



## REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WASHINGTON PEACE AGREEMENT: JUNE 27 – AUGUST 27, 2025

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**Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa**

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# Washington Peace Agreement Implementation Assessment Report

August 2025



*This report presents the assessment of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, conducted by a group of independent experts, on the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, signed on June 27, 2025, for the period from the end of June to the end of August 2025.*

*The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is an independent platform dedicated to monitoring, evaluating, and promoting the effective implementation of peace agreements in Africa, starting with the Washington Peace Agreement. Established in August 2025, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is based on the observation that many peace agreements in Africa have failed, not because of their content, but because of a lack of rigorous monitoring of their implementation. In the absence of an objective mechanism to measure compliance with commitments, each party remains free to assert its own compliance with the Agreement or to accuse the other of violating it. Far from replacing the official mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement established by the Agreement itself, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa provides reliable, up-to-date, and factual data on the progress of the peace commitments made by the parties.*

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*Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool (PAIMT), designed and adapted by one of its experts (Dr. Roger-Claude Liwanga, drawing on his previous experience with The Carter Center evaluating peace agreements in Africa), and inspired by a methodology similar to that of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.*



## ACRONYMS

AFC-M23	Congo River Alliance – March 23 Movement
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
CONOPS	Concept of Operations of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda
EAC	East African Community
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
JOC	Joint Oversight Committee
JSCM	Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo
PAIMT	Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda
SADC	Southern African Development Community
AU	African Union
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	1
2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK .....	3
3. IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS: FROM END OF JUNE TO END OF AUGUST .....	6
3.1. Implementation Table by Task .....	6
3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: August 2025.....	7
3.3. Overview of Partially Implemented Tasks .....	8
4. OBSERVATIONS.....	11
4.1. Interpretation of Quantitative Results.....	11
4.2. Progress Made .....	12
4.3. Delays and Obstacles .....	12
4.4. Causes of Delays .....	13
5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS .....	14
5.1. Recommendations to the DRC Government .....	14
5.2. Recommendations to the Rwanda Government .....	14
5.3. Recommendations to the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda .....	14
5.4. Recommendations to the United States.....	14
5.5. Recommendations to Qatar .....	15
5.6. Recommendations to the African Union Mediators .....	15

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## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The signing of the Washington Peace Agreement on June 27, 2025, between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda has raised new hopes for stability in the Great Lakes region in general and in the East of the DRC in particular, which has been marked for decades by recurring tensions, armed conflicts, and a persistent humanitarian crisis. This Agreement, which notably incorporates the CONOPS (Concept of Operations for the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and the Disengagement of Forces or the Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda) adopted in October 2024, represents an ambitious framework aimed at defusing the root causes of instability in eastern DRC through the neutralization of national and foreign armed groups, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the improvement of bilateral security cooperation, and regional economic integration.

**Two months after the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, implementation results are poor. Of the 30 tasks outlined in the Agreement, only 14 (46.6%) have been partially implemented, resulting in an overall implementation rate of 19.1% (57.5 points out of a maximum of 300). If we consider only the 14 partially implemented tasks, their cumulative implementation score corresponds to 57.5 points out of 140, representing a completion rate of 41%.**

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa nevertheless notes significant progress at the institutional and diplomatic levels during the period from the end of June to the end of August 2025: the reduction in belligerent rhetoric, the formal commitment to the cessation of hostilities, the holding of the first meetings of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) and the Joint Oversight Committee (JOC), as well as the signing of the Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework. However, this progress contrasts with the inertia observed on the most urgent security commitments that were supposed to be carried out during the same period, in particular: the location, identification and neutralization of the FDLR; the harmonization of the disengagement plan and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures from Congolese territory; as well as the protection of civilian populations.

