



## REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WASHINGTON PEACE AGREEMENT: DECEMBER 2025

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*This report presents the assessment of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, conducted by a group of independent experts, on the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, signed on June 27, 2025, for the period from December 1<sup>st</sup> to December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2025.*

*The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is an independent platform dedicated to monitoring, evaluating, and promoting the effective implementation of peace agreements in Africa, starting with the Washington Peace Agreement. Established in August 2025, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is based on the observation that many peace agreements in Africa have failed, not because of their content, but because of a lack of rigorous monitoring of their implementation. In the absence of an objective mechanism to measure compliance with commitments, each party remains free to assert its own compliance with the Agreement or to accuse the other of violating it. Far from replacing the official mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement established by the Agreement itself, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa provides reliable, up-to-date, and factual data on the progress of the peace commitments made by the parties.*

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*Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool (PAIMT), designed and adapted by one of its experts (Dr. Roger-Claude Liwanga, drawing on his previous experience with The Carter Center evaluating peace agreements in Africa), and inspired by a methodology similar to that of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.*



## ACRONYMS

AFC-M23	Congo River Alliance – March 23 Movement
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
CONOPS	Concept of Operations of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda
EAC	East African Community
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
JOC	Joint Oversight Committee
JSCM	Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo
PAIMT	Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda
SADC	Southern African Development Community
AU	African Union
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area



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## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Six months after the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement on 27 June 2025 between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, progress in implementation remains fragile, uneven, and marked by an apparent loss of momentum. Monitoring of the December 2025 period highlights the persistence of a worrying stagnation in the implementation process, as the execution score recorded in December is identical to that of November 2025. Collectively, **of the 30 tasks identified in the Agreement, only 19 have begun implementation, for an overall implementation rate of 23.3% (70 out of 300 points). Considering only partially completed tasks, the completion rate is 36.8% (70 out of 190 points).**

Individually, **of the 26 tasks under the DRC's responsibility in the Agreement, only 16 have been partially implemented, for an overall implementation rate of 22.1% (57.5 points out of 260). Considering only the partially implemented tasks, the execution rate reaches 35.9% (57.5 points out of 160).**

As for Rwanda, **of the 22 tasks assigned to it in the Agreement, only 13 have been partially implemented, for an overall implementation rate of 22.7% (50 points out of 220). Considering only the partially implemented tasks, the completion rate reaches 38.4% (50 points out of 130).**

Furthermore, **all seven (7) tasks assigned to the international community in the Agreement have been partially implemented, for an overall implementation rate of 39.2% (27.5 points out of 70).**

The only positive developments observed during the period from 1 to 31 December 2025 were purely normative in nature and consisted of the following:

- The formal endorsement, on 4 December 2025, by the Congolese and Rwandan Presidents of the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement of 27 June 2025;<sup>1</sup>
- The signing, on the same date (4 December 2025), of a series of bilateral economic and security agreements, including the Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) between the DRC and Rwanda;<sup>2</sup> and
- The adoption, on 19 December 2025, by the United Nations Security Council of the Resolution 2808 (2025), extending the mandate of MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo), strengthening certain of its prerogatives in the areas of ceasefire monitoring and verification, and urging the DRC and Rwanda to implement in good faith the obligations incumbent upon them under the Washington Peace Agreement.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> US State Department, "Joint Declaration by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda on the Occasion of Establishing the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity." [https://www.state.gov/joint-declaration-by-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda-on-the-occasion-of-establishing-the-washington-accords-for-peace-and-prosperity/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=govdelivery](https://www.state.gov/joint-declaration-by-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda-on-the-occasion-of-establishing-the-washington-accords-for-peace-and-prosperity/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery).

<sup>2</sup> US State Department, "Regional Economic Integration Framework Between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda". [https://www.state.gov/regional-economic-integration-framework-between-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-government-of-the-republic-of-rwanda/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=govdelivery](https://www.state.gov/regional-economic-integration-framework-between-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-government-of-the-republic-of-rwanda/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery).

Other accords signed on the same day include: the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the DRC and the United States; the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the DRC Concerning an Expanded Security Partnership; and the Framework for Shared Economic Prosperity between Rwanda and the United States. See also: US State Department, "Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo." [https://www.state.gov/strategic-partnership-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=govdelivery](https://www.state.gov/strategic-partnership-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery); US State Department, "Signing of the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda." [https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/12/signing-of-the-washington-accords-for-peace-and-prosperity-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=govdelivery](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/12/signing-of-the-washington-accords-for-peace-and-prosperity-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery).

