



REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS UNDER THE DOHA PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN THE DR CONGO GOVERNMENT AND AFC/M23: JULY 2025–AUGUST 2026

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Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa

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This report presents the assessment of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, conducted by a group of independent experts, on the implementation of the Doha Peace Process between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Alliance Fleuve Congo/M23 (AFC/M23), from July 2025 to August 2026.

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is an independent platform dedicated to monitoring, evaluating, and promoting the effective implementation of peace agreements in Africa, starting with the Washington Peace Agreement. Established in August 2025, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is based on the observation that many peace agreements in Africa have failed, not because of their content, but because of a lack of rigorous monitoring of their implementation. In the absence of an objective mechanism to measure compliance with commitments, each party remains free to assert its own compliance with the Agreement or to accuse the other of violating it. Far from replacing the official mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement established by the Agreement itself, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa provides reliable, up-to-date, and factual data on the parties' progress in fulfilling their peace commitments.

Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool (PAIMT), designed and adapted by one of its experts (Dr. Roger-Claude Liwanga, drawing on his previous experience with The Carter Center evaluating peace agreements in Africa), and inspired by a methodology similar to that of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.



ACRONYMS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AFC-M23	River Congo Alliance – March 23 Movement
AU	African Union
COVM	Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EJVM+	Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
JOC	Joint Oversight Committee
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo
RDF	Rwanda Defense Force
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations



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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The launch of the Doha Peace Process in July 2025, facilitated by Qatar, generated renewed hope for ending the armed conflict between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Rwanda-supported *Alliance Fleuve Congo/M23* (AFC/M23).¹ The Process constitutes a significant mechanism for addressing the internal political and military dimensions of the conflict. It is interdependent with the Washington process while remaining legally distinct from it. The latter culminated in the signing, on June 27, 2025, of the Washington Peace Agreement, which addresses the interstate dimension of the crisis between the DRC and Rwanda.² Both the Doha and Washington initiatives respond to complementary dimensions of the broader conflict in eastern DRC.

The Doha Peace Process is a multi-layered negotiated framework comprising several legal and operational instruments, including the Declaration of Principles of July 19, 2025, which established the political foundation for direct negotiations between the DRC Government and the AFC/M23, and provided the basis for subsequent confidence-building and implementation arrangements.³ The Detainee Release Mechanism of September 14, 2025, outlined procedures for identifying, verifying, and releasing detainees held by the parties.⁴ The Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM) of October 14, 2025, set out arrangements to monitor and verify compliance with the permanent ceasefire and to help prevent renewed hostilities.⁵ The Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (“Framework Agreement”) of November 15, 2025, providing the overarching framework guiding negotiations toward a broader political and security settlement through eight protocols, of which the first two had already been concluded separately and were subsequently incorporated into the broader Framework Agreement, namely⁶:

1. The Protocol on Detainee Release Mechanism;
2. The Protocol on Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism;
3. The Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection;
4. The Protocol on Restoration of State Authority, Reforms, and National Participatory Governance Arrangements;
5. The Protocol on Interim Security Arrangements, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of Local Armed Groups, and Neutralization of Foreign Armed Groups;
6. The Protocol on Identity and Citizenship, and Return and Reinstallation of IDPs and Refugees;
7. The Protocol on Economic and Social Recovery; and
8. The Protocol on Justice, Truth, and Reconciliation.

This process was subsequently complemented by the Memorandum of Understanding of April 14, 2026, on the operationalization of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), involving the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the DRC Government, and AFC/M23.⁷

¹ UN News, “Doha agreement brings DR Congo government and M23 rebels a step closer to peace,” <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165441>

² US Department of State, “Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda,” <https://www.state.gov/peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>

³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, “Qatar Hosts Signing of Declaration of Principles Between DRC, March 23 Movement,” <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2025/07/19/qatar-hosts-signing-of-declaration-of-principles-between-drc--march-23-movement>

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, “The ICRC Receives a Copy of the Mechanism for the Release of Detainees Linked to the Conflict Between the DRC and the Congo River Coalition,” <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2025/09/15/the-icrc-receives-a-copy-of-the-mechanism-for-the-release-of-detainees-linked-to-the-conflict-between-the-drc-and-the-congo-river-coalition>

⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, “Congo’s Government, Congo River Alliance Sign Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism,” <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2025/10/14/congo%27s-government--congo-river-alliance-sign-ceasefire-monitoring-and-verification-mechanism>

⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, “Signing of the Doha Framework for Peace between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congo River Alliance (M23 Movement).” <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/latest-articles/statements/signing-of-the-doha-framework-for-peace-between-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-congo-river-alliance-%28m23-movement%29>

See also: African Union, “Doha Framework Peace Agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congo River Alliance (M23 Movement).” https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45656-doc-2025.11.15_-_SIGNED_Framework_Peace_Agreement_EN.pdf

⁷ ICGLR, “Press Release: Significant Progress in Doha Peace Process Between the DRC and AFC/M23.” <https://icglr.org/press-release-significant-progress-in-doha-peace-process-between-drc-and-afc-m23>



For analytical purposes, the assessment of the implementation of the Doha Peace Process focuses on the execution of commitments under the Detainee Release Mechanism, the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism, and the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

More than one year after its launch, the **collective implementation of commitments under the Doha Peace Process remains modest and uneven, with an overall implementation rate of approximately 18.6%**. The relatively low score reflects both the modest progress made in implementing commitments already undertaken and the fact that several substantive protocols contemplated under the Doha Framework remain to be concluded and operationalized.

Regarding the implementation level of each instrument, the analysis indicates that the **Framework Agreement achieved an implementation score of 16.7% (25 out of 150 points)**, while the **COVM reached 17.3% (22.5 out of 130 points)**. The **Detainee Release Mechanism recorded a cumulative implementation score of 25% (17.5 out of 70 points)**, based on an assessment of all tasks under the Mechanism; however, **when measured solely against the number of detainees identified by the parties under the Mechanism, the completion rate was significantly lower, at just 3.1% (with only 15 of the 477 identified detainees having been released)**.⁸

The modest progress achieved thus far can be attributed to numerous interrelated constraints:

Challenges on the political and security fronts:

- *Lack of mutual trust and selective implementation of commitments:* Persistent mistrust between the DRC Government and AFC/M23 continues to impede the implementation of reciprocal commitments. Disagreements over ceasefire violations, territorial control, the identity and eligibility of detainees for release, and the designation of EJVM+ representatives have contributed to delays and divergent interpretations of obligations.⁹ In several instances, each party has appeared to condition its own compliance with the other party's prior fulfillment of its commitments;
- *Continued hostilities:* Despite ceasefire commitments, renewed fighting between the DRC armed forces (FARDC) and AFC/M23 is a major obstacle to confidence-building and effective verification. Disputes over force presence and withdrawal, security guarantees, and the neutralization of foreign armed groups remain key unresolved issues.¹⁰ The persistence of insecurity also diverts political attention from negotiations toward immediate security priorities;
- *Fragmentation of armed actors beyond the scope of the Doha process:* The Doha process primarily addresses the DRC Government and AFC/M23, while the broader conflict involves numerous other armed groups operating in North and South Kivu.¹¹ Many of these groups do not consider themselves bound by the ceasefire arrangements negotiated under the Doha process, and their continued activities contribute to insecurity and undermine stabilization efforts. This creates a structural gap between the bilateral scope of the negotiations and the conflict's multidimensional nature on the ground;
- *Delays in the implementation of the detainee-release mechanism:* Although detainee releases were intended as an early confidence-building measure, implementation has progressed slowly. Of the 477 detainees identified under the Mechanism, only 15 had been released and transferred by early August 2026, nearly one

⁸ ICRC, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: ICRC hands over 15 people released by the Congolese authorities to AFC/M23."

<https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/democratic-republic-congo-icrc-hands-over-15-people-released-congolese-authorities>

⁹ UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, "Stay Course towards Durable Peace in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Special Representative Urges, Warning Violence Continues Despite Ceasefire Accord." <https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16400.doc.htm>

See also: Business Insider Africa, "Congo rebels blame the government for delays in establishing peace,"

<https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/lifestyle/congo-rebels-blame-the-government-for-delays-in-establishing-peace/pyld8t8>

¹⁰ RFI, "Est de la RDC: la ville d'Uvira de nouveau sous les tirs malgré le retrait annoncé de l'AFC/M23." <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251222-est-de-la-rdc-la-ville-d-uvira-de-nouveau-sous-les-tirs-malgr%C3%A9-le-retrait-annonc%C3%A9-de-l-afc-m23>; RFI, "Est de la RDC: regain de tension entre l'armée congolaise et l'AFC/M23 au Nord et Sud-Kivu." <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260819-est-de-la-rdc-regain-de-tension-entre-l-arm%C3%A9e-congolaise-et-l-afc-m23-au-nord-et-sud-kivu>

¹¹ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Beyond M23: Addressing the Underlying Drivers of the DRC Conflict." <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/drc-congo-conflict-drivers-beyond-m23/>



year after its adoption.¹² Divergent positions regarding detainees' identity, status, and eligibility, compounded by verification and logistical challenges, have delayed further releases and undermined confidence in the mechanism;

- *Slow progress in negotiating the outstanding Doha protocols:* Of the eight protocols envisaged under the Doha Framework Agreement, only two had been concluded, while six remained under negotiation. Although the parties made progress on the Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection during their April 2026 Montreux meeting, the remaining protocols have yet to be finalized.¹³ Their delayed conclusion continues to impede the transition from a framework for dialogue to a comprehensive and operational peace settlement, particularly on politically and security-sensitive issues; and
- *Interdependence of Doha security commitments with the Washington Peace Agreement:* Several Doha security commitments (including the cessation of hostilities, force disengagement, security arrangements, and the neutralization of foreign armed groups) are closely linked to DRC-Rwanda obligations under the Washington Peace Agreement, particularly the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures. Accordingly, progress on these commitments is closely dependent on developments under the Washington process.