Faced with these blockages, which can be partly explained by the late establishment of the JSCM and the JOC, differences of interpretation between the parties on the modalities of implementing specific tasks, and evolving security realities on the ground, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa recommends targeted actions to be undertaken by each of the stakeholders:

- To the Congolese Government: appoint a representative to serve as co-chair of the JSCM to ensure the equal and effective functioning of the mechanism (alongside the Rwandan representative); designate representatives to the JSCM secretariat; develop an updated plan for the neutralization of the FDLR, taking into account changes on the ground, including the occupation by the AFC-M23 of regions previously under government control; implement a plan for the protection of civilians in conflict zones; and accelerate discussions for the successful conclusion of the Doha peace process, an essential requirement for the conditional integration of the AFC-M23 into the army and national police as agreed in the Washington Peace Agreement;



- To the Rwandan Government: designate representatives to the JSCM secretariat; officially announce a plan to withdraw its troops from the DRC in accordance with a mutually agreed timetable, regardless of the pace of neutralization of the FDLR; put pressure on the AFC-M23 to increase the protection of civilian populations in territories under their occupation; and use its influence on the AFC-M23 to encourage the constructive resumption of discussions within the framework of the Doha process, with a view to an effective and lasting ceasefire with the DRC government, an absolute necessity for the full and coherent implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement;
- To the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda (JSCM): increase the frequency of meetings at shorter intervals (beyond the monthly rate provided for in the Agreement) to facilitate faster review and effective decision-making on priority tasks whose execution has been delayed by the late establishment of the JSCM;
- To the United States: officially clarify its position on the simultaneity, or not, of the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the neutralization of the FDLR, based on the text provisions of the Agreement to dispel any ambiguity; increase diplomatic pressure on the DRC and Rwanda for the implementation of key security measures (neutralization of the FDLR, withdrawal of Rwandan troops, and a lasting ceasefire by the parties and their proxies); demand a binding and verifiable timetable for critical security commitments, with monthly monitoring of their execution; provide technical and logistical support to the functioning of the JSCM and the JOC; support MONUSCO in its civilian protection missions by advocating at the UN Security Council for the provisional -reinforcement of its resources; and encourage the completion of the Doha process while ensuring its strategic alignment with the Washington Peace Agreement;
- To Qatar: facilitate convergence between the Doha and Washington processes by aligning the AFC-M23/DRC discussions with the DRC/Rwanda obligations; and officially make public the content of the Draft Peace Agreement submitted on August 18, 2025, to representatives of the DRC government and the AFC-M23, to promote a transparent debate and avoid any manipulation of its actual content;
- To the African Union Mediator: ensure harmonization of the Washington and Doha processes by establishing a continental coordination and monitoring mechanism to guarantee strategic coherence and operational complementarity ; advocate for the allocation of autonomous funding to the continental monitoring mechanism, independent of contributions from international partners; and strengthen regional ownership of the peace process by initiating awareness-raising activities and facilitating the involvement of regional civil society to foster the legitimacy and sustainability of the efforts undertaken.



## 2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the PAIMT (Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool), which is based on a coding methodology, to assess the degree of implementation of each of the tasks of a peace agreement on a scale of 0 to 10 points:

- **0 point** signifies an Uninitiated Execution ( $E_0$ ): This represents the status quo. The parties have not taken any action or any observable measures to begin the implementation of the task.
- **2.5 points** means an Initiated Execution ( $E_i$ ): This represents some observable measures of the beginning of the execution of the task, meaning that the parties have established a date of the execution of the task or are having formal or informal discussions on the execution of the task concerned.
- **5 points** signifies Minimal Execution ( $E_m$ ): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the execution of the task, but these efforts are not enough for the task concerned to be completed by the end of the established deadline given the current pace of the process.
- **7.5 points** implies an Intermediate Execution ( $E_I$ ): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the execution of the task, and there is a likelihood that the task can be completed by the end of the established deadline if the current pace continues.
- **10 points** implies a Complete Execution ( $E_c$ ): This represents the situation where the task is nearly executed or fully executed given how the task is specified in the Peace Agreement.


In short, there are five levels of implementation:  $E_0$  (0 point),  $E_i$  (2.5 points),  $E_m$  (5 points),  $E_I$  (7.5 points) and  $E_c$  (10 points).

Based on the PAIMT, the Washington Peace Agreement is structured around 30 specific tasks, covering the fundamental pillars namely: respect for the territorial integrity of the states concerned, cessation of hostilities, disarmament and conditional reintegration of non-state armed groups, regional economic cooperation, protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, as well as the joint security mechanism (See: *Sketch 1-Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement*, below).