<sup>3</sup> Conseil de Sécurité des Nations, Résolution 2808 (2025) adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité à sa 10075<sup>e</sup> Séance, le 19 décembre 2025. See also : United Nations, « Security Council renews DR Congo Peacekeeping Mission amid Renewed M23 Offensives in the East". <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/12/114214/security-council-renews-dr-congo-peacekeeping-mission-amid-renewed>.



However, significant challenges were marked by the intensification of hostilities in eastern DRC and the failure to fulfill the key security-related and priority obligations provided for under the Agreement—particularly, the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures—which continue to experience substantial delays in their implementation.

During the period under review, *the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa* recorded the following observations:

- Shortly after the formal endorsement of the Washington Peace Agreement on 4 December 2025, the armed group AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) continued its offensive attacks against the FARDC along the Kamanyola–Uvira axis, resulting in the capture of several localities, including the city of Uvira.<sup>4</sup>
- Following pressure exerted by the international community—particularly the United States—on Rwanda and the AFC/M23, the latter announced its withdrawal from the city of Uvira.<sup>5</sup> However, Congolese government authorities have denounced this as an “unverified and false withdrawal,” maintaining that elements of the AFC/M23 remain present in the city and its immediate surroundings.<sup>6</sup>
- This intensification of hostilities (occurring despite the official endorsement of the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement and the signing, on 15 November 2025 in Doha, of the framework agreement between the Government of the DRC and representatives of the AFC/M23<sup>7</sup>) appears to be attributable to divergent perceptions of the ongoing peace processes in eastern DRC. Within the AFC/M23, it is reportedly considered that its disputes with the Congolese Government fall exclusively under the Doha process, and that it is therefore not bound by the Washington Peace Agreement.<sup>8</sup> Conversely, Rwanda does not appear to consider itself directly concerned by the commitments arising from the Doha process. Yet, these two processes should be understood as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive frameworks.
- Even though the FARDC launched an awareness-raising campaign aimed at encouraging FDLR elements to lay down their arms and surrender to the Congolese authorities or to MONUSCO,<sup>9</sup> the FDLR have expressed their intention to maintain their positions and “resist,” pending a possible opening of a dialogue with the Rwandan authorities<sup>10</sup> to seek obtaining specific security and/or judicial guarantees.
- At the same time, among the areas identified as hosting elements of the FDLR (including parts of Lubero, Masisi, Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, and Walikale), only one remains under the effective control of the Congolese Government. In contrast, the others have come under the control of the AFC/M23. This *de facto* configuration limits the Congolese Government’s capacity to conduct FDLR neutralization operations exclusively to the territory under its authority.

<sup>4</sup> Ministère de la Communication et Médias de la RD Congo, “Communiqué : Persistance de l’Agression Rwandaise et Mise en Pêril de l’Accord de Paix Parrainé par le Président Donald J. Trump,.” 10 décembre 2025. [https://x.com/com\\_mediasrdc/status/1998907554525753367?s=46](https://x.com/com_mediasrdc/status/1998907554525753367?s=46)

<sup>5</sup> Le Monde, “RDC : Le M23 Propose de se Retirer d’Uvira sous Condition, après la Colère Américaine.”

[https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/12/16/rdc-le-m23-propose-de-se-retirer-d-uvira-sous-condition-apres-la-colere-americaine\\_6658175\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/12/16/rdc-le-m23-propose-de-se-retirer-d-uvira-sous-condition-apres-la-colere-americaine_6658175_3212.html).

<sup>6</sup> Kivu Morning Post, “DRC: The Government Suspects a Fake M23 Withdrawal from Uvira,” <https://kivumorningpost.com/2025/12/18/rdc-le-gouvernement-soupconne-un-faux-retrait-du-m23-a-uvira/>.

<sup>7</sup> “L’Accord-Cadre de Doha pour un Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo et l’Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 Mars.” [https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45656-doc-2025.11.15\\_-\\_SIGNED\\_Framework\\_Peace\\_Agreement\\_FR.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/45656-doc-2025.11.15_-_SIGNED_Framework_Peace_Agreement_FR.pdf). See also: African Union, “African Union Welcomes the Signing of a Ceasefire Verification

Mechanism for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Press Release. <https://au.int/fr/node/45499>.