Challenges on the institutional and verification front

- *Delayed operationalization of the EJVM+:* Although the COVM was formally established in October 2025, the operationalization of the EJVM+ was only formalized through the Memorandum of Understanding of April 14, 2026. Its full operationalization has since been delayed by challenges in designating representatives, finalizing operational procedures, identifying verification sites, and deploying verification teams. Following the DRC Government's appointment of its three representatives in early July 2026, AFC/M23 reportedly raised concerns regarding one nominee. Disagreements also arose over the initial choice of Kavumu Airport in Bukavu, which is under AFC/M23 control, as the site for the first mission. As a result, the inaugural EJVM+ verification mission was subsequently scheduled for August 24, 2026, in Minembwe,¹⁴ where it ultimately took place;¹⁵
- *Limited funding for forthcoming EJVM+ missions:* Following the inaugural EJVM+ field mission conducted in Minembwe on 24 August 2026, a second mission was reportedly planned for Masisi territory in North Kivu Province. However, according to diplomatic sources, the mission could not be undertaken as scheduled due to insufficient funding, highlighting ongoing resource constraints that limit the mechanism's ability to sustain regular field-based verification activities; and
- *Absence of a comprehensive implementation and dispute-resolution mechanism:* The Doha instruments establish substantive commitments and monitoring arrangements, particularly concerning the ceasefire, but lack an integrated mechanism to systematically track implementation, resolve divergent interpretations and disputes, assign responsibility for verified violations, and provide corrective measures for non-compliance. The agreement reached by the DRC Government and AFC/M23 during the August 2026 Montreux meetings to establish such a mechanism therefore represents a positive, albeit belated, institutional development.¹⁶

¹² ICRC, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: ICRC hands over 15 people released by the Congolese authorities to AFC/M23."

<https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/democratic-republic-congo-icrc-hands-over-15-people-released-congolese-authorities>

¹³ US Department of State, "Joint Statement on Progress Between the Representatives of Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) on the Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection, the Operationalization of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism, and the Release of Prisoners of April 18, 2026." <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/joint-statement-on-progress-between-the-representatives-of-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-afc-m23-on-the-protoc>

¹⁴ US Department of State, "Joint Statement Between the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Representatives of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) on the Doha Process of August 22, 2026."

<https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/08/joint-statement-between-the-representatives-of-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-representatives-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-afc-m23-on-the-doha-proce/>

¹⁵ Actualite.CD, "Processus de Doha: une délégation du MCVE+ est arrivée à Minembwe," <https://actualite.cd/index.php/2026/08/25/processus-de-doha-une-delegation-du-mcve-est-arrivee-minembwe>

¹⁶ US Department of State, "Joint Statement Between the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Representatives of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) on the Doha Process of August 22, 2026."



Reached more than one year after the launch of the Doha process, it underscores a significant gap in the existing implementation architecture. The mechanism's operational modalities, effectiveness, and capacity to resolve disputes and ensure timely follow-up remain to be assessed.

Challenges on the diplomatic front

- *Uneven diplomatic attention and political momentum:* Although the Washington and Doha processes address different dimensions of the conflict, they involve many of the same national, regional, and international stakeholders and are substantively interconnected. The Washington track has at times benefited from more sustained high-level diplomatic engagement, particularly regarding the DRC–Rwanda relations, while the Doha process has experienced periods of comparatively limited diplomatic momentum. This disparity in diplomatic engagement has contributed to delays in addressing critical issues under the Doha Framework Agreement, including the ceasefire, detainee releases, humanitarian access, security arrangements, and the outstanding protocols;
- *Insufficiently formalized coordination between the Washington and Doha processes,* as despite the diplomatic recognition of their interdependence, the two peace tracks lack a formal coordination mechanism to ensure coherence in implementation, monitoring, and sequencing. This creates risks of overlapping initiatives, implementation gaps, and inconsistent sequencing, particularly concerning ceasefire arrangements, force disengagement and withdrawal, the neutralization of foreign armed groups, and broader security guarantees; and
- *Limited progress toward a comprehensive political settlement:* The slow pace of the Doha negotiations continues to constrain efforts to resolve the internal political and security dimensions of the conflict. Without substantial progress on the outstanding protocols and their subsequent implementation, the Doha process risks remaining predominantly focused on managing immediate security and confidence-building issues, rather than evolving into an effective pathway toward a comprehensive and sustainable political settlement.

Challenges on the legal and normative front

- *Fragmentation and Lack of Consolidation of the Legal and Operational Architecture:* The coexistence of several instruments adopted at different stages of the peace process (including the Declaration of Principles, the Detainee Release Mechanism, the COVM, the Doha Framework Agreement, and subsequent operational arrangements relating to the EJVM+) raises challenges regarding their interrelationship, the coordination of successive stages, and the allocation of legal and institutional responsibilities. Although the Doha Framework Agreement establishes the overarching framework for negotiations toward a comprehensive peace agreement and reaffirms previously undertaken commitments, the current architecture does not yet include a single, consolidated instrument bringing together the substantive commitments, their implementation modalities, monitoring and verification mechanisms, dispute-resolution procedures, and compliance arrangements applicable across the peace process as a whole. The coexistence of partially interconnected instruments may therefore create uncertainty regarding the respective relationship and scope of the obligations, as well as the responsibilities assigned to the various parties and institutions concerned. It may also complicate the implementation of commitments, the monitoring of their execution, and the attribution of responsibility, thereby potentially undermining the coherence, clarity, and overall accessibility of the peace process's legal and institutional architecture.



Challenges on the humanitarian front

- *Persistence of a severe humanitarian and socioeconomic crisis:* Widespread displacement,¹⁷ food insecurity affecting several million people,¹⁸ restricted humanitarian access, damage to essential infrastructure, shortages of essential medicines,¹⁹ and the Ebola outbreak continue to create a highly challenging environment for the implementation of the Doha commitments.²⁰ The humanitarian consequences of continued hostilities also undermine confidence in the peace process among affected populations;
- *Limited progress in humanitarian access and civilian protection:* Despite the incorporation of humanitarian dimensions into the broader peace framework, implementation remains insufficient. The continued closure of Goma and Bukavu airports, restrictions affecting humanitarian operations, and insecurity in conflict-affected areas continue to constrain the delivery of assistance and access to vulnerable populations; and
- *Weak translation of the peace process into tangible benefits for affected populations:* The limited progress on humanitarian access, civilian protection, detainee releases, and other confidence-building measures has constrained the ability of the Doha process to demonstrate concrete improvements in the daily lives and security of affected populations. This risks further weakening public confidence in the peace process and its perceived relevance to communities directly affected by the conflict.