Data on the implementation of each task of the Washington Peace Agreement was collected by the research team of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa through: discussions with certain key stakeholders involved in the peace process in the DRC, analyses of official statements or announcements by stakeholders, and the examination of press articles and reports from local and international NGOs during the period from the end of June to August 2025.



## Sketch 1: Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement







The 30 specific tasks listed in the Washington Agreement include:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire,</li><li>2. Respect for the territorial integrity of each country,</li><li>3. Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR,</li><li>4. Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures (CONOPS),</li><li>5. Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR,</li><li>6. Neutralization of the FDLR,</li><li>7. Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC (i.e., disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures),</li><li>8. Evaluation of the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops,</li><li>9. Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,</li><li>10. Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,</li><li>11. Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,</li><li>12. Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,</li><li>13. Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,</li><li>14. Conditional integration of armed groups (e.g., M23) into the FARDC and PNC,</li><li>15. Implementation: Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda,</li></ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>16. Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism,</li><li>17. Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region,</li><li>18. Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law,</li><li>19. Return of refugees,</li><li>20. Return of internally displaced people,</li><li>21. Provision of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations,</li><li>22. Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,</li><li>23. Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement,</li><li>24. Launch of the regional economic integration framework,</li><li>25. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu,</li><li>26. Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,</li><li>27. Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,</li><li>28. Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,</li><li>29. Amicable settlement of disputes and</li><li>30. Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.</li></ol> |
|--|--|

Among these 30 tasks, some must be implemented indiscriminately by both the Congolese and Rwandan governments, such as the prohibition of hostile or aggressive acts and respect for the territorial integrity of each country. Other tasks fall under the exclusive responsibility of the Congolese government, such as the conditional integration of the M23 into the national army and police, or the Rwandan government, including the disengagement of Rwandan forces and the lifting of its defensive measures from the DRC territory. Finally, a few other tasks are assigned to mediators, international partners, or other third parties.

Therefore, the assessment of the level of implementation of the Washington Agreement can be carried out in two ways: collectively, by considering all the signatory parties; and individually, by analyzing the degree of implementation by each party separately.



## 3. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: FROM END OF JUNE TO END OF AUGUST


As of August 31, 2025, **only 14 of the 30 tasks** identified in the Washington Agreement have been partially implemented: four (4) tasks have undergone intermediate implementation, one (1) has undergone minimal implementation, and nine (9) have begun implementation. The other 16 tasks remain unimplemented to date, with no concrete initiatives to initiate them.

### 3.1. Implementation Scorecard by Task

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	DRC and Rwanda	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
15	Establishment of a joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda	DRC and Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism	DRC and Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	DRC, Rwanda, and MONUSCO	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	DRC, Rwanda, and HCR	Initiated Execution	2.5
20.	Return of internally displaced persons	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	AU, SADC-EAC, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Initiated Execution	2.5
	Other tasks (3-14, 17, 21, 27 et 29)	-----	Non-initiated Execution	0



## 3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: August 2025





## 3.3. Overview of Partially Implemented Tasks

- Prohibition of Hostile Acts/Aggression between the DRC and Rwanda (Score: 5 - Minimal Execution):** Positive signs are observed on the ground, including a decrease in belligerent rhetoric between the authorities of the two states, despite recurring public accusations of implicit support for armed groups. Furthermore, given that the Washington Peace Process is closely linked to the Doha Peace Process (which is an extension of the process aimed at resolving the crisis between the DRC government and the Rwandan-backed AFC-M23), the Congolese government and the AFC-M23 each issued a communiqué on August 17, 2025, reaffirming their commitment to promoting peace.<sup>1</sup> However, this statement comes in a context marked by the resumption of fighting between the AFC-M23 and the Congolese army, despite both parties signed a Declaration of Principles on the ceasefire in Doha on July 19, 2025.<sup>2</sup>
- 2. Respect for the territorial integrity of each country (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Official declarations in favor of respecting the territorial integrity of each country were made by both sides after the signing of the Agreement. However, the disengagement of Rwandan forces or the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures (in other words, the withdrawal of Rwandan troops) from Congolese territory has not yet been initiated.
- 15. Establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda, « JSCM » (Score: 7.5 - Intermediate Execution):** Representatives of the DRC and Rwanda established the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM), the first meeting of which was held on August 7 and 8, 2025, in the presence of the United States, Qatar and the African Union mediator.<sup>3</sup> However, the Congolese side has yet to appoint its co-chair to sit alongside the Rwandan representative.
- 16. Adoption of standard operating procedures to ensure transparency in JSCM operations (Score: 7.5 - Intermediate Execution):** At the first meeting of the JSCM on 7-8 August 2025, representatives of the DRC and Rwanda adopted terms of reference to govern future meetings of the JSCM. They began discussions on the implementation of the Peace Agreement.<sup>4</sup> However, the harmonized timetable for neutralizing the FDLR, as well as the disengagement of forces and the lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda, has not yet been validated.
- 18. Protection of Civilians and Respect for International Humanitarian Law (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** Very few positive signs have been recorded on the ground, particularly thanks to the strengthening of MONUSCO's efforts to protect civilian populations in conflict zones. Major