<sup>8</sup> Groupe de Presse La République, “Crise à l’Est : Doha Convoque en Urgence Kinshasa et l’AFC-M23 Alors que les Combats S’intensifient.” <https://larepublique.net/crise-a-lest-doha-convoque-en-urgence-kinshasa-et-lafc-m23-alors-que-les-combats-sintensifient/>?

<sup>9</sup> RFI, “RDC: L’Armée Lance une Campagne de Sensibilisation pour Inciter les FDLR à Déposer les Armes », <https://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20251108-rdc-l-arm%C3%A9e-lance-une-campagne-de-sensibilisation-pour-inciter-les-fdlr-%C3%A0-d%C3%A9poser-les-armes>. Voir aussi : RFI, « RDC: «Nous résisterons jusqu’à ce que Kigali accepte un dialogue», affirment les FDLR.” <https://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20251110-rdc-nous-%C3%A9sisterons-jusqu-%C3%A0-ce-que-kigali-accepte-un-dialogue-affirment-les-fdlr>.

<sup>10</sup> RFI, “RDC: «Nous Résisterons Jusqu’à ce que Kigali Accepte un Dialogue», affirment les FDLR.” <https://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20251110-rdc-nous-%C3%A9sisterons-jusqu-%C3%A0-ce-que-kigali-accepte-un-dialogue-affirment-les-fdlr>.



- Moreover, while the joint timetable for the neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures implies the simultaneous implementation of both operations, the Rwandan authorities condition the withdrawal of their troops from the DRC territories on the prior neutralization of the FDLR.<sup>11</sup>
- Finally, the lack of effective access to humanitarian assistance remains a matter of concern, as the intensification of fighting along the Kamanyola–Uvira axis has exacerbated the already precarious conditions faced by civilian populations.<sup>12</sup> The reopening of the Goma airport, which would be used to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid as requested during the Great Lakes Region Peace Conference held in late October 2025 in Paris,<sup>13</sup> remains closed, despite the urgent needs of vulnerable populations.

Faced with these blockages, the *Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa* recommends targeted actions to be undertaken by each stakeholder:

- **To the Government of the DRC:**
  - ✓ **Accelerate, without further delay, the implementation of operations to neutralize the FDLR**, in coordination with the JSCM, while ensuring the strict protection of civilians in conflict zones;
  - ✓ **Consider, within the framework of the neutralization of the FDLR, the formal involvement of MONUSCO, with a particular focus on areas hosting FDLR elements but currently under the control of the AFC/M23.** This option is justified by the MONUSCO's renewed mandate, which authorizes it to neutralize non-state armed groups, notably through the deployment of its Intervention Brigade, acting independently or jointly with the FARDC.<sup>14</sup> Of course, the DRC has previously conducted joint FDLR-neutralization operations with MONUSCO in 2015.<sup>15</sup> Such an approach would help remove the pretexts advanced by the various parties: the DRC would no longer be able to invoke the lack of territorial control to explain potential delays in neutralization efforts, while Rwanda would no longer be able to justify the continuation of its defensive security measures if the FDLR were effectively neutralized;
  - ✓ **Consider providing transparent and verifiable assurances to all stakeholders that no members of the FDLR are integrated into the FARDC**, thereby addressing persistent allegations, reducing misperceptions, and strengthening mutual trust among the parties;
  - ✓ **Operationalize the Joint Ceasefire Verification Mechanism** signed in Doha on October 14, 2025, a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Washington Agreement; and
  - ✓ **Develop and implement a national plan for the protection of civilians, in collaboration with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors.**
- **To the Government of Rwanda:**
  - ✓ **Implement, without further delay, the harmonized plan for disengagement and lifting of defensive measures**, with measurable objectives and a joint verification mechanism;
  - ✓ **Provide security and/or judicial guarantees to FDLR members still present in the DRC who remain reluctant to surrender, to facilitate their voluntary repatriation to Rwanda;**
  - ✓ **Provide explicit assurances to the American and Qatari facilitators, as well as to the African Union mediator, regarding the effective implementation of the security and/or judicial guarantees offered to members of the FDLR**, particularly those who remain hesitant to surrender voluntarily;

<sup>11</sup> Interview du Ministre Rwandais des Affaires Etrangères sur *RFI Grand Invité Afrique*. See also : “RDC-Rwanda: Il y a des Violations Permanentes du Cessez-le-feu par l’Armée Congolaise.” <https://www.rfi.fr/podcasts/le-grand-invite%C3%A9-africain/20251126-rdc-rwanda-il-y-a-des-violations-permanentes-du-cessez-le-feu-par-l-arm%C3%A9e-congolaise>.