Despite limited overall implementation of the commitments, the first thirteen months of the Doha Peace Process saw several important developments that could provide a foundation for further progress:

Normative and institutional developments:

- *The adoption of the Doha Declaration of Principles on July 19, 2025,* established the political basis for direct negotiations between the Government of the DRC and AFC/M23 and provided a framework for subsequent confidence-building measures and peace negotiations, marking an important shift from predominantly military confrontation toward structured political dialogue between the principal Congolese parties to the conflict;²¹
- *The establishment of the Detainee Release Mechanism on September 14, 2025,* providing a formal framework for the identification, verification, and release of detainees held by the two parties, with the involvement of the ICRC as a neutral intermediary to facilitate the process and strengthen confidence between the parties;²²
- *The establishment of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM) on October 14, 2025,* provided an institutional framework for monitoring the permanent ceasefire, investigating and verifying alleged violations, and engaging with the parties to help prevent renewed hostilities, with Qatar, the United States, and the AU designated as observers to strengthen the mechanism's international and regional support;²³ and
- *The adoption of the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement on November 15, 2025,* which transformed the dialogue from a series of individual confidence-building measures into a broader framework

¹⁷ According to the International Organization for Migration, there are approximately 3.59 million internally displaced persons in the eastern DRC, including 1.23 million in South Kivu and 1.17 million in North Kivu, primarily due to armed conflict. See: OIM, "République Démocratique du Congo : Aperçu du Déplacement Interne 2026." https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1461/files/reports/DRC_NDO_172026_Final_FR.pdf?iframe=true

¹⁸ World Food Programme, "Emergency: Democratic Republic of the Congo." <https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/drc-emergency>. Voir aussi: IPC, "République Démocratique du Congo : Analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire aigue Janvier-Juin 2026." https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_DRC_Acute_Food_Insecurity_May2026_Report_French.pdf

¹⁹ ICRC, "RD Congo : Soins de santé de plus en plus inaccessibles dans les Kivu". <https://www.icrc.org/fr/communiqu-de-presse/rd-congo-soins-sante-plus-inaccessibles-kivu>

²⁰ World Health Organization, "Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus - Democratic Republic of the Congo". <https://www.who.int/india/home/emergencies/diseaseoutbreak-news/item/2026-DON603>

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, "Qatar Hosts Signing of Declaration of Principles Between DRC, March 23 Movement." <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2025/07/19/qatar-hosts-signing-of-declaration-of-principles-between-drc-march-23-movement>

²² ICRC, "DRC: The ICRC stands ready to support detainee releases between conflict parties." <https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/drc-icrc-stands-ready-support-detainee-releases-between-conflict-parties>

²³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, "Congo's Government, Congo River Alliance Sign Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism." <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2025/10/14/congo%27s-government-congo-river-alliance-sign-ceasefire-monitoring-and-verification-mechanism>



for negotiating a comprehensive political settlement, with a structured agenda covering the restoration of state authority, governance and reforms, security arrangements and DDR, identity and citizenship, displacement and return, socioeconomic recovery, and justice, truth, and reconciliation.²⁴

Diplomatic and negotiating developments:

- *The continuation of direct political dialogue between the Government of the DRC and AFC/M23, despite persistent disagreements and ongoing insecurity, represents a significant positive development, as maintaining a direct negotiating channel remains important given the intensity of the conflict and the parties' divergent political and security positions;*
- *The signing of the COVM Terms of Reference in February 2026, demonstrating the parties' continued engagement with the ceasefire-monitoring architecture and their reaffirmation of commitments to the ceasefire and the Doha Framework;²⁵ and*
- *The April and August 2026 Montreux discussions represented significant diplomatic development in the Doha peace process. Convened from April 13 to 18, 2026, at the initiative of the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23, under the facilitation of Qatar, the United States, and the African Union, with Switzerland serving as host country, the participants made substantial progress toward concluding the Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection; and they reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring rapid, safe, sustained, and unhindered humanitarian access, as well as strengthening the protection of civilians.²⁶ The August 17-21, 2026 meetings, in turn, helped reinvigorate the process by encouraging commitment to accelerate negotiations on the six outstanding protocols and by establishing a mechanism to monitor progress and address implementation challenges.²⁷*

Ceasefire-monitoring and security developments

- *Efforts to operationalize the EJVM+ in April 2026 represented significant institutional development. The Memorandum of Understanding of 14 April, 2026, concluded among the ICGLR, the DRC Government, and AFC/M23, established a framework for integrating the Doha Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM) into the ICGLR's EJVM, thereby strengthening the broader architecture for monitoring, tracking, verifying, and reporting on ceasefire implementation.²⁸ The establishment of the EJVM+ Secretariat and the conduct of a reconnaissance mission on 20 August 2026 marked further progress towards the mechanism's full operationalization;²⁹ and*
- *With logistical support from MONUSCO,³⁰ the first EJVM+ ceasefire verification mission, conducted on 24 August 2026 in Minembwe, constituted an important step towards deploying the mechanism's verification*

²⁴Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, "Signing of the Doha Framework for Peace between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congo River Alliance (M23 Movement)." <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/latest-articles/statements/signing-of-the-doha-framework-for-peace-between-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-congo-river-alliance-%28m23-movement%29>

²⁵Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, "The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Alliance Fleuve Congo signed in Doha the terms of reference stemming from the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region." <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2026/02/02/the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-sign-in-doha-the-terms-of-reference-stemming-from-the-international-conference-on-the-great-lakes-region>

²⁶ MONUSCO welcomes the progress made in Montreux within the framework of the Doha process. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/press-releases/la-monusco-salue-les-avancees-enregistrees-a-montreux-dans-le-cadre-du>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, "Joint Statement on Progress Between the Representatives of Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23)." <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/latest-articles/statements/joint-statement-on-progress-between-the-representatives-of-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-%28afc-m23%29>

²⁷ "Joint Statement on Progress Between the Representatives of Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23)." <https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/22/08/2026/joint-statement-between-representatives-of-government-of-drc-and-representatives-of-alliance-fleuve-congomarch-23-movement-on-doha-peace-process>

²⁸ ICGLR, "Press Release: Significant Progress in Doha Peace Process between DRC and AFC/M23." <https://icglr.org/press-release-significant-progress-in-doha-peace-process-between-drc-and-afc-m23>

²⁹ US Department of State, "Joint Statement Between the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Representatives of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) on the Doha Process of August 22, 2026." <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/08/joint-statement-between-the-representatives-of-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-representatives-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-afc-m23-on-the-doha-proce/>

³⁰ MONUSCO, "Press Release: MONUSCO welcomes the progress made in Montreux within the framework of the Doha process." <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/press-releases/la-monusco-salue-les-avancees-enregistrees-a-montreux-dans-le-cadre-du>



capacity in the field.³¹ However, this development came relatively late in the implementation process, as EJVM+ had not yet reached full operational capacity. Systematic joint verification and investigation of alleged ceasefire violations also remained limited.

Humanitarian and confidence-building developments:

- *The release of detainees has remained an important confidence-building measure within the Doha Process.* During the Montreux consultations, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to the release of detainees in accordance with the Detainee Release Mechanism.³² This commitment was subsequently translated into action by releasing and transferring the first 15 detainees among the 477 individuals identified under the Mechanism;³³ and
- *The parties' commitments concerning humanitarian access and civilian protection at Montreux* constituted an important normative development. The parties committed themselves to rapid, safe, sustained, and unhindered humanitarian access and to respect for international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international refugee law, with particular attention to the protection of civilians, women, and children.³⁴

International and regional engagement:

- *The increasing convergence of international and regional support around the Doha process* is another positive development. The engagement of the United States, the AU, Togo, Switzerland, the ICGLR, and MONUSCO has complemented Qatar's facilitation. The April 2026 Montreux consultations demonstrated a particularly broad diplomatic configuration involving the principal facilitators and regional and international actors;³⁵
- *The explicit recognition of the Doha process within the broader Washington diplomatic architecture* has also strengthened the process's strategic relevance. At the April 2026 meeting of the Joint Oversight Committee (JOC) of the Washington Peace Agreement, participants underscored the essential role of the Doha Process in the implementation of the Agreement. This represents an important acknowledgment of the substantive interdependence between the two tracks;³⁶ and
- *The targeted sanctions imposed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee against several actors linked to the conflict in eastern DRC constitute a significant development in strengthening accountability and enhancing the credibility of the peace process as a whole.* These measures included sanctions against: (a) the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and several senior officials in early March 2026, in connection with alleged violations of the Washington Peace Agreement; (b) former DRC President Joseph Kabila in late April 2026, for his alleged support for AFC/M23; (c) several FDLR and AFC/M23 commanders in early June 2026, for activities alleged to undermine peace and stability in the region; (d) a Rwandan gold refinery in late June 2026, in connection with alleged facilitation

³¹ US Department of State, "Joint Statement Between the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Representatives of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) on the Doha Process of August 22, 2026." <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/08/joint-statement-between-the-representatives-of-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-representatives-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-afc-m23-on-the-doha-proce/>

³² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, "Joint Statement on Progress Between the Representatives of Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23)." <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/latest-articles/statements/joint-statement-on-progress-between-the-representatives-of-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-%28afc-m23%29>

³³ ICRC, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: ICRC hands over 15 people released by the Congolese authorities to AFC/M23." <https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/democratic-republic-congo-icrc-hands-over-15-people-released-congolese-authorities>

³⁴ MONUSCO, "Press Release: MONUSCO welcomes the progress made in Montreux within the framework of the Doha process." <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/press-releases/la-monusco-salue-les-avancees-enregistrees-a-montreux-dans-le-cadre-du>

³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, "Joint Statement on Progress Between the Representatives of Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23)." <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/latest-articles/statements/joint-statement-on-progress-between-the-representatives-of-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-%28afc-m23%29>

³⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, "Joint Statement on the Fifth Joint Oversight Committee for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda." <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/latest-articles/statements/joint-statement-on-the-fifth-joint-oversight-committee-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda>



of the illicit trade in conflict minerals; and (e) subsequently, the leader of AFC/M23, its intelligence chief, two FDLR commanders, an ADF commander, and a military official associated with Twirwaneho, as well as (f) the AFC and Twirwaneho as entities.³⁷ Taken together, these measures demonstrated increased international willingness to impose targeted consequences on actors and entities alleged to contribute to the conflict, while reinforcing the broader expectation that peace-process commitments should be accompanied by accountability for non-compliance.