<sup>1</sup> Jeune Afrique, « Est de la RDC : un projet d'accord de paix partagé avec Kinshasa et le M23 ».

<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1714903/politique/est-de-la-rdc-un-projet-daccord-de-paix-partage-avec-kinshasa-et-le-m23/>

<sup>2</sup> RFI, « RDC: reprise des combats entre le groupe AFC/M23 et l'armée, malgré la signature du cessez-le-feu ». [https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250810-rdc-reprise-des-combats-entre-le-groupe-afc-m23-et-l-arm%C3%A9e-malgr%C3%A9-la-signature-du-cessez-le-feu?utm\\_medium=social&utm\\_campaign=x&utm\\_source=shorty&utm\\_slink=rfi.my%2FBuak](https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250810-rdc-reprise-des-combats-entre-le-groupe-afc-m23-et-l-arm%C3%A9e-malgr%C3%A9-la-signature-du-cessez-le-feu?utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=x&utm_source=shorty&utm_slink=rfi.my%2FBuak)

<sup>3</sup> Joint Statement on the Inaugural Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) Meeting for the Peace Agreement Between the DRC and Rwanda of August 8, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/joint-statement-on-the-inaugural-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-jscm-meeting-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*



challenges persist.<sup>5</sup> The warring parties, namely the DRC government and the Rwandan-backed AFC-M23, have not yet been able to ensure sufficient protection of civilians in the face of recurring violence. This reality is corroborated by recent reports from UN agencies in the DRC as well as international non-governmental organizations, which document serious human rights violations, resulting in the loss of several hundred civilian lives in the east of the country between July and August 2025.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the United States (one of the mediators in the peace process in the DRC) has even requested a meeting of the UN Security Council on August 22, 2025, to denounce the violence targeting civilians.<sup>7</sup>

- **19. Return of refugees (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** The tripartite agreement between the DRC, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Rwanda established the principles of voluntary repatriation for refugees. A joint communiqué was signed on July 24, 2025, in Addis Ababa between the DRC and Rwanda.<sup>8</sup>
- **20. Return of internally displaced persons (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** Representatives of the DRC government and the AFC-M23 (supported by Rwanda) committed, through the Declaration of Principles signed in Doha on July 19, 2025, to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons to their areas of origin. However, no date for the start of the return has been set, nor has any infrastructure or reintegration plan been put in place.
- **22. Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** There are positive signs of cooperation between MONUSCO and the belligerents. This is illustrated by the suspension of the roadmap for MONUSCO's withdrawal (initially planned for March 2024),<sup>9</sup> which allows this UN mission to continue its peacekeeping mandate in conflict zones.
- **23. Support from the regional and international community for the signatories of the agreement (Score: 7.5 - Intermediate Execution):** Concrete manifestations of international community support have been observed. Following the mission to Kinshasa, from 14 to 19 July, 2025, of the African Union panel of facilitators led by former Presidents Catherine Samba-Panza (Central African Republic) and Sahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia),<sup>10</sup> the government of the DRC and the AFC-M23 (supported by Rwanda) signed a Declaration of Principles on the ceasefire in Doha on 19

