REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WASHINGTON PEACE AGREEMENT: AUGUST-OCTOBER 2026

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November 2026

This report presents the assessment of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa, conducted by a group of independent experts, on the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, signed on June 27, 2025, covering the period from August to October 2026.

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is an independent platform dedicated to monitoring, evaluating, and promoting the effective implementation of peace agreements in Africa, starting with the Washington Peace Agreement. Established in August 2025, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa is based on the observation that many peace agreements in Africa have failed, not because of their content, but because of a lack of rigorous monitoring of their implementation. In the absence of an objective mechanism to measure compliance with commitments, each party remains free to assert its own compliance with the Agreement or to accuse the other of violating it. Far from replacing the official mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement established by the Agreement itself, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa provides reliable, up-to-date, and factual data on the parties' progress in fulfilling their peace commitments.

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Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool (PAIMT), designed and adapted by one of its experts (Dr. Roger-Claude Liwanga, drawing on his previous experience with The Carter Center evaluating peace agreements in Africa), and inspired by a methodology similar to that of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

ACRONYMS

AFC-M23	Congo River Alliance – March 23 Movement
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AFC-M23	Congo River Alliance – March 23 Movement
AU	African Union
CONOPS	Concept of Operations of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EJVM+	Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FRN	*Front pour la Refondation de la Nation*
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
JOC	Joint Oversight Committee
JSCM	Joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo
PAIMT	Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool
SADC	Southern African Development Community

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The August–October 2026 reporting period was marked by a slight regression in the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement, signed on 27 June 2025 by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. As of the end of October 2026, the Agreement's **overall implementation rate stood at 33.3% (100 points out of 300), down from 35% (105 points out of 300) at the end of July 2026, representing a decrease of 1.7 percentage points. The implementation rates for the respective commitments of the DRC and Rwanda also declined, from 31.7% to 30.8% for the DRC and from 30.6% to 29.5% for Rwanda.**

This trend unfolded against a backdrop of continued hostilities in eastern DRC; persistent disagreements over the neutralization of the FDLR; differences over the sequencing of force disengagement and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures; limited verification capacities; deteriorating political and security relations; and ongoing constraints affecting humanitarian access and civilian protection. From an assessment standpoint, the overall score declined primarily because the implementation levels for two planning tasks related to these security commitments were revised downward.

Another major concern during the reporting period related to the incomplete implementation of the Operational Order (OPORD), developed in September 2025 and scheduled for execution beginning in October 2025.[1] The OPORD was intended to translate the Concept of Operations (CONOPS)[2] into coordinated operational actions on the ground. Following the DRC and Rwanda's review of progress under Phase 1 in November 2025 (including intelligence-sharing on FDLR locations and the DRC's awareness-raising campaign to encourage FDLR disarmament),[3] the implementation of Phase 2 (concerning planning actions for FDLR neutralization and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures)[4] remained constrained by disagreements over the sequencing of operations, limited verification capabilities, and the evolving security situation. These challenges raised questions about the OPORD's continued suitability to prevailing conditions on the ground and prompted the parties' representatives, during the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) in August 2026, to consider revisiting the operational planning process to address persistent obstacles to translating the agreed security framework into coordinated and verifiable action.[5] Although the JSCM conference on the OPORD, held from October 20 to 22, 2026, advanced efforts to finalize the revised draft, no new version of the OPORD had been formally approved as of October 31, 2026.[6] The absence of an updated and operationally viable plan—one that clearly defines responsibilities, establishes realistic timelines and measurable milestones, and provides for credible verification mechanisms—continued to hamper the implementation of the security commitments.

From this perspective, the assessment framework of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa (BPAA) led to a downward revision of the scores assigned to two tasks relating to the implementation of the harmonized plan for

[1] US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Second Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, » September 24, 2025. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/joint-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda
[2] Id.
[3] US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Third Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, » October 22, 2025. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/10/joint-statement-on-the-third-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda
[4] US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Fourth Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, » November 20, 2025. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2025/11/joint-statement-on-the-fourth-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement
[5] US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, » 13 August 2026. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/08/joint-statement-on-the-sixth-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda
[6] US State Department Bureau of African Affairs (@AsstSecStateAF), October 27, 2026. From October 20 to 22, the United States convened military planners from the DRC and Rwanda at Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany, for the JSCM Operations Order Conference… https://x.com/AsstSecStateAF/status/2115076383529410763

neutralizing the FDLR and the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures were revised downward. Each task's score fell from 7.5 out of 10 (Intermediate Execution) to 5 out of 10 (Minimal Execution). These revisions reflect a deterioration in the assessed implementation status of the two planning tasks, with their scores falling below the threshold for Intermediate Execution. However, this does not necessarily mean that the corresponding substantive obligations have worsened to the same extent. Indeed, the effective neutralization of the FDLR, on the one hand, and the effective disengagement of Rwandan forces and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures, on the other, are assessed separately, based on the available evidence for each obligation.

Main obstacles observed during the August–October 2026 reporting period included:

- *Continued clashes between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and AFC/M23 (supported by Rwanda),* which reportedly now operates under the banner of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN).[7]
- *Limited progress in the neutralization of the FDLR and their voluntary repatriation:* Data compiled for this report indicate that **approximately 313 FDLR combatants were reportedly repatriated to Rwanda between June 2025 and September 2026**, accompanied by approximately 392 dependents. **This number of repatriated combatants would represent between 9% and 10.4% of the FDLR's estimated strength of 3,000 to 3,500 combatants under the Washington peace process.**[8] Although these figures reflect measurable, albeit modest, progress in repatriation, they are not, in themselves, sufficient to establish that the FDLR's command structures have been dismantled, that its operational capabilities have been neutralized, or that it is no longer capable of resuming hostilities. Accordingly, progress in the FDLR neutralization process should be assessed against clearly defined, objectively verifiable, and mutually agreed criteria.
- *Lack of independent verification of the disengagement of Rwandan forces, whose presence in the DRC is estimated at between 14,000 and 18,000 troops, according to the United Nations Group of Experts.*[9] Although tactical withdrawals from certain areas, followed by repositioning or reinforcement elsewhere, have reportedly taken place,[10] these movements should be distinguished from the disengagement of forces and the lifting of defensive measures as provided for under the Washington Peace Agreement.
- *Recurring disagreements over the sequencing of FDLR neutralization and the disengagement of Rwandan forces.* The parties remain divided over whether these two operations should be carried out sequentially or simultaneously. Rwanda has made the disengagement of its force's conditional on the DRC's prior neutralization of the FDLR. The DRC, for its part, maintains that it cannot neutralize FDLR elements present in areas controlled by Rwanda-backed FRN/AFC-M23 elements without the prior withdrawal of the latter. These differences, compounded by the absence of mutually agreed, measurable, and verifiable completion criteria, remain a major obstacle to the effective implementation of the Agreement
- *Persistent constraints on humanitarian access and concerns regarding civilian protection, which continue to be exacerbated by ongoing hostilities and widespread insecurity in eastern DRC.*

[7] Radio Okapi, « Poursuite des combats AFC/M23-FARDC/Wazalendo à Masisi. » https://www.radiookapi.net/2026/10/07/actualite/securite/poursuite-des-combats-afcm23-fardcwazalendo-masisi ; Actualite DC, « Walikale : les combats entre le FRN et les FARDC appuyées par les Wazalendo se poursuivent pour le troisième jour à Kibati, » https://actualite.cd/2026/10/18/walikale-les-combats-entre-le-frn-et-les-fardc-appuyees-par-les-wazalendo-se-poursuivent#google_vignette

[8] United Nations Security Council, « Letter dated 5 June 2026 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, » S/2026/466, para. 130, p. 26. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/466. "… United Nations and intelligence sources estimated that the total FDLR strength was between 3,500 and 4,500 combatants, with FDLR-FOCA accounting for the large majority. The Washington Agreement estimated FDLR strength to be between 3,000 and 3,500 combatants.»

[9] Id., para. 96, p.20.

[10] Security Council Report, Great Lakes Region (DRC). » https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-10/great-lakes-region-drc-10.php?

Despite these challenges, **some progress was made between August and October 2026**, particularly in the diplomatic and institutional spheres, providing grounds for cautious optimism:

- *Continued dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda within the JSCM framework, despite unresolved differences* During the JSCM meetings held in August,[11] September[12] and October 2026,[13] the parties, alongside representatives of the United States, Qatar, Togo, and the African Union Commission, discussed several initiatives to advance implementation of the Agreement. These included: (i) the proposal on revisiting the OPORD; (ii) the potential use of the EJVM+ as an interim verification mechanism; and (iii) the DRC's presentation of its plan for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of FDLR combatants.
- *Continued efforts to advance FDLR disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation.* In September 2026, MONUSCO announced the repatriation of about 122 FDLR combatants and their dependents to Rwanda.[14] Although it is unclear if those repatriations were particularly connected with the DRC–FDLR's Disarmament, Demobilization, and Cantonment Protocol on 28 July 2026 ("DRC-FDLR DDC Protocol"), they nevertheless represented progress toward translating its commitments into an operational framework. The continued repatriation of FDLR combatants and their dependents to Rwanda constituted another measurable development.
- *AU-led consultations in Goma, Kigali and Kinshasa.* From 5 to 11 October 2026, the African Union (AU) Panel of Facilitators, comprising former Ethiopian President Sahle-Work Zewde, former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, and former Botswanan President Mokgweetsi Masisi, conducted consultations in Goma,[15] Kigali,[16] and Kinshasa[17] as part of the AU-led mediation efforts. The consultations aimed to engage directly with relevant stakeholders and discuss the implementation of existing peace commitments, security arrangements, refugee protection, the return of displaced populations, and regional economic cooperation.
- *Regional consultations held under the auspices of the ICGLR in Lusaka:* From 8 to 19 October 2026, consultations convened in Lusaka, Zambia, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) provided a forum for discussions between the ICGLR Committee of Ministers of Defense and other regional and international stakeholders on the security challenges affecting eastern DRC and, more broadly, the entire Great Lakes region. In this context, participants notably examined a draft set of Standard Operating Procedures governing the processes of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration (DDRR) of members of foreign armed groups, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and RED-Tabara.[18] These consultations represent a constructive initiative aimed at strengthening regional coordination and developing common approaches to addressing the activities of foreign armed groups.

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[11] US State Department, « Joint Statement on the Sixth Meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism for the Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda. » https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/08/joint-statement-on-the-sixth-meeting-of-the-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda

[12] Security Council Report, Great Lakes Region (DRC), » https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-10/great-lakes-region-drc-10.php?

[13] US State Department Bureau of African Affairs (@AsstSecStateAF), October 27, 2026. From October 20 to 22, the United States convened military planners from the DRC and Rwanda at Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany, for the JSCM Operations Order Conference… https://x.com/AsstSecStateAF/status/2115076383529410763

[14] UN Security Council, «United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2026/748, 21 September 2026. » https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/748.

[15] African Union Political Affairs Peace and Security Department, «Statement by the African Union Panel of Facilitators Following Consultations in Goma, DRC, » 7 October 2026. https://peaceau.org/en/article/statement-by-the-african-union-panel-of-facilitators-following-consultations-in-goma-drc?

[16] African Union Political Affairs Peace and Security Department, «Statement by the African Union Panel of Facilitators Following Consultations in Kigali, Rwanda, » 9 October 2026. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/statement-by-the-panel-of-facilitators-of-the-au-led-mediation-architecture-following-consultations-in-kigali-republic-of-rwanda?