In light of the constraints and modest developments recorded since the launch of the Doha Peace Process in July 2025, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa recommends the following actions for each stakeholder:

Recommendations

- **To all stakeholders of the Doha Peace Process (DRC Government, AFC/M23, Qatar, the United States, the African Union, and ICGLR):**
 - ✓ *Consider consolidating the commitments and institutional arrangements developed under the Doha process into a single, comprehensive, and legally coherent Peace Agreement. The agreement should, as appropriate, bring together provisions on cessation of hostilities; humanitarian access and judicial protection; detainee releases; restoration of state authority; governance and institutional reforms; interim security arrangements; DDR; neutralization of armed groups; identity and citizenship; displacement and refugee return and reintegration; socio-economic recovery; justice, truth, and reconciliation; and implementation, monitoring, verification, dispute resolution, and compliance; and*
 - ✓ *While such a comprehensive agreement cannot by itself ensure compliance without political will and good-faith implementation, it could reduce legal and institutional fragmentation, clarify the hierarchy and interrelationship of commitments, facilitate monitoring and evaluation, and provide a single authoritative framework for the parties, facilitators, guarantors, and affected populations.*
- **To the Government of the DRC:**
 - ✓ *Prioritize the full and verifiable implementation of existing Doha commitments, particularly those relating to the ceasefire, detainee release, humanitarian access, and EJVM+ operationalization;*
 - ✓ *Accelerate the release and safe transfer of eligible detainees, in coordination with AFC/M23 and the ICRC;*
 - ✓ *Ensure full cooperation with the EJVM+ by deploying its designated representatives and guaranteeing unhindered access, security, and freedom of movement to locations required for effective verification;*
 - ✓ *Strengthen ceasefire compliance by ensuring that forces under Government control refrain from unilateral military actions that could undermine the cessation of hostilities;*
 - ✓ *Facilitate unhindered humanitarian access and support the restoration of essential public services in areas under AFC/M23 control, in coordination with humanitarian and development partners; and*
 - ✓ *Accelerate negotiations on the six outstanding protocols and work with AFC/M23 and the Qatari facilitation to establish clear, realistic, and time-bound deadlines for their conclusion and adoption.*

³⁷ See: The U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Rwanda Officials, Condemns Blatant Violations of Washington Peace Accords." <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0411>;

The U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Former Democratic Republic of the Congo President for Ties to Armed Conflict." <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0480>; The U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Rebel Commanders Driving Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0518>;

The U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Gold Refinery and Network Enabling Illicit Conflict Minerals Trade." <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0543>; United Nations, "Security Council 1533 Sanctions Committee Adds Six Individuals and Two Entities to Its Sanctions List." <https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16416.doc.htm>



- **To AFC/M23**

- ✓ *Demonstrate sustained commitment to the ceasefire by refraining from offensive military operations and further territorial expansion;*
- ✓ *Ensure full cooperation with the EJVM+ by deploying its designated representatives and guaranteeing unhindered access, security, and freedom of movement to locations required for effective verification;*
- ✓ *Prioritize resolving any disputes concerning access to verification sites through the procedures established by the EJVM+, rather than by imposing unilateral restrictions. Where a site is deemed unsafe or no longer relevant for verification purposes, AFC/M23 should promptly inform the EJVM+ and agree with the parties concerned on an appropriate alternative site;*
- ✓ *Accelerate the release and safe transfer of eligible detainees, in coordination with the DRC Government and the ICRC;*
- ✓ *Facilitate the restoration of state authority in territories under AFC/M23 control by progressively dismantling parallel administrative, judicial, security, and governance structures operating outside the DRC's constitutional and legal framework;*
- ✓ *Facilitate humanitarian access in areas under its control by ensuring prompt, safe, sustained, and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and personnel, and support the reopening and secure operation of Goma and Bukavu airports; and*
- ✓ *Accelerate negotiations on the six outstanding protocols and work constructively with the DRC Government and the Qatari facilitation to establish clear, realistic, and time-bound deadlines for their conclusion and adoption.*

- **To the Government of Qatar**

- ✓ *Intensify facilitation efforts to accelerate negotiations on the six outstanding protocols, particularly the Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection, by working with the parties to establish clear, realistic, and time-bound deadlines for their negotiation, conclusion, and adoption;*
- ✓ *Continue to encourage and support the Government of the DRC and AFC/M23 in fully implementing the protocols already concluded and in resolving outstanding procedural and political obstacles to their execution;*
- ✓ *Encourage the parties to consolidate the commitments arising from the Doha Process into a single, comprehensive, and legally coherent peace agreement, in order to reduce fragmentation and clarify the modalities for implementation, monitoring, verification, and dispute resolution; and*
- ✓ *Strengthen diplomatic coordination with the AU, the United States, ICGLR, and other relevant partners to enhance coherence between the Doha and Washington processes and ensure coordinated support for implementation.*

- **To the Government of the United States**

- ✓ *Maintain and strengthen coordinated diplomatic engagement with the parties to promote full, timely, and verifiable compliance with their commitments under the Doha Peace Process;*
- ✓ *Encourage and support the accelerated negotiation and conclusion of the six outstanding Doha protocols, particularly through clear, realistic, and time-bound negotiating and implementation benchmarks;*
- ✓ *Continue considering, as a last resort, targeted coercive measures against actors found to be deliberately obstructing or undermining implementation of the Doha commitments;*
- ✓ *Support MONUSCO and, where appropriate, the EJVM+ with adequate technical, financial, and logistical resources to strengthen ceasefire monitoring, verification, reporting, and operational capacity; and*
- ✓ *Institutionalize coordination between the Washington and Doha processes, including through regular consultations among Qatar, the African Union, and the ICGLR, to ensure coherent sequencing, avoid contradictory initiatives, and address the substantive interdependence between the two tracks.*



- **To the ICGLR:**
 - ✓ *Accelerate the full operationalization of the EJVM+, including, inter alia, the designation of verification sites and the deployment of verification teams;*
 - ✓ *Establish a regular and impartial public communication mechanism on verified ceasefire-related incidents, measures taken in response, as well as outstanding or disputed cases, to enhance transparency and public confidence; and*
 - ✓ *Strengthen coordination with MONUSCO, the AU, and other relevant partners with respect to logistical and technical support, information-sharing, geographical access, and verification activities.*
- **To MONUSCO:**
 - ✓ *Continue to provide appropriate logistical, technical, and operational support to the EJVM+;*
 - ✓ *Continue documenting and reporting alleged ceasefire and international humanitarian law violations impartially and transparently;*
 - ✓ *Strengthen civilian protection efforts in areas affected by hostilities; and*
 - ✓ *Facilitate, within its mandate and in coordination with national authorities and humanitarian partners, humanitarian access and medical evacuations, particularly in areas affected by insecurity and restricted access.*
- **To the AU Commission and the AU Mediator:**
 - ✓ *Strengthen proactive political engagement through regular consultations with the DRC Government and AFC/M23 to identify and address blockages before they escalate into implementation crises;*
 - ✓ *Promote a broader regional security approach by supporting complementary arrangements addressing armed groups outside the Doha framework, while respecting its bilateral mandate;*
 - ✓ *Make implementation central to mediation efforts by promoting measurable commitments, clear responsibilities, realistic timelines, and effective verification modalities;*
 - ✓ *Strengthen strategic preparedness and communication to anticipate emerging obstacles, improve engagement with the parties and affected populations, and enhance transparency and confidence in AU mediation; and*
 - ✓ *Secure predictable and sustainable financing through systematic mobilization of the AU Peace Fund and other appropriate resources to ensure continuity of mediation and institutional support.*



2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the PAIMT (Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool), which is based on a coding methodology, to assess the degree of implementation of each of the tasks of a peace agreement on a scale of 0 to 10 points:

- **0 point** signifies an Uninitiated Execution (E_0): This represents the status quo. The parties have not taken any action or observable measures to begin implementing the task.
- **2.5 points** mean an Initiated Execution (E_i): This represents some observable measures of the beginning of the execution of the task, meaning that the parties have established a date for the execution of the task or are having formal or informal discussions on the execution of the task concerned.
- **5 points** signify Minimal Execution (E_m): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards executing the task, but these efforts are insufficient to complete the task by the established deadline, given the current pace of the process.
- **7.5 points** imply an Intermediate Execution (E_I): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the execution of the task, and there is a likelihood that the task can be completed by the end of the established deadline if the current pace continues.
- **10 points** imply a Complete Execution (E_c): This represents the situation in which the task is nearly or fully executed, as specified in the Peace Agreement.