<sup>5</sup> « Déclaration à la presse faite par le Conseil de sécurité sur la situation en République démocratique du Congo, » SC/16139, 7 août 2025. <https://press.un.org/fr/2025/sc16139.doc.htm>. See also : ONU Info, « RDC : après un massacre en Ituri, la Mission de paix de l'ONU intensifie ses patrouilles », <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2025/07/1157203>

<sup>6</sup> UN Office in Geneva, « Ceasefire in doubt as Rwanda-backed rebels kill hundreds in eastern DR Congo », [https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/08/109293/ceasefire-doubt-rwanda-backed-rebels-kill-hundreds-eastern-dr-congo?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/08/109293/ceasefire-doubt-rwanda-backed-rebels-kill-hundreds-eastern-dr-congo?utm_source=chatgpt.com). See also: Reuters, « Rebels armed with machetes kill at least 52 in eastern Congo », <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rebels-armed-with-machetes-kill-least-52-eastern-congo-2025-08-18/>; OCHA, « RD Congo : Situation Humanitaire dans la Province du Sud-Kivu », Rapport de Situation #6, 21 juillet 2025.

<sup>7</sup> United States Mission to the United Nations, « Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Democratic Republic of the Congo », <https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-4/>

<sup>8</sup> Radio Okapi, « La RDC, le Rwanda et le HCR s'accordent sur les principes de rapatriement volontaire des réfugiés », <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/07/24/actualite/securite/la-rdc-le-rwanda-et-le-hcr-saccordent-sur-les-principes-de>

<sup>9</sup> Congo Quotidien, « Retrait de la MONUSCO en RDC : le plan suspendu face à l'insécurité dans l'Est », <https://www.congoquotidien.com/2025/07/02/monusco-retrait-pause-securite-est-rdc/>

<sup>10</sup> Radio Okapi, « Les anciennes présidentes Sahle-Work Zewde et Catherine Samba-Panza satisfaites de leur mission de facilitation pour la paix en RDC », <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/07/22/actualite/politique/les-anciennes-presidentes-sahle-work-zewde-et-catherine-samba-panza>



July, 2025, facilitated by Qatar. The mediators of the peace process, namely Qatar, the African Union, and the United States, then took part in the first meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM). At the same time, Qatar submitted a draft peace agreement to the Congolese government and the AFC-M23 on August 18, 2025.<sup>11</sup>

- **24. Launch of the regional economic integration framework based on the AfCFTA, the ICGLR, and the EAC (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** A positive sign from the parties concerned regarding the formalization of the regional economic integration process has been observed. The Congolese and Rwandan governments adopted the Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework on August 1, 2025.<sup>12</sup>
- **25. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** A positive sign from the parties concerned regarding the formalization of the regional economic integration process has been observed. The Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework of August 1, 2025,<sup>13</sup> highlights bilateral cooperation in the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu.
- **26. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** A positive sign from the parties concerned was observed regarding the formalization of the regional economic integration process. The Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework also highlights bilateral cooperation in the sectors of mining, infrastructure, energy, and industrial development.<sup>14</sup>
- **28. Creation of the Joint Oversight Committee, JOC » (Score: 7.5 - Intermediate Execution):** The JOC was officially announced and its members appointed. The first meeting was held on July 31, 2025, with representatives from the DRC, Rwanda, the African Union, the United States, and Qatar in attendance. During this meeting, the members elected the JOC chairs, adopted the terms of reference governing the JOC's work, reviewed the progress of implementing the Agreement, and prepared for the first session of the JSCM.<sup>15</sup>
- **30. Monitoring of the Effective Implementation of the Agreement by the Joint Oversight Committee (Score: 2.5 - Initiated Execution):** Aside from the inaugural meeting held on July 31, 2025, announced by the issuance of a press release,<sup>16</sup> the JOC has not issued any reports on violations of the Agreement or the measures taken to address them.