[17] Radio Okapi, «Félix Tshisekedi reçoit le Panel des facilitateurs de l'UA pour des consultations sur la paix en RDC, » https://www.radiookapi.net/2026/10/11/actualite/politique/felix-tshisekedi-recoit-le-panel-des-facilitateurs-de-lua-pour-des

[18] ICGLR, « Press Release: ICGLR Statutory Meetings Underway in Lusaka, Zambia, Ahead of the 20th Ordinary Meeting of the Regional Interministerial Committee ». https://icglr.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/016_Press-Release-ICGLR-RIMC-Oct-2026.pdf?x48703

In light of these constraints, the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa recommends the following actions for each stakeholder:

- **To the Government of the DRC**:
  - ✓ *Finalize and adopt a comprehensive, verifiable plan to neutralize the FDLR, translating the 28 July 2026 DDR Protocol into a detailed operational framework that is consistent with the Washington Peace Agreement and the CONOPS.* The plan should distinguish between the individual disarmament and demobilization of combatants, the dismantling of the FDLR's command structures, and the elimination of the group's capacity to resume hostilities;
  - ✓ *Jointly establish with the Rwandan authorities clear, measurable, and verifiable benchmarks for assessing progress and determining the effectiveness of FDLR neutralization operations;* and
  - ✓ *Demonstrate its commitment and good faith in implementing its obligations under the Washington Agreement by taking the following measures, with the technical support of MONUSCO:* (1) identify and locate FDLR combatants present in areas under government control; (2) identify those willing to participate in a DDRR process, as well as assess possible options for voluntary relocation to a third country; (3) repatriate or relocate all those concerned; and (4) define and implement, in accordance with the commitments undertaken under the Agreement, appropriate neutralization measures against combatants who refuse these options. This approach would enable the neutralization process to begin in areas under the effective control of the Congolese Government before, at a subsequent stage, addressing the situation of FDLR elements present in areas beyond government control.

- **To the Government of Rwanda:**
  - ✓ *Support a constructive and verifiable approach to FDLR neutralization by considering support for the DRC-FDLR DDC Protocol of 28 July 2026*, rather than contesting its implementation, as a step toward fulfilling the FDLR-neutralization commitments under the Washington Peace Agreement;
  - ✓ *Jointly establish, with the Congolese authorities, clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria for assessing the effectiveness of FDLR-neutralization operations;*
  - ✓ *Clarify, in a spirit of transparency and mutual trust, the arrangements governing the withdrawal of armed elements and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures by establishing a revised and detailed timetable, with indicative deadlines, supported by credible verification mechanisms;* and
  - ✓ *Demonstrate its good faith by initiating, in parallel with the DRC's progress in neutralizing the FDLR, a gradual, transparent, and verifiable process for disengaging its forces from Congolese territory and lifting its defensive measures. By way of illustration, the repatriation of 10% of FDLR elements to Rwanda could be accompanied by the withdrawal of an equivalent proportion of Rwandan troops deployed in the DRC. Such an approach, grounded in proportionality and verification, would provide tangible evidence of Rwanda's commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the Agreement.*

- **To the Government of the United States:**
  - ✓ *Maintain and strengthen coordinated diplomatic and political pressure on the parties to encourage compliance with commitments undertaken under the Washington Peace Agreement;*
  - ✓ *Continue considering, as a last resort, targeted coercive measures against actors found to be deliberately obstructing or undermining implementation of the Washington and Doha processes' commitments;*
  - ✓ *Continue encouraging the parties to reach a common understanding regarding the timelines for the neutralization operations against the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures;* and
  - ✓ *Continue facilitating efforts to finalize and secure approval of the revised draft OPORD, ensuring it addresses divergences in the sequencing of security commitments and clearly defines implementation responsibilities, timelines, and verifiable milestones.*

- **To the Governments of Qatar and Switzerland:**
  - ✓ *Continue encouraging the parties to agree on a timetable for implementing their security commitments, supported by specific, measurable, and verifiable milestones. This would facilitate the regular monitoring of each party's progress and help prevent the process from reaching an impasse.*

- **To the African Union and the AU Mediator:**
  - ✓ *Consider inviting high-level representatives of the DRC and Rwanda to participate in a dedicated session of the forthcoming High-Level Harmonization Meeting of the AU Panel of Facilitators on the DRC peace process.* This would aim to strengthen coordination between the Washington and Doha peace processes, clarify the implications for the continuity of commitments under the Doha Framework, and identify practical measures to advance implementation of existing peace commitments; and
  - ✓ *Continue promoting a comprehensive and inclusive approach to regional security by supporting complementary mechanisms to address, in a coordinated manner, the issue of all armed groups operating in the Great Lakes region, including those not covered by the Washington and Doha processes.*

- **To MONUSCO:**
  - ✓ *Continue efforts to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of FDLR combatants and enhance the transparency of the process by regularly publishing detailed reports specifying, inter alia, the areas of origin of repatriated former combatants, while distinguishing between areas under the effective control of the Congolese Government and those outside its control;*
  - ✓ *Intensify civilian protection efforts in areas most affected by hostilities;* and
  - ✓ *Facilitate, in coordination with national authorities and humanitarian partners, humanitarian access to affected civilian populations, particularly in conflict-affected areas.*

2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa uses the PAIMT (Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool), which is based on a coding methodology, to assess the degree of implementation of each of the tasks of a peace agreement on a scale of 0 to 10 points:

- **0 point** signifies an Uninitiated Execution (E_0): This represents the status quo. The parties have not taken any action or observable measures to begin implementing the task.
- **2.5 points** means an Initiated Execution (E_i): This represents some observable measures of the beginning of the execution of the task, meaning that the parties have established a date for the execution of the task or are having formal or informal discussions on the execution of the task concerned.
- **5 points** signifies Minimal Execution (E_m): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards executing the task, but these efforts are not sufficient for the task to be completed by the established deadline, given the current pace of the process.
- **7.5 points** implies an Intermediate Execution (E_I): This represents the situation where the parties have made some efforts towards the execution of the task, and there is a likelihood that the task can be completed by the end of the established deadline if the current pace continues.
- **10 points** implies a Complete Execution (E_c): This represents the situation in which the task is nearly or fully executed, as specified in the Peace Agreement.