<sup>12</sup> RFI, “RDC: au Sud-Kivu, l’AFC/M23 Annonce son Retrait Sous Conditions de la ville d’Uvira.” <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/africain/20251216-rdc-au-sud-kivu-l-afc-m23-annonce-son-retrait-de-la-ville-d-uvira-sous-conditions>.

<sup>13</sup> Jeune Afrique, “RDC : la conférence de Paris Lève des Fonds Humanitaires mais Paye son Impuissance Politique.”

<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1736399/politique/rdc-la-conference-de-paris-leve-des-fonds-humanitaires-mais-paye-son-impuissance-politique/>

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, “Security Council Renews DR Congo Peacekeeping Mission amid Renewed M23 Offensives in the East.”

<https://www.un.org/en/news-media/news/2025/12/114214/security-council-renews-dr-congo-peacekeeping-mission-amid-renewed>.

<sup>15</sup> MONUSCO, “Opérations Militaires de l’Est de la RD Congo Objectif : Neutraliser les FDLR.”

[https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/echos\\_monusco\\_numero\\_41\\_2.pdf](https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/echos_monusco_numero_41_2.pdf).





- ✓ **Encourage the AFC/M23 to refrain from obstructing potential MONUSCO operations aimed at neutralizing FDLR elements in territories under their control**, should a formal request be formulated by the Congolese Government;
- ✓ **Persuade the AFC/M23 to strengthen the protection of civilian populations in territories under their control**; and
- ✓ **Use its influence over the AFC/M23 to facilitate unimpeded humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations** (including the reopening of the Goma airport).
- **To the JOC and the JSCM:**
  - ✓ **Publish reports providing a more comprehensive and detailed account of all observed violations, delays, instances of non-compliance with agreed commitments, and planned corrective measures.** Such an approach would help strengthen transparency and increase public confidence in the implementation process, while replacing the brief joint communiqués currently issued.
- **Collectively to the Facilitators (USA, Qatar, and the African Union mediator):**
  - ✓ **Develop and propose to the parties the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding establishing the complementarity and non-exclusivity of the commitments arising from the Washington and Doha processes.** Such an instrument would allow for the integration of the AFC/M23 within the framework of the Washington Agreement, formally engage Rwanda in the Doha process, and consequently facilitate coordination and coherence between the two peace processes.
- **To the United States:**
  - ✓ **Continue to exert increased diplomatic pressure on both parties** to respect the agreed deadlines (particularly those relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops);
  - ✓ **Encourage Rwanda to provide security and/or judicial guarantees to members of the FDLR still present in the DRC to facilitate their voluntary repatriation to their country**;
  - ✓ **Provide technical and logistical support for the coordination and verification operations of the JSCM and the JOC**;
  - ✓ **Ensure that MONUSCO is provided with the necessary financial resources, as well as adequate technical and logistical support**, to enable it to effectively fulfill its newly reinforced mandate, notably in the areas of civilian protection, neutralization of armed groups, monitoring of the ceasefire surveillance and verification mechanism under the Doha process, and support for DDR programs; and
  - ✓ **Continue to actively support the mediation between the AFC/M23 and the DRC government** to advance the Doha process, while ensuring its strategic alignment with the Washington Agreement.
- **To Qatar:**
  - ✓ **Continue to work towards greater complementarity between the Doha and Washington processes**; and
  - ✓ **Support the functioning of the Joint Verification Mechanism** agreed on October 14, 2025, by the DRC government and the AFC/M23 and encourage the publication of its initial observations as soon as possible.
- **To the African Union Mediator:**
  - ✓ **Continue to ensure the harmonization of the Washington and Doha processes in line with continental peace efforts in the Great Lakes region — particularly by recommending that participants at the high-level meeting scheduled for January 2026 in Togo examine the feasibility and advisability of adopting a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at strengthening cohesion between the two processes**; and
  - ✓ **Advocate for the allocation of autonomous funding to the continental monitoring mechanism**, through the adoption of a dedicated budget within the African Union, guaranteeing its institutional and operational viability.