In short, there are five levels of implementation: E_0 (0 point), E_i (2.5 points), E_m (5 points), E_I (7.5 points), and E_c (10 points).

2.2. Legal Instruments Subject to Assessment

Based on the PAIMT methodology and given that the commitments arising from the Doha Peace Process are set out across several legal instruments, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa will assess their implementation on the basis of the obligations contained in the Detainee Release Mechanism, the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM), and the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Accordingly, the Barometer has identified seven (7) measurable tasks under the Detainee Release Mechanism, thirteen (13) under the COVM, and fifteen (15) under the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Tasks Listed in the Detainee Release Mechanism

1. Establishment and validation of the list of detainees;
2. Identification and verification of the listed detainees in detention facilities;
3. Facilitation of ICRC access to detainees;
4. Non-obstruction and timely facilitation of detainee transfer and release;
5. Ensuring the security and integrity of detainees throughout the transfer process;
6. Release and transfer of all eligible detainees; and
7. Resolving disputed or ineligible cases.



Tasks Listed in the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism

1. Designation of representatives;
2. Elaboration and adoption of an operationalization plan;
3. Establishment of a rapid Incident prevention framework;
4. Deployment of verification team;
5. Participation in joint verification;
6. Ensuring EJVM+'s unhindered access, safety, and freedom of movement;
7. Violation reporting and incident information sharing;
8. Verification and investigations of alleged violations;
9. Cooperating with EJVM+'s investigation,
10. Documenting ceasefire violations;
11. Corrective/de-escalation measures;
12. Providing logistical and other resources to EJVM+; and
13. Publication of a weekly bulletin on ceasefire violations.

Tasks Listed in the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement

1. Adoption of the remaining six of the Eight Protocols;
2. Ceasefire;
3. Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism;
4. Detainee-Release Mechanism;
5. Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection;
6. Restoring State Authority;
7. National Government Participation;
8. Institutional Reforms;
9. Restoration of Essential Public Services and Socio-Economic Recovery;
10. Identity and Citizenship Issues;
11. Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees;
12. Justice, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission;
13. Interim Security Arrangements and DDR for Eligible Local Armed Groups;
14. Neutralization of Foreign Armed Groups; and
15. Oversight, Monitoring and Dispute Resolution Mechanism.


Some commitments identified in the above-mentioned legal instruments require joint implementation by the DRC Government and AFC/M23, while others fall under the responsibility of one party or require support from international and regional stakeholders, including the United States, Qatar, the African Union, ICGLR, and relevant United Nations entities.

The implementation of the Doha Peace Process is therefore assessed at two complementary levels: collectively, across all measurable commitments; and individually, for each legal instrument. The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa research team assessed implementation through consultations with key stakeholders, official statements and announcements, and reports from local and international NGOs and the media, covering the period from July 2025 to August 2026.

The scores assigned to the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism and Detainee Release Mechanism as tasks of the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement do not duplicate the detailed instrument-level scores. They measure the implementation of those mechanisms specifically as Framework-level commitments and therefore should not be interpreted as alternative implementation rates for the mechanisms themselves.



Sketch 1: Protocols and the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement





3. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF THE DOHA PEACE PROCESS: JULY 2025-AUGUST 2026

3.1. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF THE DETAINEE RELEASE MECHANISM

As of the end of August 2026, six of the seven tasks identified under the Mechanism had recorded some level of implementation. Five tasks were at the initiated execution stage, one at the minimal execution stage, and one remained uninitiated.

3.1.1. Table 1- Task-Level Implementation Scorecard for the Detainee Release Mechanism

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Establishment and validation of the list of detainees	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
2	Identification and verification of the listed detainees in detention facilities	ICRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Facilitation of ICRC access to detainees	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Non-obstruction and timely facilitation of detainee transfer and release	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Ensuring the security and integrity of detainees throughout the transfer process	DRC Government, AFC/M23, and ICRC	Minimal Execution	5
6	Release and transfer of all eligible detainees	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
7	Resolving disputed or ineligible cases	DRC Government, AFC/M23, and ICRC	Uninitiated Execution	0
Total				17.5/70

Table 2- Task-Level Implementation Scorecard for the Detainee Release Mechanism by the DRC Gov.


N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Establishment and validation of the list of detainees	Initiated Execution	2.5
2	Identification and verification of the listed detainees in detention facilities	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Facilitation of ICRC access to detainees	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Non-obstruction and timely facilitation of detainee transfer and release	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Ensuring the security and integrity of detainees throughout the transfer process	Minimal Execution	5
6	Release and transfer of all eligible detainees	Initiated Execution	2.5
7	Resolving disputed or ineligible cases	Non-initiated Execution	0
Total			17.5/70

Table 3- Task-Level Implementation Scorecard for the Detainee Release Mechanism by AFC/M23

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Establishment and validation of the list of detainees	Initiated Execution	2.5
2	Identification and verification of the listed detainees in detention facilities	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Facilitation of ICRC access to detainees	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Non-obstruction and timely facilitation of detainee transfer and release	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Ensuring the security and integrity of detainees throughout the transfer process	Minimal Execution	5
6	Release and transfer of all eligible detainees	Uninitiated Execution	0
7	Resolving disputed or ineligible cases	Uninitiated Execution	0
Total			15/70



Chart 1- Task-Level Implementation for the Detainee Release Mechanism



3.1.2. Overview of Partially Implemented Tasks under the Detainee Release Mechanism

- **1. Establishment and validation of the list of detainees (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The parties have exchanged information and compiled preliminary lists identifying a total of 477 detainees, including 311 persons claimed by AFC/M23 and detained by the DRC Government, and 166 persons linked to the DRC Government and detained by AFC/M23.³⁸ However, the lists have not yet been jointly verified and formally validated by the parties, and discrepancies regarding the identity, status, and eligibility of some detainees remain to be resolved.
- **2. Identification and verification of the listed detainees in detention facilities (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The parties have undertaken preliminary efforts to identify and verify detainees included on their respective release lists. However, the verification process remains limited in scope, with only a small number of detainees identified or verified to date. A comprehensive verification exercise covering all listed detainees has yet to be completed.
- **3. Facilitation of ICRC access to detainees (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The parties have formally expressed their willingness to facilitate the ICRC's access to detention facilities. However, substantive access to the detainees remains significantly limited, as several identified on the relevant lists could not be located or verified.
- **4. Non-obstruction and timely facilitation of detainee transfer and release (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Although the parties have acknowledged their respective obligations to facilitate the timely transfer and release of

³⁸ Radio Okapi, "Le CICR facilite la première remise de détenus entre le Gouvernement et l'AFC/M23."

<https://www.radiookapi.net/2026/08/07/actualite/securite/le-cicr-facilite-la-premiere-remise-de-detenus-entre-le-gouvernement>



detainees, implementation has been delayed by logistical constraints. In particular, there were delays between the ICRC's identification of the detainees in question and their actual transfer and release. These delays indicate that, although the process has been initiated, the necessary arrangements have not yet been implemented consistently and effectively.

- **5. Ensuring the security and integrity of detainees throughout the transfer process (Score: 5 – Minimal Execution):** Measures were reportedly implemented to safeguard the 15 detainees identified for release. On 6 August 2026, all 15 detainees departed from Beni, North Kivu, as part of a convoy that transited through Uganda. They arrived in Rutshuru Territory, South Kivu, on 7 August 2026, where they were formally handed over to the AFC/M23.³⁹
- **6. Release and Transfer of All Eligible Detainees (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Of the 477 detainees identified under the Protocol on the Liberation of Detainees Mechanism, 15 have been released to date, representing approximately 3.1% of the detainees identified for release. This indicates that implementation of the release and transfer commitment has been initiated, but remains at a very early stage, with most eligible detainees yet to be released.
- **7. Resolve disputed or ineligible cases (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** According to certain sources, six of the fifteen detainees released by the Government of the DRC were reportedly not affiliated with the AFC/M23.⁴⁰ At present, there is limited information regarding the establishment or activation of a mechanism to review and address disputed or potentially ineligible cases, including through appropriate verification and consultation with the relevant parties.

3.1.3. Quantitative Interpretation of the Results for the Detainee Release Mechanism

The analysis of the data presented in Table 1 (above) indicates that out of **7 tasks** identified in the Detainee Release Mechanism, five (5) had achieved an initial stage of implementation, one (1) task had reached a minimal execution, and another (1) had recorded no concrete initiative.

The cumulative implementation score is **17,5 points out of 70** (the maximum score if all tasks were fully implemented), corresponding to **an overall implementation rate of 25%**. Measured **by the number of detainees identified by the parties**, implementation was more limited. **Of the 477 detainees identified, only 15 were released, representing approximately 3.1%**. Nearly one year after the Protocol was signed on 14 September 2025, the limited number of releases underscores the need to accelerate implementation of its commitments.