<sup>11</sup> Jeune Afrique, « Est de la RDC : ce que contient le projet d'accord de paix du Qatar. » <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1715085/politique/est-de-la-rdc-ce-que-contient-le-projet-daccord-de-paix-du-qatar/>

<sup>12</sup> US State Department, « Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework ». <https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-african-affairs/2025/08/statement-of-tenets-for-the-regional-economic-integration-framework/>

<sup>13</sup> *Id.*

<sup>14</sup> *Id.*

<sup>15</sup> US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Inaugural Joint Oversight Committee Meeting for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda ». <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/joint-statement-on-the-inaugural-joint-oversight-committee-meeting-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*





## 4. OBSERVATIONS


### 4.1. Quantitative Interpretation of Results

The combined analysis of data from the Implementation by Task Table (section 3.1 above) and the Implementation by Task Chart (section 3.2 above) reveal an overall low level of implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement commitments.

While a few tasks have shown moderate progress, most key commitments remain at a standstill. In fact:

- **Of the 30 tasks** set out in the Washington Peace Agreement, **only 14** have begun to be implemented (at an initial, minimal, or intermediate level), representing **46.6% of the tasks**.
- **Considering all 30 tasks**, their **cumulative implementation score reaches 57.5 points out of 300** (maximum points if all 30 tasks were fully implemented), representing an **overall implementation rate of 19.1%**.
- **Considering only the 14 partially completed tasks**, their cumulative completion score corresponds to **57.5 points out of 140**, representing a **completion rate of 41%**.
- The tasks with the highest scores (7.5/10) concern: support from the international and regional community to the signatories, the establishment of the JSCM, the adoption of its operational procedures, and the creation of the JOC.
- Most tasks that the governments of the DRC and Rwanda should implement individually or jointly have a score of 2.5/10 or less, except the prohibition of hostile acts/aggression (5/10) and the establishment of the JSCM (which increased from 2.5/10 at the end of July<sup>17</sup> to 7.5/10 at the end of August).

#### Comparative chart on the progress of implementation: July and August



The comparative graph (above) highlights progress in implementing the Agreement between the end of July and the end of August 2025. Indeed, the proportion of tasks completed increased from 26.6% to 46.6%, reflecting a dynamic acceleration in execution. Similarly, the overall score, which reflects all the functions provided for in the Agreement, more than doubled, rising from 9% to 19% over the same period. Finally, regarding the score relating to only partially completed tasks, an improvement was also recorded, rising from

<sup>17</sup> Roger-Claude Liwanga, « Preliminary Assessment of the Implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement: One Month After Its Signature (June 27-July 27, 2025) ». [https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/\\_files/ugd/ddb61b\\_0f3e115a537946868f4306e1211d020c.pdf](https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/_files/ugd/ddb61b_0f3e115a537946868f4306e1211d020c.pdf)



34% to 41%. These results demonstrate a faster pace in operationalizing the Agreement, although additional efforts are still needed to consolidate this progress.

## 4.2. Progress Made

Despite persistent tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, some notable progress has been made, primarily in terms of institutions and cooperation:

1. **Reduction in belligerent rhetoric** between the authorities of the two states, despite recurring public accusations of implicit support for armed groups.
2. **Formal commitment to a cessation of hostilities**, reflected in the separate publication on August 17, 2025, by the DRC government and the Rwandan-backed AFC-M23 of communiqués reaffirming their commitment to promoting peace.<sup>18</sup> This is despite the temporary resumption of fighting between the AFC-M23 and the Congolese army, supported by the Wazalendo, in the provinces of North Kivu (particularly in the Walua Yungu group) and South Kivu (specifically in Kanyola, Muzinzi, Ciruko, Mulamba, Kipupu, and Mikenge).<sup>19</sup>
3. **Establishment of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM)** between the DRC and Rwanda, which held its inaugural meeting from August 7 to 8, 2025, as well as the adoption of the JSCM's terms of reference to govern its future sessions and improve the transparency of operations.
4. **The establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee (JOC)**, composed of the DRC, Rwanda, the African Union, Qatar, and the United States. It held its first meeting on July 31, 2025, marking the official launch of this support and monitoring mechanism.
5. **Signing of the Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework Between the DRC and Rwanda** of August 1, 2025, which paves the way for bilateral cooperation in the areas of national park management, sustainable exploitation of Lake Kivu resources, hydroelectric development, mining, and derisking mineral supply chains.