In short, there are five levels of implementation: E_0 (0 point), E_i (2.5 points), E_m (5 points), E_I (7.5 points), and E_c (10 points).

Based on the PAIMT, the Washington Peace Agreement is structured around 30 specific tasks, covering the fundamental pillars namely: respect for the territorial integrity of the states concerned, cessation of hostilities, disarmament and conditional reintegration of non-state armed groups, regional economic cooperation, protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, as well as the joint security mechanism (*See: Sketch 1-Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement, below*).

Each task is assessed independently according to its implementation status and the available verifiable evidence. Consequently, progress or regression in one task does not automatically imply a corresponding change in the implementation status of another, even where the tasks are interrelated.

Data on the implementation of each task of the Washington Peace Agreement was collected by the research team of the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa through discussions with certain key stakeholders involved in the peace process in the DRC, analyses of official statements or announcements by stakeholders, and the examination of press articles and reports from local and international NGOs during the period from August to October 2026.

Sketch 1: Pillars and Tasks of the Washington Peace Agreement



The 30 specific tasks listed in the Washington Agreement include:

1. Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire,
2. Respect for the territorial integrity of each country,
3. Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR,
4. Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures (CONOPS),
5. Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR,
6. Neutralization of the FDLR,
7. Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC (i.e., disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures),
8. Evaluation of the neutralization of the FDLR and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops,
9. Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,
10. Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,
11. Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,
12. Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,
13. Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,
14. Conditional integration of armed groups (e.g., M23) into the FARDC and PNC,
15. Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda,
16. Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism,
17. Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region,
18. Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law,
19. Return of refugees,
20. Return of internally displaced people,
21. Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations,
22. Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,
23. Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement,
24. Launch of the regional economic integration framework,
25. Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu,
26. Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,
27. Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,
28. Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,
29. Amicable settlement of disputes and
30. Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.

Among these 30 tasks, some must be implemented indiscriminately by both the Congolese and Rwandan governments. Other tasks fall under the exclusive responsibility of each government, and a few are assigned to the international community (including the United States, Qatar, the African Union's representative, and the United Nations' agencies).

Therefore, the assessment of the level of implementation of the Washington Agreement can be carried out in two ways: collectively, by considering all the signatory parties; and individually, by analyzing the degree of implementation by each party separately.

3. IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS: AUGUST-OCTOBER 2026

As of the end of October 2026**, 22 of the 30 tasks** identified in the Washington Peace Agreement had been partially or fully implemented: three (3) tasks had been fully completed, two (2) had reached an intermediate level of implementation, five (5) had achieved minimal implementation, and twelve (12) had recorded an initial stage of implementation. The remaining eight (8) tasks have not yet been implemented to date, as no concrete initiatives have been observed toward their launch.

3.1. Implementation Scorecard by Task

N°	Task	Actor(s) Responsible for Executing the Task	Level of Execution	Score/10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	DRC and Rwanda	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	DRC	Minimal Execution	5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Rwanda	Minimal Execution	5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	DRC and JSCM	Intermediate Execution	7.5
6	Neutralization of FDLR	DRC	Minimal Execution	5[19]
7	Disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures)	Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5[20]
15	Establishment of a joint Security Coordination Mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda	DRC and Rwanda	Complete Execution	10
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the joint security coordination mechanism	DRC and Rwanda	Complete Execution	10
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	DRC, Rwanda, and MONUSCO	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	DRC, Rwanda, and HCR	Initiated Execution	2.5
20.	Return of internally displaced persons	DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	DRC and UN agencies	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support from the DRC and Rwanda for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	AU, SADC-EAC, Qatar, and USA	Intermediate Execution	7.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Complete Execution	10
29	Amicable settlement of disputes on the Accord's implementation	DRC and Rwanda	Initiated Execution	2.5
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement.	DRC, Rwanda, AU, Qatar, and USA	Minimal Execution	5
	Other tasks (8-14 and 27)	----------	Non-initiated Execution	0
Total				**100/300**

[19] Progress in preparing or implementing the plan on the neutralization of the FDLR does not necessarily establish progress in the actual neutralization of the FDLR elements.
[20] Progress in preparing or implementing the plan on the disengagement of forces/lifting of defensive measures does not necessarily establish progress in the actual disengagement of forces or lifting of defensive measures.

3.2. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the DRC

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
3	Implementation of the harmonized plan for neutralization of the FDLR	Minimal Execution	5
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Intermediate Execution	7.5
6	Neutralization of the FDLR	Minimal Execution	5
8	Evaluation of the FDLR neutralization des FDLR	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
14	Conditional integration of M23 into the FARDC and Police,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism (JSCM)	Complete Execution	10
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Complete Execution	10
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
20	Return of internally displaced people	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for the work of MONUSCO and other multilateral peacekeeping forces.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains,	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects,	Non-initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee,	Complete Execution	10
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Initiated Execution	2.5
Total			**80/260**

3.3. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by Rwanda

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
1	Prohibition of hostile acts/aggression or ceasefire	Minimal Execution	5
2	Respect for the territorial integrity of each country	Initiated Execution	2.5
4	Implementation of the harmonized plan for the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures	Minimal Execution	5
7	Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC	Initiated Execution	2.5
8	Evaluation of the withdrawal of Rwandan troops	Non-initiated Execution	0
9	Prohibition of state support for armed groups to attack either country,	Non-initiated Execution	0
10	Prevention of hostilities by non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
11	Coordination of the disengagement of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
12	Coordination of the disarmament of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
13	Coordination of the integration of non-state armed groups,	Non-initiated Execution	0
15	Establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM)	Complete Execution	10
16	Adoption of common operational procedures to ensure transparency in the operations of the JSCM	Complete Execution	10
17	Promotion of stability, security, and development in the region	Initiated Execution	2.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
22	Support for MONUSCO's and other multilateral peacekeeping forces' work.	Initiated Execution	2.5
24	Launch of the regional economic integration framework	Initiated Execution	2.5
25	Launch or expansion of bilateral cooperation on the management of national parks and resources in Lake Kivu	Initiated Execution	2.5
26	Launch of bilateral cooperation on hydropower development and derisking of mineral supply chains	Initiated Execution	2.5
27	Economic monitoring and combating corruption in mineral supply chains and infrastructure projects	Non-initiated Execution	0
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Complete Execution	10
29	Amicable settlement of disputes	Initiated Execution	2.5
Total			**65/220**