By party, **the DRC Government recorded 17.5 out of 70 points (25%)**, compared with **15 out of 70 (21.4%) for AFC/M23**. The difference in scores is principally attributable to the fact that the 15 detainees released to date were released by the DRC Government. At the same time, it is also important to acknowledge that, before the adoption of the Protocol, the AFC/M23 authorized the ICRC, between April and May 2025, to facilitate the transfer of more than 1,300 disarmed members of the DRC Government forces and their families from Goma to Kinshasa.⁴¹ This action may reasonably be regarded as an early gesture of goodwill and a confidence-building measure, reflecting the AFC/M23's initial willingness to facilitate the safe transfer of individuals associated with the opposing side.

³⁹ ICRC, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: ICRC hands over 15 people released by the Congolese authorities to AFC/M23."

<https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/democratic-republic-congo-icrc-hands-over-15-people-released-congolese-authorities>

⁴⁰ RFI, "RDC: après la libération de 15 détenus, les divergences persistent entre Kinshasa et l'AFC/M23." <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260810-rdc-apr%C3%A8s-la-lib%C3%A9ration-de-15-d%C3%A9tenus-les-divergences-persistent-entre-kinshasa-et-l-afc-m23>

⁴¹ ICRC, "DRC: The ICRC stands ready to support detainee releases between conflict parties." <https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/drc-icrc-stands-ready-support-detainee-releases-between-conflict-parties>



3.2. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF THE CEASEFIRE OVERSIGHT AND VERIFICATION MECHANISM (COVM)


As of the end of August 2026, the analysis of the data presented in Table 4 indicates that out of 13 tasks identified in the COVM, seven (7) had achieved an initial stage of implementation, one (1) task had reached minimal execution, and five (5) had recorded no concrete initiative.

3.2.1. Table 4- Task-Level Implementation Scorecard for the COVM

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Designation of representatives	DRC Government, AFC/M23, Qatar, USA, AU, MONUSCO, and ICGLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
2	Elaboration and adoption of an operationalization plan	ICGLR, the Government of the DRC, and AFC/M23	Minimal Execution	5
3	Establishment of a rapid Incident prevention framework	ICGLR, the Government of the DRC, and AFC/M23	Uninitiated Execution	0
4	Deployment of verification team	DRC Government, AFC/M23, Qatar, USA, AU, MONUSCO, and ICGLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Participation in joint verification	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
6	Ensuring EJVM+'s unhindered access, safety, and freedom of movement	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
7	Violation reporting and incident information sharing	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
8	Verification and investigations of alleged violations	DRC Government, AFC/M23, Qatar, USA, AU, MONUSCO, and ICGLR	Uninitiated Execution	0
9	Cooperating with EJVM+'s investigation	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
10	Documenting ceasefire violations	EJVM+	Uninitiated Execution	0
11	Corrective/de-escalation measures	EJVM+	Uninitiated Execution	0
12	Providing logistical and other resources to EJVM+	MONUSCO and international partners	Initiated Execution	2.5
13	Publication of a weekly bulletin on ceasefire violations	EJVM+	Uninitiated Execution	0
Total				22.5/130



Chart 2.-Task-Level Implementation for the COVM



3.2.2. Overview of Partially Implemented Tasks under the COVM

- **1. Designation of representatives (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Most stakeholders have identified or nominated their representatives. The DRC Government appointed three officers in July 2026 to serve within the EJVM+, although concerns were subsequently raised by AFC/M23 regarding one nominee. The AU, however, had reportedly not yet formally designated its representatives.
- **2. Elaboration and adoption of operationalization plan (Score: 5 – Minimal Execution):** In April 2026, the ICGLR, the Government of the DRC, and AFC/M23 signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the operationalization of the EJVM+, establishing a framework for its implementation, including operational plans, deployment modalities, areas of operation, coordination arrangements, and logistical requirements. However, as EJVM+ is not yet fully operational, its effectiveness cannot yet be fully assessed.
- **3. Establishment of a rapid Incident prevention framework (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** As of the end of August 2026, there is no evidence that the operationalization of the EJVM+ has, to date, resulted in the



establishment and integration of a rapid incident-prevention mechanism drawing on the ICGLR's existing early-warning, verification, and incident-monitoring architecture.

- **4. Deployment of verification team (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Initial measures have been undertaken to prepare for deploying the Verification Team, including the designation of representatives by most stakeholders. However, a concern reportedly raised by AFC/M23 regarding the identity of one of the officers designated by the Government of the DRC has delayed the team's deployment on the ground. Furthermore, the AU has reportedly not yet designated its representatives.
- **5. Participation in joint verification (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Most stakeholders have designated their representatives and begun making the preparatory arrangements necessary for joint verification. However, substantive joint verification activities have yet to commence.
- **6. Ensuring EJVM+'s unhindered access, safety, and freedom of movement (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The parties have formally committed to facilitating EJVM+'s access, safety, and freedom of movement and have initiated measures such as issuing access authorizations, providing security assurances, or granting movement clearances. However, the verification team has not yet been deployed.
- **7. Violation reporting and incident information sharing (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The parties have established procedures and communication channels for reporting alleged violations and sharing relevant incident information. However, no formal reports have yet been submitted through EJVM+, as the mechanism has not yet become fully operational.
- **8. Verification and investigations of alleged violations (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** Although the EJVM+ conducted its first field mission in Minembwe on August 24, 2026, no completed investigation or publicly documented verification finding was available by the assessment date. The task therefore remains at an uninitiated level under the Barometer's evidence-based coding criteria.
- **9. Cooperating with EJVM+'s investigation (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The parties have expressed their willingness to cooperate with EJVM+ investigations and have taken preliminary steps to facilitate the mechanism's work. However, substantive cooperation remains limited, as no significant investigative activities or concrete acts of cooperation have yet been documented, pending the full operationalization of EJVM+.
- **10. Documenting ceasefire violations (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** The EJVM+ has not yet undertaken any documentation of alleged ceasefire violations, as the report on its first mission to Minembwe has not been published.
- **11. Corrective/de-escalation measures (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** No corrective or de-escalation measures have been initiated in response to reported ceasefire violations or heightened tensions. The mechanism has not yet become sufficiently operational to facilitate, coordinate, or implement such measures.
- **12. Providing logistical and other resources to EJVM+ (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** In July 2026, the Deputy Special Representative of MONUSCO, Vivian van de Perre, whose institution had indicated its willingness to provide logistical support to the EJVM+, visited Goma and accompanied the three FARDC officers designated to represent the Congolese side within the EJVM+. ⁴² This engagement is an initial step toward operationalizing the mechanism. However, following the inaugural EJVM+ field mission conducted in Minembwe on 24 August 2026, a second mission was reportedly planned for Masisi Territory in North Kivu Province. According to diplomatic sources, however, the mission could not be undertaken as scheduled due to insufficient funding. This suggests that, despite initial efforts to mobilize logistical support, the resources effectively available for sustained EJVM+ field operations remained limited.
- **13. Publication of a weekly bulletin on ceasefire violations (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** No weekly bulletin or equivalent periodic public reporting mechanism for ceasefire violations has been published, as the mechanism is not yet fully operational.

⁴² RFI, "La RDC envoie trois officiers pour le mécanisme de cessez-le-feu dans l'Est où armée et AFC/M23 s'accusent de violations."

<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260714-la-rdc-envoie-trois-officiers-pour-le-m%C3%A9canisme-de-cessez-le-feu-dans-l-est-o%C3%B9-arm%C3%A9e-et-afc-m23-s-accusent-de-violations>



3.2.3. Quantitative Interpretation of the Results for the COVM

The analysis of the data presented in Table 4 (above) indicates that out of 13 tasks identified in the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism, seven (7) achieved an initial stage of implementation, one (1) task had reached a minimal execution, and five (5) had recorded no concrete initiative. **The cumulative implementation score is 22.5 points out of 130** (the maximum score if all tasks were fully implemented), **corresponding to an overall implementation rate of 17.3%.**

3.3. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT


As of the end of August 2026, the analysis of the data presented in Table 5 indicates that out of 15 tasks identified in the Doha Framework Agreement, six (6) had achieved an initial stage of implementation, two (2) tasks had reached a minimal execution, and seven (7) had recorded no concrete initiative.