## 2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the PAIMT (Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool), which is based on a coding methodology, to assess the degree of implementation of each of the tasks of a peace agreement on a scale of 0 to 10 points:

- **0 point** signifies an Uninitiated Execution ( $E_0$ ): This represents the status quo. The parties have not taken any action or observable measures to begin implementing the task.
- **2.5 points** means an Initiated Execution ( $E_i$ ): This represents some observable measures of the beginning of the execution of the task, meaning that the parties have established a date for the execution of the task or are having formal or informal discussions on the execution of the task concerned.
- **5 points** signifies Minimal Execution ( $E_m$ ): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards executing the task, but these efforts are not sufficient for the task to be completed by the established deadline, given the current pace of the process.
- **7.5 points** implies an Intermediate Execution ( $E_l$ ): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the execution of the task, and there is a likelihood that the task can be completed by the end of the established deadline if the current pace continues.
- **10 points** implies a Complete Execution ( $E_c$ ): This represents the situation in which the task is nearly or fully executed, as specified in the Peace Agreement.


In short, there are five levels of implementation:  $E_0$  (0 point),  $E_i$  (2.5 points),  $E_m$  (5 points),  $E_l$  (7.5 points) and  $E_c$  (10 points).

Based on the PAIMT, the Washington Peace Agreement is structured around 30 specific tasks, covering the fundamental pillars namely: respect for the territorial integrity of the states concerned, cessation of hostilities, disarmament and conditional reintegration of non-state armed groups, regional economic cooperation, protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, as well as the joint security mechanism (See: *Sketch 1-Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement*, below).

Data on the implementation of each task of the Washington Peace Agreement was collected by the research team of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa through: discussions with certain key stakeholders involved in the peace process in the DRC, analyses of official statements or announcements by stakeholders, and the examination of press articles and reports from local and international NGOs during the period from December 1<sup>st</sup> to December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2025.



## Sketch 1: Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement





The 30 specific tasks listed in the Washington Agreement include:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire,</li> <li>2. Respect for the territorial integrity of each country,</li> <li>3. Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR,</li> <li>4. Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures (CONOPS),</li> <li>5. Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR,</li> <li>6. Neutralization of the FDLR,</li> <li>7. Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC (i.e., disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures),</li> <li>8. Evaluation of the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops,</li> <li>9. Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,</li> <li>10. Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,</li> <li>11. Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,</li> <li>12. Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,</li> <li>13. Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,</li> <li>14. Conditional integration of armed groups (e.g., M23) into the FARDC and PNC,</li> <li>15. Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda,</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>16. Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism,</li> <li>17. Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region,</li> <li>18. Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law,</li> <li>19. Return of refugees,</li> <li>20. Return of internally displaced people,</li> <li>21. Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations,</li> <li>22. Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,</li> <li>23. Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement,</li> <li>24. Launch of the regional economic integration framework,</li> <li>25. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu,</li> <li>26. Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,</li> <li>27. Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,</li> <li>28. Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,</li> <li>29. Amicable settlement of disputes and</li> <li>30. Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.</li> </ol> |
|--|---|

Among these 30 tasks, some must be implemented indiscriminately by both the Congolese and Rwandan governments. Other tasks fall under the exclusive responsibility of each government, and a few are assigned to the international community (including the United States, Qatar, the African Union's representative, and the United Nations' agencies).

Therefore, the assessment of the level of implementation of the Washington Agreement can be carried out in two ways: collectively, by considering all the signatory parties; and individually, by analyzing the degree of implementation by each party separately.



### 3. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: DECEMBER 2025


As of December 31, 2025, **only 19 of the 30 tasks** identified in the Washington Agreement have been partially implemented: four (4) tasks have undergone intermediate implementation, one (1) has undergone minimal implementation, and fourteen (14) have begun implementation. The other 11 tasks remain unimplemented to date, with no concrete initiatives to initiate them.

#### 3.1. Implementation Scorecard by Task

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	DRC and Rwanda	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	DRC and JSCM	Initiated Execution	2.5
15	Establishment of a joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda	DRC and Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism	DRC and Rwanda	Intermediate Execution	7.5
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	DRC, Rwanda, and MONUSCO	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	DRC, Rwanda, and HCR	Initiated Execution	2.5
20.	Return of internally displaced persons	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	DRC and UN agencies	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	AU, SADC-EAC, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Initiated Execution	2.5
	Other tasks (6-14, 27 and 29)	-----	Non-initiated Execution	0