3.4. Table of the Implementation of Commitments by the International Community

N°	Task	Level of Execution	Score/ 10
5	Preparation, identification, and location of the FDLR	Intermediate Execution	7.5
18	Protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law	Initiated Execution	2.5
19	Return of refugees	Initiated Execution	2.5
21	Providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations	Initiated Execution	2.5
23	Support from the regional and international community to the signatories of the agreement	Intermediate Execution	7.5
28	Establishment of the Joint Oversight Committee	Complete Execution	10
30	Monitoring the effective implementation of the Agreement	Minimal Execution	5
Total			**37.5/70**

3.5. Implementation of Security Commitments: FDLR Neutralization and Rwanda's Disengagement

More than 15 months after the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement on 27 June 2025, implementation of the parties' security-related commitments concerning FDLR neutralization, Rwanda's disengagement of forces, and the lifting of defensive measures remains limited. Progress continues to be affected by differences between the DRC and Rwanda over the scope of FDLR neutralization, estimates of the group's strength, the sequencing of the parties' respective obligations, and the criteria and mechanisms for verifying implementation.

3.5.1. FDLR Combatants and Estimates of Their Strength

FDLR is a fragmented armed organization whose structure has evolved over time. FDLR-FOCA (*Forces combattantes Abacunguzi*) remains its principal armed structure, while RUD-Urunana (*Rassemblement pour l'unité et la démocratie)* and CNRD (*Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie*) are identified in the literature as distinct splinters or associated groups.[21] Their inclusion in the implementation assessment should be based on the applicable provisions of the Washington Peace Agreement and the parties' agreed definitions of the FDLR and affiliated groups.[22]

Documented areas of activity in eastern DRC include Rutshuru, Nyiragongo, Masisi, and Walikale for FDLR-FOCA elements;[23] southern Lubero and northern Rutshuru for RUD-Urunana elements;[24] and Kalehe territory in South Kivu for CNRD elements.[25] These geographic distinctions are relevant to operational planning and verification, although location alone does not establish that a particular group falls within the scope of the neutralization commitment.

Estimates of FDLR combatant strength remain divergent. In the context of the Washington peace process, the estimated FDLR strength is approximately 3,000–3,500 combatants,[26] whereas the UN Group of Experts on the DRC estimated about 3,500–4,500 combatants in its June 2026 report, with FDLR-FOCA accounting for the vast majority. These estimates should be attributed to their respective sources rather than treated as interchangeable.[27]

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[21] United Nations, « Pathways Home: A Retrospective Study on 25 years of United Nations Efforts to Repatriate Foreign Combatants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, » pp. 35-36. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/ddrrr_retrospective_study_final_0_compressed.pdf?

[22] Id.

[23] United Nations Security Council, « Letter dated 5 June 2026 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, » S/2026/466, para.73. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/118/80/pdf/n2411880.pdf?

[24] United Nations, « Pathways Home: A Retrospective Study on 25 years of United Nations Efforts to Repatriate Foreign Combatants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, » pp. 35-36. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/ddrrr_retrospective_study_final_0_compressed.pdf?


[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 5 June 2026 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/2026/466, para. 130, p. 29. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/466.

The divergence highlights the difficulty of establishing a reliable baseline for measuring progress. The parties should therefore agree on a common, evidence-based baseline that specifies the groups and personnel covered, the methodology for identifying combatants, and procedures to prevent double-counting.

Comparative Chart of FDLR Elements and Rwandan Troops Present in the DRC



Source: Calculations by BAPA researchers based on the UN Group of Experts on the DRC data.

The United Nations Group of Experts has also reported an estimated 14,000 to 18,000 Rwandan troops deployed in eastern DRC, including approximately 8,000 to 10,000 in South Kivu and 6,000 to 8,000 in North Kivu.[28] By comparison, the FDLR's strength is estimated at between 3,000 and 3,500 combatants under the Washington peace process.[29] Based on the midpoints of these ranges—16,000 Rwandan troops and 3,250 FDLR combatants—the ratio is approximately 5 Rwandan troops per FDLR combatant. This comparison provides context for the security environment but does not, in itself, establish the military necessity or proportionality of any particular deployment.

3.5.2. Definition and Scope of FDLR Neutralization

The implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement continues to be affected by differing interpretations of the scope and intended outcome of FDLR neutralization. The Congolese authorities emphasize disarmament, demobilization, and cantonment, followed by the repatriation of eligible former combatants to Rwanda or, where appropriate, relocation to a third country. The DRC–FDLR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Cantonment (DDC) Protocol of 28 July 2026 provides a framework for pursuing these objectives.[30]

Rwanda, by contrast, maintains that the DDC Protocol and negotiations with FDLR leaders are not, in themselves, sufficient to demonstrate effective neutralization under the Washington Peace Agreement and its incorporated Concept of Operations (CONOPS). It emphasizes the need for a comprehensive and verifiable outcome addressing the FDLR's

[28] United Nations Security Council, « Letter dated 5 June 2026 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, » S/2026/466, para. 96, p. 20. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/466
[29] id., para. 130, p. 26.
[30] U.S. Department of State, «Joint Statement from the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes, » 13 August 2026, acknowledging the DRC Government's announcement that a faction of the FDLR had signed a disarmament, demobilization, and cantonment protocol on 28 July 2026. The statement calls on the DRC to develop an operational plan and realistic timeline for FDLR neutralization consistent with the Washington Peace Agreement and CONOPS.

