preserve the trust and national cohesion necessary for the effective implementation of the Washington and Doha peace processes;*
- *Hold more frequent meetings between the AU Mediator, the Panel of Facilitators, and the principal partners involved in the peace processes, at intervals shorter than the current semi-annual cycle, to strengthen strategic oversight, assess African initiatives promptly, and facilitate the prompt adoption of corrective measures in response to emerging challenges in eastern DRC; and*
- *Anticipate and secure the continuity of funding for peace-related activities, particularly mediation, deployment, and political support, by establishing a sustainable Peace Fund mobilization mechanism to prevent any interruption of resources likely to hinder the continuation of mediation operations.*

5.7. Recommendations to MONUSCO and ICGLR:

- *Accelerate the full operationalization of the EJVM+ to enable the effective deployment of monitoring, verification, and reporting missions;*
- *Strengthen the technical, logistical, and analytical capacities of verification teams;*
- *Intensify civilian protection efforts in areas most affected by hostilities;*
- *Continue documenting and impartially reporting violations of the ceasefire and international humanitarian law; and*
- *Facilitate, in coordination with national authorities and humanitarian partners, humanitarian access and medical evacuation operations.*



ANNEX

PROPOSAL

Protocol on the Subsequent and Voluntary Accession of Certain Congolese Armed Groups to the Security, Humanitarian, and Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Provisions of the Future Comprehensive Peace Agreement Emerging from the Doha Process

Background

The crisis in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has prompted several successive diplomatic initiatives aimed at restoring peace and stability in the region. The Luanda Process (2022–2025), conducted under the Mediation of the Angolan President João Lourenço on behalf of the African Union, was primarily dedicated to managing the crisis between the DRC and Rwanda. It was subsequently succeeded by the Washington Process (2025–present), which culminated in the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement of 27 June 2025 between the two States.

In parallel, the Nairobi Process (2022–2025), launched under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) following the resurgence of the M23, sought to address the issue of all Congolese armed groups operating in eastern DRC (including the M23) through dialogue and demobilization. This framework was subsequently replaced by the Doha Process (2025–present), conducted under the Mediation of the State of Qatar, whose current objective is to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict between the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23.

Due to differences between the Parties to the Doha talks regarding the adoption of a single comprehensive settlement instrument, the Parties signed a Framework Agreement on 15 November 2025, establishing a roadmap leading to the conclusion of a future Comprehensive Peace Agreement arising from the Doha Process. This Framework Agreement provides for the adoption of eight separate protocols. To date, two protocols have been signed: the Protocol on the Mechanism for the Release of Detainees (September 14, 2025) and the Protocol on the Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (October 14, 2025). The remaining six protocols are still under negotiation and concern, inter alia, humanitarian access and judicial protection; governance and the restoration of State authority; security arrangements and DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration); identity and citizenship as well as the return of internally displaced persons and refugees; economic and social recovery; and justice, truth, and reconciliation.

However, the Doha Process directly concerns only the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23. Several local armed groups continue to operate in certain areas of North Kivu and South Kivu without being covered by the ceasefire and verification arrangements established under this framework. Although their capacity to cause harm is generally lower than that of the AFC/M23, their activities continue to threaten civilian security and generate incidents that may undermine stability on the ground. This situation limits the overall effectiveness of the ceasefire and verification mechanisms, particularly the Enhanced Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), and could ultimately necessitate the opening of new negotiation frameworks with such local armed groups.

To prevent such a development and strengthen the inclusiveness of the peace process, it appears appropriate for the Mediation of the Doha Process, in consultation with the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23, to consider adopting a Protocol on Subsequent and Voluntary Accession enabling certain Congolese armed groups to subscribe to specific provisions of the future Comprehensive Peace Agreement emerging from the Doha Process, particularly those relating to the ceasefire, protection of civilians, humanitarian access, and monitoring, verification, and reporting mechanisms. Such an approach would make it possible to progressively extend the gains of the peace process to other armed actors without affecting the special status or prerogatives of the signatory Parties.

It is within this context that the present proposal for a “Protocol on the Subsequent and Voluntary Accession of Certain Congolese Armed Groups to the Security, Humanitarian, and Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Provisions of the Future Comprehensive Peace Agreement Emerging from the Doha Process” has been developed, with a view to facilitating the gradual extension of the peace process gains to other armed actors willing to renounce violence and contribute to the sustainable stabilization of eastern DRC.



Preamble

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“the Government”), on the one hand, and the Alliance Fleuve Congo/23 March Movement (“AFC/M23”), on the other hand, in their capacity as the “Parties” to the Doha Peace Process;

Recalling United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2773 (2025) and 2808 (2026), which emphasize that the continued activities of domestic armed groups in eastern the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) remain a threat to peace, security, and stability in the region, and which call for the implementation of appropriate measures to address the issue of such armed groups on a lasting basis;

Considering that the sustainable stabilization of eastern DRC requires a gradual reduction of armed violence in all its forms; Recognizing that several domestic armed groups operating within the national territory are not direct parties to the Doha Process;

Reaffirming their commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of the DRC; Emphasizing the need to promote the protection of civilians, humanitarian access, respect for international humanitarian law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes;

Convinced that the gradual extension of certain provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement emerging from the Doha Process to other domestic armed groups may contribute to strengthening stability and preventing the resurgence of violence;

The Parties hereby agree as follows:

Article 1: Purpose

The Parties agree on the modalities under which certain Congolese armed groups that are not parties to the Doha Process may voluntarily accede to the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement relating to:

- the ceasefire;
- the protection of civilians;
- humanitarian access;
- monitoring, verification, and reporting mechanisms; and
- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (“DDR”).