### 3.2. Implementation Chart by Task: December 2025





### 3.3. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the DRC

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score / 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
6	Neutralization of the FDLR	Non-initiated Execution	0
8	Evaluation of the FDLR neutralization des FDLR	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
14	Conditional integration of M23 into the FARDC and Police,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism (JSCM)	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Intermediate Execution	7.5
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
20	Return of internally displaced people	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,	Initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,	Intermediate Execution	7.5
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Non-initiated Execution	0

### 3.4. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by Rwanda

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score / 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Initiated Execution	2.5
7	Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC	Non-initiated Execution	0
8	Evaluation of the withdrawal of Rwandan troops	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM)	Intermediate Execution	7.5
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Intermediate Execution	7.5
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects	Initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Intermediate Execution	7.5
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Non-initiated Execution	0





### 3.5. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the International Community

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	Intermediate Execution	7.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Intermediate Execution	7.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement	Initiated Execution	2.5

### 3.6. Interpretation of Quantitative Results

#### 3.6.1. Assessment of the Collective Implementation Rate

The combined analysis from the Implementation Table (3.1 above) and the Task-by-Task Implementation Chart (3.2 above) shows that most key commitments remain stalled. Specifically:

- **Of the 30 tasks** set out in the Washington Peace Agreement, **only 19** have begun to be implemented (at an initial, minimal, or intermediate level), representing **63.3% of all tasks**.
- **Considering all 30 tasks**, their **cumulative implementation score amounts to 70 points out of 300** (maximum points if all 30 tasks were fully implemented), representing an **overall implementation rate of 23.36%**.
- **When considering only the partially implemented tasks**, the **completion rate stands at 36.8% (70 points out of 190)**, corresponding to the performance score recorded in November 2025.

#### 3.6.2. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the DRC

The analysis of the DRC Commitments Implementation Table (3.3 above) indicates that:

- **Of the 26 tasks** falling under the DRC's responsibility in the Agreement, **only 16** have seen partial implementation, resulting in an **overall implementation rate of 22.1% (57.5 points out of 260)**.
- **When considering only the partially implemented tasks**, the **completion rate reaches 35.9% (57.5 points out of 160)**.

#### 3.6.3. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by Rwanda

The analysis of the Rwanda Commitments Implementation Table (3.4 above) reveals that:

- **Of the 22 tasks** assigned to Rwanda under the Agreement, **only 13** have begun to be implemented, resulting in an **overall implementation rate of 22.7% (50 points out of 220)**.
- **When considering only the partially implemented tasks**, the **completion rate stands at 38.4% (50 points out of 130)**.

#### 3.6.4. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by the International Community

The analysis of the International Community Commitments Implementation Table—which includes the United States, Qatar, the AU representative, and UN agencies (3.5 above)—illustrates **that all seven (7) tasks entrusted to the international community under the Agreement have seen partial implementation, resulting in an overall implementation rate of 39.2% (27.5 points out of 70)**.






### **3.6.5. Comparison of the Implementation Progress: July-December 2025**

The comparative chart (below) shows that the proportion of tasks completed (at various stages of completion) stagnated in December 2025, following a sustained increase from 26.6% at the end of July to 46.6% at the end of August, then to 56.6% at the end of October, reaching 63% at the end of November 2025.

#### **Comparative chart on the progress of implementation: July to December 2025**



Similarly, the overall cumulative completion scores showed no improvement in December 2025, despite the progress observed in previous months, rising from 9% at the end of July to 19% at the end of August, then to 21.6% at the end of October, and reaching 23.3% at the end of November 2025. A similar observation applies to the score for partially completed tasks, which remained strictly unchanged in December 2025.

This stagnation observed in the implementation process at the end of December 2025 highlights limitations in the effective fulfillment of commitments undertaken by the parties and underscores the need for mediation actors and relevant partners to intensify their efforts to enhance the quality of implementation, foster a good-faith dynamic, and safeguard the sustainability of the progress, still fragile, achieved to date.

## **4. OBSERVATIONS**

### **4.1. Progress Made**

The positive findings during the period from December 1<sup>st</sup> to December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2025, are:

- The formal endorsement, on 4 December 2025, by the Congolese and Rwandan Presidents of the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement of 27 June 2025;<sup>16</sup>
- The signing, on the same date (4 December 2025), of a series of bilateral economic and security agreements, including the Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) between the DRC and Rwanda;<sup>17</sup>
- The adoption, on 19 December 2025, by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 2808 (2025), extending the mandate of MONUSCO, strengthening certain of its prerogatives in the areas of ceasefire monitoring and verification, and urging the DRC and Rwanda to implement in good faith the obligations incumbent upon them under the Washington Peace Agreement; and<sup>18</sup>
- The ongoing pressure and support from the regional and international community on the signatory parties;

<sup>16</sup> US State Department, *supra*, note 1.