## 4.3. Delays and Obstacles

The most sensitive and urgent tasks of the Agreement, particularly the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of Rwandan troops from the DRC territory, have not yet begun, despite the official timetable (including the CONOPS) setting their completion by August 3, 2025, at the latest. For example:

1. **Location and identification of the FDLR:** This step, entrusted to the DRC and the JSCM, was to be carried out between July 4 and 19, 2025 (meaning, 7 to 15 days after the signing of the Agreement);
2. **Implementation of the harmonized plan for the neutralization of the FDLR**, scheduled for July 27, 2025 (meaning, 30 days after the signing), to be carried out by the DRC and the JSCM;

<sup>18</sup> Jeune Afrique, « Est de la RDC : ce que contient le projet d'accord de paix du Qatar. » <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1715085/politique/est-de-la-rdc-ce-que-contient-le-projet-daccord-de-paix-du-qatar/>

<sup>19</sup> RFI, « RDC: reprise des combats entre le groupe AFC/M23 et l'armée, malgré la signature du cessez-le-feu ». [https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250810-rdc-reprise-des-combats-entre-le-groupe-afc-m23-et-l-arm%C3%A9e-malgr%C3%A9-la-signature-du-cessez-le-feu?utm\\_medium=social&utm\\_campaign=x&utm\\_source=shorty&utm\\_slink=rfi.my%2FBuak](https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250810-rdc-reprise-des-combats-entre-le-groupe-afc-m23-et-l-arm%C3%A9e-malgr%C3%A9-la-signature-du-cessez-le-feu?utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=x&utm_source=shorty&utm_slink=rfi.my%2FBuak)





3. **Neutralization of the FDLR**, scheduled between July 24 and August 3, 2025 (meaning, 20 to 30 days after the signing of the Agreement);
4. **Harmonized plan for the disengagement of Rwandan forces** was to be implemented by Rwanda no later than July 27, 2025 (meaning, 30 days after the signing of the Agreement); and
5. **Withdrawal of Rwandan troops (or lifting of defensive measures)**, planned between July 24 and August 3, 2025 (meaning, 20 to 30 days after signing of the Agreement).

## 4.4. Causes of Delays

The delays observed in the execution of the tasks mentioned above can be explained, in part, by the following factors:

1. **Late establishment of the JSCM**, responsible for piloting and supervising the implementation of harmonized plans relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces or the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures from Congolese territory. Unfortunately, the inaugural meeting of the JSCM, held on August 7-8, 2025, did not address these two crucial issues. They may be included on the agenda of the next meeting scheduled for early September 2025. However, this postponement could raise questions about the appropriateness of holding monthly JSCM meetings. Given the complexity and urgency of these issues, a more frequent meeting schedule seemed more appropriate to expedite their review and decision-making.
2. **Divergence in the interpretation of commitments**, as confusion persists in the understanding of the clauses relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces, or the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures. Rwanda believes that the withdrawal of its troops should take place only after the effective neutralization of the FDLR by the DRC.<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, the DRC considers that these two actions must be carried out simultaneously, in accordance with the spirit of the Agreement. This divergence of interpretation creates an area of ambiguity that hinders momentum towards the faster implementation of these commitments.
3. **Evolution of the security context on the ground**: the clause on the neutralization of the FDLR now seems out of step with the reality on the ground. Between the adoption of the CONOPS (in October 2024) and the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement (in June 2025), the security situation has changed: several areas initially targeted for operations to neutralize the FDLR have now come under the control of the AFC-M23, supported by Rwanda. This new configuration of territorial control could concretely limit the Congolese government's capacity to directly carry out the actions incumbent upon it according to the Agreement.
4. Furthermore, **some stakeholders mistakenly perceive the Doha peace process (between the Congolese government and the AFC-M23) as separate from the Washington peace process (between the DRC and Rwanda)**. The Doha process is a continuation of the Washington process. Thus, any blockage or delay in the Doha discussions could have a direct impact on the implementation of specific provisions of the Washington Agreement, such as the conditional integration of AFC-M23 members into the DRC armed forces and national police.