military capabilities, command structures, and capacity to continue posing a security threat. Rwanda has also characterized the DRC–FDLR process as potentially delaying the implementation of existing commitments.[31]

The Washington Peace Agreement and its incorporated Concept of Operations (CONOPS) provide a basis for assessing these positions. Section 2(ii) supports efforts to disarm and demobilize non-state armed groups, [32] while Section 3(ii) requires the parties to identify, assess, and locate the FDLR and affiliated groups and to pursue their neutralization in accordance with the CONOPS. [33] Section 7 of the CONOPS assigns the DRC responsibility for neutralizing the FDLR and promoting the repatriation of its members to Rwanda, while Rwanda is responsible for disengaging its forces, lifting its defensive measures, and supporting the social reintegration of demobilized FDLR ex-combatants repatriated to its territory. [34]

The Operating Procedures of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) further provides for the identification and verification of FDLR membership, locations, activities, and threat levels, as well as the coordination of appropriate neutralization measures, with the ultimate objective of eradicating the threat posed by the FDLR and affiliated groups in the DRC. [35]

These provisions support an approach that combines disarmament and demobilization with demonstrable and verifiable reductions in the FDLR's capacity to pose a security threat. Neither the implementation of repatriation measures alone nor the mere existence of a neutralization plan should automatically be treated as proof that the commitment has been fulfilled. Conversely, the assessment should not assume that neutralization necessarily requires the physical elimination of every combatant. The key outstanding requirement is a jointly accepted set of measurable criteria for determining when the agreed security objective has been achieved.

3.5.3. Sequencing of FDLR Neutralization and Rwanda's Disengagement

A further implementation challenge concerns the sequencing of FDLR neutralization and Rwanda's disengagement of forces and lifting of defensive measures. The Congolese authorities maintain that the vast majority of FDLR combatants are located in territories under AFC/M23 control[36] and that implementation of the DDC process can proceed concurrently with Rwanda's disengagement. They consider the DDC Protocol a concrete step toward fulfilling the DRC's obligations under the Washington Peace Agreement.[37] Rwanda, by contrast, emphasizes the need for effective and verifiable neutralization of the FDLR as a key criterion for assessing compliance with the security-related commitments under the Agreement.[38]

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[31] Security Council Report, « Great Lakes Region (DRC). » https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-09/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-35.php?; see also: The Ministry of Defence of Rwanda, « Statement of Ambassador Mathilde to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, » 23 January 2026, https://www.mod.gov.rw/docs-media/news-detail/statement-of-ambmathilde-to-house-foreign-affairs-committee?cHash=7b49d8329c6932dc5ddd030b711fc3f4&tx_news_pi1%5BcurrentPage%5D

[32] Section 2(ii) of the Washington Peace Agreement: «the Parties shall support the disengagement, disarmament, and integration of non-state armed groups as provided for by other Agreements or processes and the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reintegration and Stabilization Process (P-DDRCS) and the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism as set out in Section 3 of this Agreement. »

[33] Section 3 (ii) of the Washington Peace Agreement: «A commitment to identify, assess, locate, and neutralize in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda (CONOPS) of October 31, 2024, as established under the Luanda Process. »

[34] Section 7 of CONOPS: «Mission: The DRC: Neutralize the FDLR; promote the repatriation of FDLR members to Rwanda; guarantee the conditions for lasting peace and stability in the Great Lakes subregion; and protect the population and ensure the return of displaced persons to their places of origin; Rwanda: Disengage forces/ lift the defense measures put in place by Rwanda; and ensure the social reintegration of demobilized FDLR ex-combatants repatriated to Rwanda. » See Appendix A of the Washington Peace Agreement: Concept of Operations for the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda. See also the Joint Statement on the Fourth Meeting of the JSCM: « … JSCM observers acknowledged the efforts of the Parties to facilitate the continued demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration of FDLR members. »

[35] The Agreement on the Operating Procedures of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM): «The Parties agree that the mission of the JSCM is to identify, assess, and locate the FDLR and affiliated groups in order to allow for the neutralization of the FDLR and affiliated groups... Assess the nature of the threat of the FDLR and affiliated groups and determine appropriate actions to neutralize…»

[36] Actualité CD, «RDC : cinq des six zones identifiées comme abritant les FDLR sont sous le contrôle du Rwanda/AFC-M23, selon le gouvernement.» https://actualite.cd/index.php/2026/07/30/rdc-cinq-des-six-zones-identifiees-comme-abritant-les-fdlr-sont-sous-le-controle-du?

[37] Security Council Report, « Great Lakes Region (DRC). https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-09/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-35.php?

[38] United Nations Transcripts, « Democratic Republic of the Congo - Security Council, » 10232nd Meeting 29 September 2026". https://transcripts.un.org/en/sc/10232? *See also* : Media Congo, « Est de la RDC : pas de retrait sans neutralisation définitive des

Without a mutually agreed-upon sequence, measurable benchmarks, timelines, and verification arrangements, these differing approaches risk creating reciprocal conditionality, in which each party's progress becomes dependent on the other party's prior performance.


The Washington Peace Agreement and CONOPS assign complementary responsibilities to the parties. Their effective implementation therefore requires an agreed framework that measures progress in FDLR neutralization while independently verifying Rwanda's disengagement and the lifting of its defensive measures. The parties should clarify which actions may proceed concurrently, which milestones require prior verification, and how compliance disputes will be addressed.

3.5.4. Status of FDLR's Repatriation and Neutralization and Rwanda's Disengagement

FDLR Repatriation to Rwanda: June 2025-September 2026

According to data compiled by the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa researchers from MONUSCO-related reporting, around 313 FDLR combatants were repatriated to Rwanda between June 2025 and September 2026. Approximately 392 dependents were also repatriated during the same period, bringing the reported combined total to approximately 705 individuals.