3.3.1. Table 5- Task-Level Implementation Scorecard for the Framework Agreement

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Adoption of the remaining six of the Eight Protocols	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
2	Ceasefire	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism	DRC Government, AFC/M23, Qatar, USA, AU, and ICGLR	Minimal Execution	5
4	Detainee-Release Mechanism	DRC Government, AFC/M23, and International Community ("ICCR")	Minimal Execution	5
5	Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection	DRC Government, AFC/M23, and International Community	Initiated Execution	2.5
6	Restoring State Authority	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Uninitiated Execution	0
7	National Government Participation	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Uninitiated Execution	0
8	Institutional Reforms	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Uninitiated Execution	0
9	Restoration of Essential Public Services and Socio-Economic Recovery	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Uninitiated Execution	0
10	Identity and Citizenship Issues	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Uninitiated Execution	0
11	Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees	DRC Government, AFC/M23, and International Community ("HCR")	Initiated Execution	2.5
12	Justice, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Uninitiated Execution	0
13	Interim Security Arrangements and DDR for Eligible Local Armed Groups	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Uninitiated Execution	0
14	Neutralization of Foreign Armed Groups	DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
15	Oversight, Monitoring and Dispute Resolution Mechanism	Qatar, USA, and AU, DRC Government and AFC/M23	Initiated Execution	2.5
Total				25/150



Chart 3- Task-Level Implementation for the Framework Agreement





3.3.2. Overview of Partially Implemented Tasks under the Framework Agreement

- **1. Adoption of the remaining six of the Eight Protocols (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The parties have initiated discussions on the Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection Protocol.⁴³ However, as of the reporting period, there is no clear evidence of substantive negotiations on the other outstanding protocols. Continued engagement will be necessary to advance discussions on the remaining protocols toward their adoption.
- **2. Ceasefire (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The parties have taken initial steps toward implementing the ceasefire, including publicly reaffirming their commitment. However, significant armed clashes between the FADC and the AFC/M23 continue in several localities and regions, with no sustained cessation of hostilities.
- **3. Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (Score: 5 – Minimal Execution):** The EJVM+ has been formally established, with representatives designated and initial procedures agreed upon. However, its first verification mission was not conducted until August 24, 2026, in Minembwe, indicating that the mechanism remains at an early stage of operationalization. Further efforts are required to ensure the mechanism's effective and full functioning in the areas concerned.
- **4. Detainee-Release Mechanism (Score: 5 – Minimal Execution):** The Detainee-Release Mechanism has been formally established, and the parties have begun implementing several key elements, including the creation and verification of detainee lists, the identification of eligible detainees, and the facilitation of ICRC access. Of the 477 detainees identified under the Protocol on the Liberation of Detainees Mechanism, 15 have been released to date. Such a limited number of releases completed to date suggests that implementation remains at a very early stage, with significant additional effort required to advance the process toward full implementation.
- **5. Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Concrete measures have been taken to initiate negotiations and advance the adoption of the Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection, which remains to be finalized. In the interim, the parties have agreed to respect and protect the continued provision of essential services to the civilian population, facilitate access to basic social services (including food, water, healthcare, and education) and refrain from any action that could disrupt the delivery of these services.
- **6. Restoring State Authority (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** No substantive measures have been undertaken to restore state authority in conflict-affected areas currently under the control of the AFC/M23. State institutions remain absent, displaced, or otherwise unable to exercise their lawful functions effectively. This indicates that, notwithstanding the parties' agreement in principle on the restoration of state authority, implementation of this commitment has not yet commenced in any meaningful or verifiable manner.
- **7. National Government Participation (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** The DRC Government has not yet taken substantive steps to facilitate the participation of the AFC/M23 in the agreed national government arrangements or to enable the designation of its representatives to the relevant state institutions. At the same time, the AFC/M23 continues to exercise administrative authority in territories under its control, operating in practice with a significant degree of autonomy from the central government.
- **8. Institutional Reforms (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** No concrete or verifiable steps have yet been undertaken to identify, formulate, or initiate the implementation of the agreed institutional reforms. While the parties have expressed agreement in principle on the need for institutional reforms, this commitment has not yet been translated into substantive or demonstrable implementation measures.
- **9. Restoration of Essential Public Services and Socio-Economic Recovery (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** No substantive measures have yet been undertaken to restore essential public services or initiate socio-economic recovery in the affected areas. Several critical public services remain disrupted. Although the parties have expressed agreement in principle on the importance of restoring essential public services and supporting socio-economic recovery, this commitment has not yet been translated into concrete, demonstrable, or sustained implementation measures.

⁴³ US Department of State, "Joint Statement on Progress Between the Representatives of Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) on the Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection, the Operationalization of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism, and the Release of Prisoners of April 18, 2026." <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/joint-statement-on-progress-between-the-representatives-of-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-of-the-alliance-fleuve-congo-march-23-movement-afc-m23-on-the-protoc>



- **10. Identity and Citizenship Issues (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** To date, there is no clear evidence of substantive negotiations or other concrete measures to advance the Identity and Citizenship Protocol, including efforts to address issues relating to identity, nationality, citizenship, civil documentation, and other related matters of legal status arising from the conflict.
- **11. Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** The parties have committed to facilitating the safe, voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their areas of origin. At this stage, however, concrete arrangements to support their sustainable return and reintegration remain limited. In particular, no comprehensive reintegration mechanism or adequate infrastructure appears to have been implemented to facilitate this process. Furthermore, there is currently no clear indication that substantive discussions on the Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees Protocol have commenced.
- **12. Justice, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** No action has been taken to establish the Justice, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission. No institutional framework, mandate, membership, or operational arrangements exist.
- **13. Interim Security Arrangements and the DDR for Eligible Local Armed Groups (Score: 0 – Uninitiated Execution):** No concrete measures have been taken to establish interim security arrangements or initiate DDR for eligible local armed groups. No agreed transitional security structure, deployment, or coordination arrangement is operational, and no eligible armed groups or combatants have entered a formal DDR process.
- **14. Neutralization of Foreign Armed Groups (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** Under the Washington Peace Agreement, the Government of the DRC has undertaken measures to neutralize elements of the FDLR that continue to retain significant operational capacity. The DRC Government has also concluded bilateral arrangements with Uganda⁴⁴ and Burundi⁴⁵ to address the presence and activities of the ADF and RED-Tabara in eastern DRC, respectively. However, these measures have yet to translate into verifiable and sustained progress toward the effective neutralization of these foreign armed groups.
- **15. Oversight and Dispute Resolution Mechanism (Score: 2.5 – Initiated Execution):** During the Montreux meeting in July 2026, the parties agreed to establish an oversight mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Doha Framework Agreement.⁴⁶ However, the modalities and procedures governing this mechanism's operation have not yet been publicly released.

3.3.3. Quantitative Interpretation of the Results for the Framework Agreement

The analysis of the data presented in Table 5 indicates that out of 15 tasks identified in the Doha Framework Agreement for a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of the DRC and the AFC/M23, six (6) had achieved an initial stage of implementation, two (2) tasks had reached a minimal execution, and seven (7) had recorded no concrete initiative.

The cumulative implementation score is 25 points out of 150 (the maximum score if all tasks were fully implemented), corresponding to an overall implementation rate of 16.7%.

⁴⁴ RFI, "Shujaa: le jeu d'équilibriste de l'Ouganda dans l'Est de la RDC." <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241202-shujaa-jeu-equilibriste-ouganda-est-de-la-rdc>

⁴⁵ Africa 24 TV, "La RD Congo et le Burundi signent un accord de coopération militaire." <https://africa24tv.com/la-rd-congo-et-le-burundi-signent-un-accord-de-cooperation-militaire/>

⁴⁶ RFI, "RDC et AFC/M23 se retrouvent en Suisse pour tenter de relancer le processus de paix." <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260822-rdc-et-afc-m23-se-retrouvent-en-suisse-pour-tenter-de-relancer-le-processus-de-paix>



4. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE THREE INSTRUMENTS


A comparative assessment of implementation across the three principal instruments of the Doha Peace Process, as presented in Table 6 (Distribution of Implementation) and the accompanying comparative chart, reveals generally limited progress, with notable variation among the instruments. The Detainee Release Mechanism achieved the highest implementation rate at 25%, followed by COVM at 17.3%, while the Doha Framework Agreement recorded 16.7%.

Table 6-Distribution of Implementation across the Three Instruments

Instrument	Total Tasks	Uninitiated Execution	Initiated Execution	Minimal Execution	Intermediary Execution	Complete Execution	Score	Rate
Detainee Release Mechanism	7	1	5	1	0	0	17.5/70	25.0%
COVM	13	5	7	1	0	0	22.5/130	17.3%
Doha Framework	15	7	6	2	0	0	25/150	16.7%
Total	35	13	18	4	0	0	65/350	18.6%

In total, the three instruments comprise **35 measurable tasks**, with a cumulative maximum of 350 points if all tasks are fully implemented. **The combined score across the three instruments stands at 65 out of 350 points, corresponding to an overall implementation rate of 18.6%.**

Comparative Chart on the Implementation of the Three Instruments



The analysis also reveals that, despite the establishment of formal negotiating and implementation architecture, **fewer than one-fifth of the measurable commitments assessed by the Barometer had been implemented as of the assessment date.**

- The **Detainee Release Mechanism** recorded the highest implementation rate among the three instruments, at 25%. Five of its seven measurable tasks have entered the initiated execution phase, one has entered the minimal execution phase, and one remains unexecuted. This comparatively higher score reflects the parties' progress in undertaking preliminary measures, including the identification and processing of detainees, as well as the ICRC's involvement. However, implementation remains largely procedural, with most tasks still at the initial stage and limited progress toward the actual release and transfer of eligible detainees. The Mechanism therefore illustrates a broader pattern in the Doha process: the establishment of agreed frameworks and preliminary implementation measures has not yet consistently translated into substantive and verifiable outcomes.