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<sup>20</sup> The East African, « Rwanda rules out troops exit from Congo before FDLR 'is neutralized' ». [https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rwanda-rules-out-congo-troop-exit-before-fdlr-is-neutralised-5138730?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rwanda-rules-out-congo-troop-exit-before-fdlr-is-neutralised-5138730?utm_source=chatgpt.com)



## 5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Two months after its signing (i.e., from June 27 to August 27, 2025), the Washington Peace Agreement has enabled structural progress in institutional cooperation. However, it remains weakened by the lack of improvement in the most crucial security measures. The continued fighting between the Congolese army and the Rwandan-backed M23, as well as the delay in implementing clauses relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces or the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, risk compromising the credibility of the process. In this regard, the following recommendations are proposed:

### 5.1. Recommendations to the DRC Government:

- **Immediately appoint the Congolese co-chair of the JSCM** to ensure the equal and effective functioning of the mechanism (alongside the Rwandan representative);
- **Designate representatives to the JSCM secretariat** to ensure its proper functioning;
- **Rapidly develop an updated FDLR neutralization plan**, considering the change in territorial control, particularly the AFC-M23's occupation of areas formerly under government control;
- **Implement a plan to protect civilians in conflict zones**, in collaboration with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors; and
- **Accelerate discussions within the Doha process to achieve an effective ceasefire with the AFC-M23**, a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement.

### 5.2. Recommendations to the Government of Rwanda:

- **Designate representatives to the JSCM secretariat** to ensure its proper functioning;
- **Formally and publicly commit to disengaging its forces or lifting its defensive measures from the DRC territory** according to a mutually agreed timetable, regardless of the pace of neutralization of the FDLR;
- **Pressure the AFC-M23 to increase the protection of civilian populations in territories under its occupation**; and
- **Use its influence on the AFC-M23 to encourage constructive resumption of discussions within the framework of the Doha process**, with a view to an effective and lasting ceasefire with the DRC government, which is an absolute necessity for the full and coherent implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement.

### 5.3. Recommendations for the JSCM:

**Increase the frequency of meetings** at shorter intervals (beyond the monthly rate provided for in the Agreement) to facilitate faster review and effective decision-making on priority tasks whose execution has been delayed by the late establishment of the JSCM.

### 5.4. Recommendations to the United States:

- **Officially clarify its position on the simultaneity, or not, between the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the neutralization of the FDLR**, based on the provisions of the Agreement, to dispel any ambiguity;
- **Increase diplomatic pressure on the DRC and Rwanda to implement key security measures** (neutralization of the FDLR, withdrawal of Rwandan troops, and a lasting ceasefire by the parties and their proxies);
- **Provide technical and logistical support for the operation of the JSCM and the JOC**;
- **Demand a binding and verifiable timetable for critical security commitments**, with monthly monitoring of their implementation;



- **Support MONUSCO in its mission to protect civilian populations**, through advocacy at the UN Security Council for a provisional increase in its resources; and
- **Encourage active mediation between the AFC-M23 and the Congolese government to advance the Doha process**, while ensuring its strategic alignment with the Washington Peace Agreement.

## 5.5. Recommendations to Qatar:

- **Facilitate convergence between the Doha and Washington processes** by aligning the AFC-M23/DRC discussions with the DRC/Rwanda obligations; and
- **Officially make public the content of the Draft Peace Agreement** shared on August 18, 2025, with representatives of the Congolese government and the AFC-M23, to foster a transparent debate and avoid any manipulation of its actual content.

## 5.6. Recommendations to the African Union Mediator:

- **Ensure the harmonization of the Washington and Doha processes by establishing continental coordination and monitoring mechanisms** to ensure strategic coherence, operational complementarity, and alignment of peace efforts in the Great Lakes region;
- **Advocate for the allocation of autonomous funding to the continental monitoring mechanism** through the adoption of a dedicated budget within the African Union, guaranteeing its institutional and operational viability, and independent of contributions from international partners; and
- **Strengthen regional ownership of the peace process** by initiating awareness-raising activities and facilitating the active involvement of regional civil society organizations to promote the transparency, legitimacy, and sustainability of the efforts undertaken.

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