Compilation of the Number of FDLR Combatants and Their Dependents Repatriated to Rwanda (June 2025–September 2026)



Source: Calculations by BAPA researchers, based on MONUSCO information, official statements, and other relevant sources.

Using the Washington peace process's estimated FDLR strength of 3,000–3,500 combatants, the reported repatriation of 313 combatants represents approximately 9.0–10.4% of that estimated force. This constitutes measurable progress in removing FDLR elements from the DRC. However, the figures do not, by themselves, establish the extent to which the group's command structures, operational capabilities, or capacity to resume hostilities have been dismantled.

The figures should therefore be interpreted alongside verified information on disarmament, demobilization, cantonment, the status of command structures, and the implementation of repatriation arrangements. The September 2026 figures should also be reconciled with the cumulative totals and clearly distinguish combatants from dependents.

FDLR». https://www.mediacongo.net/publireportage-reportage-164198_est_de_la_rdc_pas_de_retrait_sans_neutralisation_definitive_des_fdlr_rwanda.html

Rwanda's disengagement and lifting of defensive measures: June 2025–September 2026
The information reviewed for this assessment does not establish that Rwanda has completed the disengagement of its 14,000–18,000 forces and lifted the defensive measures outlined in the Washington Peace Agreement. Reports of tactical disengagement from certain locations, followed by the repositioning or reinforcement of forces elsewhere, should be distinguished from verified implementation of the agreed commitments.

The extent of Rwanda's disengagement and the status of its defensive measures therefore remain insufficiently established by the publicly available evidence reviewed. A conclusive assessment would require agreed geographic parameters, clear definitions of the measures to be lifted, and independent verification of the relevant movements and changes in operational posture.

3.5.5. Verification of the Ceasefire, FDLR Neutralization, and Rwanda's Disengagement
Credible verification remains essential to assessing implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement and resolving disagreements over the parties' security commitments. The DRC and Rwanda have reportedly considered using the EJVM+, established under the Doha framework, as an interim mechanism to verify commitments under the Washington process, pending the operationalization of the proposed verification arrangements. This proposal should be distinguished from an approved and fully operational mandate under the Washington Agreement.

Several institutional and operational questions require clarification:


- *Mandate and composition:* What mandate, composition, and institutional arrangements would govern EJVM+ activities under the Washington process?
- *Institutional continuity and participation:* Would the existing EJVM+ team assume additional responsibilities, or would a separate team be established? How would the participation and acceptance of all relevant parties be secured?
- *Financing and logistics:* What personnel, equipment, funding, and logistical support would be required to sustain regular field missions?
- *Verification standards:* What procedures would govern the identification of FDLR personnel, verification of disarmament and repatriation, assessment of command structures and operational capabilities, and monitoring of Rwanda's disengagement and lifting of defensive measures?
- *Reporting and dispute resolution:* How would findings be corroborated, reported, and used to address disagreements over compliance?

Clarifying these issues would help establish a credible, adequately resourced verification arrangement. Regular reporting based on agreed procedures and independently corroborated information would provide a common evidentiary basis for assessing implementation, identifying outstanding commitments, and addressing disputes over compliance. Until such arrangements are agreed and operational, the Barometer should distinguish between reported developments, independently verified implementation, and commitments whose completion cannot yet be established from the available evidence.

3.6. Interpretation of Results

3.6.1. Assessment of the Overall Implementation Rate
The data presented in the Comparative Chart on the Progress of Implementation (below) indicate a slight regression in the overall implementation of the Agreement by the end of the August–October 2026 reporting period. Although **22 of the Agreement's 30 tasks** had reached some level of implementation (initial, minimal, intermediate, or complete), the overall implementation score declined compared with the previous reporting period.

Comparative Chart on the Progress of the Implementation Rate



The Agreement's overall implementation score decreased from 105 out of 300 points (35%) at the end of July 2026 to 100 out of 300 points (33.3%) at the end of October 2026, a decline of 5 points, equivalent to 1.7 percentage points. This change resulted from a downward revision of the scores for two tasks, each losing 2.5 points, from 7.5/10 (Intermediate Execution) to 5/10 (Minimal Execution). These tasks concern, respectively, the implementation of the harmonized plan for the neutralization of the FDLR and the implementation of the harmonized plan for the disengagement of forces and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures. These revisions reflect a less favorable assessment of the implementation status of the tasks concerned, bringing their scores below the threshold for Intermediate Execution.

It should be emphasized, however, that the downward revision of the overall implementation score does not, in itself, mean that the corresponding substantive obligations have experienced an equivalent deterioration. The implementation status of each obligation must be assessed separately, based on evidence specific to the task in question. Accordingly, as indicated in Table 3.1, which assesses implementation on a task-by-task basis, the scores assigned to distinct tasks, such as the effective neutralization of the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures, remained unchanged.

For instance, the FDLR neutralization task remains at 5/10. The repatriation of FDLR members and affiliated group elements in September 2026 represents limited quantitative progress but is insufficient, in itself, to justify an adjustment to the score. By comparison, the task of lifting Rwanda's defensive measures remains at 2.5/10 (Initiated Execution), as publicly available information does not yet establish that a verifiable withdrawal of Rwandan troops has commenced, despite Rwanda's commitment to do so.

Similarly, humanitarian commitments, particularly those related to the protection of civilians, assistance to vulnerable populations, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, remain at a particularly low level, with each task maintaining an unchanged score of 2.5 points out of 10.