Such accession shall not alter the nature or scope of the commitments undertaken by the Principal Parties.

Article 2: Guiding Principles

The Agreement shall remain open to the voluntary accession of domestic armed groups. Such accession shall be based on the following principles:

- a. voluntary participation;
- b. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC;
- c. protection of civilian populations;
- d. peaceful settlement of disputes;
- e. responsibility and accountability;
- f. gradual progression toward demobilization; and
- g. good-faith implementation of commitments.

Article 3: Eligibility Criteria

Any domestic armed group may apply for accession, provided that it:

- a. possesses an identifiable chain of command;
- b. exercises effective control over its members;
- c. accepts the provisions of this Protocol;
- d. undertakes to respect international humanitarian law and human rights; and
- e. publicly renounces attacks against civilians.

Article 4: Status of “Acceding Group”

Admission shall confer the status of Acceding Group exclusively.

An Acceding Group:

- a. shall not acquire the status of Principal Party;
- b. shall not participate in the political negotiations of the Doha Process;
- c. shall not participate in decision-making bodies established under the Agreement;
- d. may participate in the technical and consultative mechanisms established under this Protocol; and



- e. may benefit from the support measures provided for under Articles 10 and 11.

The status of **Principal Party** shall remain exclusively reserved for the original signatories of the Agreement.

Article 5: Accession Procedure

The applicant group shall:

- a. submit a written request to the Mediation;
- b. sign the Instrument of Accession;
- c. provide information concerning its organizational structure; and
- d. designate focal points.

Following consultation with the Principal Parties, the Mediation structures, and the Enhanced Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+) responsible for ceasefire monitoring and verification, the Mediator shall decide on the admission of the applicant group.

Article 6: Gradual Implementation

a. Level I: Applicant Group

- declaration of cessation of hostilities;
- designation of focal points; and
- commitment to the principles of this Protocol.

b. Level II: Acceding Group

- compliance with the ceasefire;
- cooperation with verification mechanisms; and
- participation in notification mechanisms.

c. Level III: Transitional Group

- cantonment;
- progressive disarmament; and
- participation in DDR.

Article 7: Consultative Participation

Acceding Groups may:

- a. designate liaison officers;
- b. participate in technical meetings concerning local security issues;
- c. submit observations or reports regarding incidents; and
- d. be consulted on matters directly related to the implementation of this Protocol.

Such participation shall be strictly consultative and shall not confer any voting rights.

Article 8: Security Guarantees

Subject to compliance with the ceasefire:

- a. Acceding Groups shall benefit from the guarantees provided under the ceasefire arrangements;
- b. incidents involving Acceding Groups shall receive priority consideration by the verification mechanisms; and
- c. any allegation of violation shall be examined impartially.

Article 9: Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access

Acceding Groups undertake to:

- a. protect civilian populations;
- b. facilitate humanitarian access;
- c. refrain from using civilian infrastructure for military purposes; and
- d. respect international humanitarian law.

Article 10: Disarmament and Reintegration

Within a timeframe agreed upon with the competent mechanisms, each Acceding Group shall submit an indicative roadmap for:

- disarmament;
- demobilization; and
- reintegration.

Article 11: Support Measures

Acceding Groups that comply with their commitments may benefit from:

- a. DDR programs;
- b. community reintegration projects;



- c. training programs;
- d. local stabilization initiatives; and
- e. community development programs.

Article 12: Community Dialogue

Acceding Groups are encouraged to participate in:

- reconciliation mechanisms;
- social cohesion initiatives; and
- local dialogue frameworks.

Article 13: Monitoring and Verification

The EJV+M, together with other competent mechanisms established under the Doha Process, shall be responsible for:

- a. monitoring compliance;
- b. receiving notifications;
- c. verifying incidents; and
- d. formulating recommendations.

Article 14: Settlement of Disputes

Acceding Groups undertake to submit any dispute relating to the implementation of this Protocol to the competent technical mechanisms. Failing resolution through such mechanisms, the matter shall be referred to the Mediation of the Doha Peace Process.

Article 15: Suspension or Withdrawal of Status

The status of the Acceding Group may be suspended or withdrawn in the event of:

- a. repeated violations of the ceasefire;
- b. attacks against civilians;
- c. refusal to cooperate with verification mechanisms; or
- d. serious violation of this Protocol.

Any such decision shall be taken following notification and after the concerned Acceding Group has been given an opportunity to present its observations.

Withdrawal of Acceding Group status shall result in the loss of all rights, benefits, and participation mechanisms provided for under this Protocol. The group concerned shall thereafter remain subject to the measures provided for under applicable national law and the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2808 (2026) relating to operations aimed at the disarmament of armed groups and local militias.

Article 16: Final Provisions

This Protocol shall constitute a supplementary instrument to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement emerging from the Doha Process.

Its purpose is to facilitate the gradual expansion of the ceasefire, strengthen the effectiveness of verification mechanisms, reduce the risk of a resurgence of violence, and promote the sustainable stabilization of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Done at _____, on _____.