<sup>17</sup> US State Department, *supra*, note 2.

<sup>18</sup> Conseil de Sécurité des Nations, *supra*, note 3.



## 4.2. Delays and Obstacles

The security and priority commitments of the Agreement are experiencing significant delays, in particular:

- **The neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures**, which remain unimplemented, despite the endorsement on December 4, 2025, by the Congolese and Rwandan Presidents of the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement, as well as the adoption on September 17, 2025, by the DRC and Rwanda of a joint timetable stipulating that the operations to neutralize the FDLR and lift the Rwandan defensive measures would be carried out between October 1 and October 30, 2025.
- **The ceasefire**: shortly after the endorsement on December 4, 2025, of the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement, the armed group AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda) continued its offensive against the FARDC along the Kamanyola-Uvira axis, resulting in the capture of several localities, including the city of Uvira.<sup>19</sup>
- **Effective access to humanitarian aid is becoming imperative**: the intensification of fighting along the Kamanyola-Uvira axis has exacerbated the already precarious conditions of the civilian population.<sup>20</sup> The reopening of Goma airport (requested at the Conference on Peace in the Great Lakes Region, held at the end of October 2025 in Paris)<sup>21</sup> to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance is still pending, despite the urgent needs of vulnerable populations.

## 4.3. Causes of Delays

As highlighted in previous reports,<sup>22</sup> the delays observed in the execution of the tasks can be explained, in part, by the following factors:

- **The lack of mutual trust between the parties, and the selective and bad-faith implementation**: Although the DRC and Rwanda have repeatedly demonstrated a political and diplomatic willingness to implement the Agreement, mutual distrust remains high. In this context, some obligations appear to be enforced selectively, conditionally, or with delays, with each party making its actions contingent on the other's. This dynamic, in several cases, amounts to a bad-faith execution of the commitments made, undermining the credibility of the process and contributing to the stagnation of its implementation;
- **Uneven prioritization between political, security, and economic components**: The most visible progress concerns the institutional and economic components (JSCM, JOC, regional economic integration framework), while urgent military and security tasks (such as neutralization, disengagement, protection of civilians) have remained at a standstill;
- **Weak operational capacity and a lack of resources on the ground**: Despite the DRC's call for the FDLR to surrender, the country lacks sufficient technical and logistical resources to conduct the planned operations alone; and
- **Ambiguities in coordination among the different peace processes**: The coexistence of the Washington process (DRC–Rwanda) and the Doha process (DRC–M23, under Qatari mediation) risks overlapping and fragmenting diplomatic efforts. Some actions decided within one framework (Doha) are not immediately integrated into the monitoring mechanism of the other framework (Washington); and

<sup>19</sup> Ministère de la Communication et Médias de la RD Congo, *supra*, note 4.

<sup>20</sup> RFI, *supra*, note 12.

<sup>21</sup> Jeune Afrique, *supra*, note 13.

<sup>22</sup> Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, "Report on the Assessment of the Implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement : November 2025," p. 13. [https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/files/ugd/ddb61b\\_9c73a731dbe4441c944d447d68a85cb6.pdf?index=true](https://www.peacebarometerafrica.org/files/ugd/ddb61b_9c73a731dbe4441c944d447d68a85cb6.pdf?index=true).



## 5. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Six months after its signing, the Washington Peace Agreement enabled structural progress in institutional cooperation. However, it remains weakened by the lack of improvement in the most crucial security measures. The continued fighting between the Congolese army and the Rwandan-backed AFC-M23, as well as the delay in implementing clauses relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces or the lifting of Rwandan defensive measures, risk compromising the credibility of the process. In this regard, the following recommendations are proposed:

### 5.1. Recommendations to the Government of the DRC:

- **Accelerate, without further delay, the implementation of operations to neutralize the FDLR**, in coordination with the JSCM, while ensuring the strict protection of civilians in conflict zones;
- **Consider, within the framework of efforts to neutralize the FDLR, the formal involvement of MONUSCO, with a particular focus on areas hosting FDLR elements but currently under the control of the AFC/M23.** This option is justified by the Mission's renewed mandate, which authorizes it to neutralize non-state armed groups, notably through the deployment of its Intervention Brigade, acting independently or jointly with the FARDC.<sup>23</sup> Of course, the DRC has previously conducted joint FDLR-neutralization operations with MONUSCO in 2015.<sup>24</sup> Such an approach would help remove the pretexts advanced by the various parties: the DRC would no longer be able to invoke the lack of territorial control to explain potential delays in neutralization efforts, while Rwanda would no longer be able to justify the continuation of its defensive security measures if the FDLR were effectively neutralized.
- **Consider providing transparent and verifiable assurances to all stakeholders that no members of the FDLR are integrated into the FARDC**, thereby addressing persistent allegations, reducing misperceptions, and strengthening mutual trust among the parties;
- **Operationalize the Joint Ceasefire Verification Mechanism** signed in Doha on October 14, 2025, a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Washington Agreement; and
- **Develop and implement a national plan for the protection of civilians, in collaboration with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors.**

### 5.2. Recommendations to the Government of Rwanda:

- **Implement, without further delay, the harmonized plan for disengagement and lifting of defensive measures**, with measurable objectives and a joint verification mechanism;
- **Provide security and/or judicial guarantees to FDLR members still present in the DRC who remain reluctant to surrender, to facilitate their voluntary repatriation to Rwanda;**
- **Provide explicit assurances to the American and Qatari facilitators, as well as to the African Union mediator, regarding the effective implementation of the security and/or judicial guarantees offered to members of the FDLR, particularly those who remain hesitant to surrender voluntarily;**
- **Encourage the AFC/M23 to refrain from obstructing potential MONUSCO operations aimed at neutralizing FDLR elements in territories under their control**, should a formal request be formulated by the Congolese Government;
- **Persuade the AFC/M23 to strengthen the protection of civilian populations in territories under their control;** and
- **Use its influence over the AFC/M23 to facilitate unimpeded humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations** (including the reopening of the Goma airport).

<sup>23</sup> United Nations, *supra* note 14.

<sup>24</sup> MONUSCO, *supra* note 15.



### 5.3. Recommendations to the JOC and the JSCM:

- **Publish reports provide a more comprehensive and detailed account of all observed violations, delays, instances of non-compliance with agreed commitments, and planned corrective measures.** Such an approach would help strengthen transparency and increase public confidence in the implementation process, while replacing the brief joint communiqués currently issued.

### 5.4. Collective Recommendation to the Facilitators (USA, Qatar, and the African Union mediator):

- **Develop and propose to the parties the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding establishing the complementarity and non-exclusivity of the commitments arising from the Washington and Doha processes.** Such an instrument would allow for the integration of the AFC/M23 within the framework of the Washington Agreement, formally engage Rwanda in the Doha process, and consequently facilitate coordination and coherence between the two peace processes.

### 5.5. Recommendations to the United States:

- **Continue to exert increased diplomatic pressure on both parties** to respect the agreed deadlines (particularly those relating to the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops);
- **Encourage Rwanda to provide security and/or judicial guarantees to members of the FDLR still present in the DRC** to facilitate their voluntary repatriation to their country;
- **Provide technical and logistical support for the coordination and verification operations of the JSCM and the JOC;**
- **Ensure that MONUSCO is provided with the necessary financial resources, as well as adequate technical and logistical support, to enable it to effectively fulfill its newly reinforced mandate,** notably in the areas of civilian protection, neutralization of armed groups, monitoring of the ceasefire surveillance and verification mechanism under the Doha process, and support for DDR programs; and
- **Continue to actively support the mediation between the AFC/M23 and the DRC government** to advance the Doha process, while ensuring its strategic alignment with the Washington Agreement.

### 5.6. Recommendations to Qatar:

- **Continue to work towards greater complementarity between the Doha and Washington processes;** and
- **Support the functioning of the Joint Verification Mechanism** agreed on October 14, 2025, by the DRC government and the AFC/M23 and encourage the publication of its initial observations as soon as possible.

### 5.7. Recommendations to the African Union Mediator:

- **Continue to ensure the harmonization of the Washington and Doha processes in line with continental peace efforts in the Great Lakes region — particularly by recommending that participants at the high-level meeting scheduled for January 2026 in Togo examine the feasibility and advisability of adopting a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at strengthening cohesion between the two processes;** and
- **Advocate for the allocation of autonomous funding to the continental monitoring mechanism,** through the adoption of a dedicated budget within the African Union, guaranteeing its institutional and operational viability.

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