- The **COVM** achieved an implementation rate of 17.3%, marginally higher than the Framework Agreement but still substantially below a level indicative of meaningful implementation. Of its thirteen tasks, seven had reached the initiated execution stage, one had reached the minimal execution stage, while five remained uninitiated. This relatively low level of implementation is particularly significant given the EJVM+'s central role within the institutional architecture of the Doha peace process. Its effectiveness depends not only on its formal establishment but also on its operational deployment, access to relevant locations, verification of alleged ceasefire violations, information-sharing, reporting, and follow-up on identified violations. The predominance of tasks at the Initiated Execution stage, together with five tasks that remain uninitiated, underscores a significant gap between the formal establishment of the EJVM+ and its effective operationalization in the field.
- The **Doha Framework Agreement** accomplished an implementation rate of 16.7%, the lowest among the three instruments. Of the fifteen measurable tasks identified, six had reached the Initiated Execution stage, two had reached the Minimal Execution stage, while seven remained Uninitiated. The high proportion of uninitiated tasks reflects that several substantive components of the Framework remain in the preliminary stages of negotiation or implementation. In particular, delays in concluding the six remaining protocols have slowed progress across several essential dimensions of the political, security, and socioeconomic settlement of the crisis.

Taken together, the results show that none of the three instruments has reached one-third of full implementation. The Detainee Release Mechanism records the highest implementation rate at 25%, while the COVM and Doha Framework remain below 20%.



5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

The assessment of the Doha Peace Process for the period from July 2025 to August 2026 shows that progress has focused more on establishing the legal and institutional framework than on the effective implementation of the agreed commitments. Nevertheless, significant progress has been made, notably through the adoption of the Framework Agreement, advances toward operationalizing the EJVM+, the release and transfer of the first detainees, and the resumption of negotiations during the Montreux consultations. Despite these developments, the overall implementation rate remains limited, at approximately 18.6%. Moreover, the gains achieved during the first thirteen months remain fragile and have not yet translated into a sustained reduction in hostilities or tangible improvements in the security and humanitarian conditions of affected populations.

In this regard, the following specific recommendations are formulated:

5.1. Recommendations to all stakeholders of the Doha Peace Process (DRC Government, AFC/M23, Qatar, the United States, the African Union, and ICGLR):

- Consider consolidating the commitments and institutional arrangements developed under the Doha process into a single, comprehensive, and legally coherent Peace Agreement. The agreement should, as appropriate, bring together provisions on cessation of hostilities; humanitarian access and judicial protection; detainee releases; restoration of state authority; governance and institutional reforms; interim security arrangements; DDR; neutralization of armed groups; identity and citizenship; displacement and refugee return and reintegration; socio-economic recovery; justice, truth, and reconciliation; and implementation, monitoring, verification, dispute resolution, and compliance; and
- While such a comprehensive agreement cannot by itself ensure compliance without political will and good-faith implementation, it could reduce legal and institutional fragmentation, clarify the hierarchy and interrelationship of commitments, facilitate monitoring and evaluation, and provide a single authoritative framework for the parties, facilitators, guarantors, and affected populations.

5.2. Recommendations to the Government of the DRC:

- Prioritize the full and verifiable implementation of existing Doha commitments, particularly those relating to the ceasefire, detainee release, humanitarian access, and EJVM+ operationalization;
- Accelerate the release and safe transfer of eligible detainees, in coordination with AFC/M23 and the ICRC;
- Ensure full cooperation with the EJVM+ by deploying its designated representatives and guaranteeing unhindered access, security, and freedom of movement to locations required for effective verification;
- Strengthen ceasefire compliance by ensuring that forces under Government control refrain from unilateral military actions that could undermine the cessation of hostilities;
- Facilitate unhindered humanitarian access and support the restoration of essential public services in areas under AFC/M23 control, in coordination with humanitarian and development partners; and
- Accelerate negotiations on the six outstanding protocols and work with AFC/M23 and the Qatari

5.3. Recommendations to the AFC/M23:

- Demonstrate sustained commitment to the ceasefire by refraining from offensive military operations and further territorial expansion;
- Ensure full cooperation with the EJVM+ by deploying its designated representatives and guaranteeing unhindered access, security, and freedom of movement to locations required for effective verification;
- Prioritize resolving any disputes concerning access to verification sites through the procedures established by the EJVM+, rather than by imposing unilateral restrictions. Where a site is deemed unsafe or no longer relevant for verification purposes, AFC/M23 should promptly inform the EJVM+ and agree with the parties concerned on an appropriate alternative site;
- Accelerate the release and safe transfer of eligible detainees, in coordination with the DRC Government and the ICRC;



- Facilitate the restoration of state authority in territories under AFC/M23 control by progressively dismantling parallel administrative, judicial, security, and governance structures operating outside the DRC's constitutional and legal framework;
- Facilitate humanitarian access in areas under its control by ensuring prompt, safe, sustained, and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and personnel, and support the reopening and secure operation of Goma and Bukavu airports; and
- Accelerate negotiations on the six outstanding protocols and work constructively with the DRC Government and the Qatari facilitation to establish clear, realistic, and time-bound deadlines for their conclusion and adoption.

5.4. Recommendations to Qatar:

- Intensify facilitation efforts to accelerate negotiations on the six outstanding protocols, particularly the Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection, by working with the parties to establish clear, realistic, and time-bound deadlines for their negotiation, conclusion, and adoption;
- Continue to encourage and support the Government of the DRC and AFC/M23 in fully implementing the protocols already concluded and in resolving outstanding procedural and political obstacles to their execution;
- Encourage the parties to consolidate the commitments arising from the Doha Process into a single, comprehensive, and legally coherent peace agreement, in order to reduce fragmentation and clarify the modalities for implementation, monitoring, verification, and dispute resolution; and
- Strengthen diplomatic coordination with the AU, the United States, ICGLR, and other relevant partners to enhance coherence between the Doha and Washington processes and ensure coordinated support for implementation.

5.5. Recommendations to the United States:

- Maintain and strengthen coordinated diplomatic engagement with the parties to promote full, timely, and verifiable compliance with their commitments under the Doha Peace Process;
- Encourage and support the accelerated negotiation and conclusion of the six outstanding Doha protocols, particularly through clear, realistic, and time-bound negotiating and implementation benchmarks;
- Continue considering, as a last resort, targeted coercive measures against actors found to be deliberately obstructing or undermining implementation of the Doha commitments;
- Support MONUSCO and, where appropriate, the EJVM+ with adequate technical, financial, and logistical resources to strengthen ceasefire monitoring, verification, reporting, and operational capacity; and
- Institutionalize coordination between the Washington and Doha processes, including through regular consultations among Qatar, the African Union, and the ICGLR, to ensure coherent sequencing, avoid contradictory initiatives, and address the substantive interdependence between the two tracks.

5.6. Recommendations to the ICGLR:

- Accelerate the full operationalization of the EJVM+, including, inter alia, the designation of verification sites and the deployment of verification teams;
- Establish a regular and impartial public communication mechanism on verified ceasefire-related incidents, measures taken in response, as well as outstanding or disputed cases, to enhance transparency and public confidence; and
- Strengthen coordination with MONUSCO, the AU, and other relevant partners with respect to logistical and technical support, information-sharing, geographical access, and verification activities.



5.7. Recommendations to MONUSCO:

- Continue to provide appropriate logistical, technical, and operational support to the EJVM+;
- Continue documenting and reporting alleged ceasefire and international humanitarian law violations impartially and transparently;
- Strengthen civilian protection efforts in areas affected by hostilities; and
- Facilitate, within its mandate and in coordination with national authorities and humanitarian partners, humanitarian access and medical evacuations, particularly in areas affected by insecurity and restricted access.

5.8. Recommendations to the African Union and the AU Mediator:

- Strengthen proactive political engagement through regular consultations with the DRC Government and AFC/M23 to identify and address blockages before they escalate into implementation crises;
- Promote a broader regional security approach by supporting complementary arrangements addressing armed groups outside the Doha framework, while respecting its bilateral mandate;
- Make implementation central to mediation efforts by promoting measurable commitments, clear responsibilities, realistic timelines, and effective verification modalities;
- Strengthen strategic preparedness and communication to anticipate emerging obstacles, improve engagement with the parties and affected populations, and enhance transparency and confidence in AU mediation; and
- Secure predictable and sustainable financing through systematic mobilization of the AU Peace Fund and other appropriate resources to ensure continuity of mediation and institutional support.