Under the Barometer of Peace Agreements in Africa (BPAA) measurement framework, each commitment is assessed based on its implementation status and the available verifiable evidence. Accordingly, progress or regression in implementing a planning instrument, such as the harmonized plan for FDLR neutralization or the disengagement of forces and lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures, does not automatically establish corresponding progress or regression in the substantive security obligation itself. Likewise, reported activities, including the repatriation of FDLR members, are considered relevant evidence of implementation but do not, in isolation, determine the score assigned to the broader neutralization commitment. Each score adjustment must be justified by evidence relevant to the specific task and applied consistently with the BPAA measurement scale.

3.6.2. Assessment of the Implementation Rate by Each Actor

The assessment of commitments assigned to the DRC and Rwanda indicates a decline in their respective implementation rates during the reporting period. **The DRC's score decreased from 31.7% (82.5 out of 260 points) to 30.8% (80 out of 260 points), while Rwanda's score declined from 30.6% (67.5 out of 220 points) to 29.5% (65 out of 220 points).**

These declines resulted from the downgrading of one task assigned to each party. The DRC's task concerning the implementation of the harmonized plan for FDLR neutralization and Rwanda's task concerning the disengagement of forces and the lifting of its defensive measures were each downgraded from 7.5/10 (Intermediate Execution) to 5/10 (Minimal Execution).

By contrast, **the implementation score for the international community remained unchanged at 37.5 out of 70 points, corresponding to an implementation rate of 53.5%.** The seven tasks assigned to the international community under the Agreement do not include implementing the harmonized plan for FDLR neutralization, disengaging forces, or lifting Rwanda's defensive measures. Accordingly, the regression recorded in these two tasks affected the respective scores of the DRC and Rwanda but did not alter the international community's implementation score. These actor-specific scores reflect assessments of the responsibilities assigned to each actor and should not be summed to calculate the overall implementation score, as some commitments involve shared responsibilities and are assessed across overlapping categories.

4. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

The August–October 2026 reporting period was characterized by a slight regression in the overall implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement. At the close of the reporting period, the Agreement's overall implementation score had declined from 35% at the end of July to 33.3%. Key challenges included continued hostilities in eastern DRC; persistent disagreements over FDLR neutralization and the sequencing of Rwanda's disengagement and the lifting of its defensive measures; limited verification capacity; deteriorating political and security relations; and ongoing constraints on humanitarian access and civilian protection.

In this regard, the following specific recommendations are formulated:

4.1. Recommendations to the Government of the DRC:

- *Finalize and adopt a comprehensive, verifiable plan to neutralize the FDLR, translating the 28 July 2026 DDR Protocol into a detailed operational framework that is consistent with the Washington Peace Agreement and the CONOPS.* The plan should distinguish between the individual disarmament and demobilization of combatants, the dismantling of the FDLR's command structures, and the elimination of the group's capacity to resume hostilities;
- *Jointly establish with the Rwandan authorities clear, measurable, and verifiable benchmarks for assessing progress and determining the effectiveness of FDLR neutralization operations;* and
- *Demonstrate its commitment and good faith in implementing its obligations under the Washington Agreement by taking the following measures, with the technical support of MONUSCO:* (1) identify and locate FDLR combatants present in areas under government control; (2) identify those willing to participate in a DDRR process, as well as assess possible options for voluntary relocation to a third country; (3) repatriate or relocate all those concerned; and (4) define and implement, in accordance with the commitments undertaken under the Agreement, appropriate neutralization measures against combatants who refuse these options. This approach would enable the neutralization process to begin in areas under the effective control of the Congolese Government before, at a subsequent stage, addressing the situation of FDLR elements present in areas beyond government control.

4.2. Recommendations to the Government of Rwanda:

- *Support a constructive and verifiable approach to FDLR neutralization by considering support for the DRC-FDLR DDC Protocol of 28 July 2026*, rather than contesting its implementation, as a step toward fulfilling the FDLR-neutralization commitments under the Washington Peace Agreement;
- *Jointly establish, with the Congolese authorities, clear, measurable, and verifiable criteria for assessing the effectiveness of FDLR-neutralization operations;*
- *Clarify, in a spirit of transparency and mutual trust, the arrangements governing the withdrawal of armed elements and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures by establishing a revised and detailed timetable, with indicative deadlines, supported by credible verification mechanisms;* and
- *Demonstrate its good faith by initiating, in parallel with the DRC's progress in neutralizing the FDLR, a gradual, transparent, and verifiable process for disengaging its forces from Congolese territory and lifting its defensive measures. By way of illustration, the repatriation of 10% of FDLR elements to Rwanda could be accompanied by the withdrawal of an equivalent proportion of Rwandan troops deployed in the DRC. Such an approach, grounded in proportionality and verification, would provide tangible evidence of Rwanda's commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the Agreement.*

4.3. Recommendations to the United States:

- *Maintain and strengthen coordinated diplomatic and political pressure on the parties to encourage compliance with commitments undertaken under the Washington Peace Agreement;*
- *Continue considering, as a last resort, targeted coercive measures against actors found to be deliberately obstructing or undermining implementation of the Washington and Doha processes' commitments;*
- *Continue encouraging the parties to reach a common understanding regarding the timelines for the neutralization operations against the FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures; and*

- *Continue facilitating efforts to finalize and secure approval of the revised draft OPORD, ensuring it addresses divergences in the sequencing of security commitments and clearly defines implementation responsibilities, timelines, and verifiable milestones.*

4.4. Recommendations to Qatar and Switzerland:

- *Continue encouraging the parties to agree on a timetable for implementing their security commitments, supported by specific, measurable, and verifiable milestones. This would facilitate the regular monitoring of each party's progress and help prevent the process from reaching an impasse.*

4.5. Recommendations to the African Union and the AU Mediator:

- *Consider inviting high-level representatives of the DRC and Rwanda to participate in a dedicated session of the forthcoming High-Level Harmonization Meeting of the AU Panel of Facilitators on the DRC peace process.* This would aim to strengthen coordination between the Washington and Doha peace processes, clarify the implications for the continuity of commitments under the Doha Framework, and identify practical measures to advance implementation of existing peace commitments; and
- *Continue promoting a comprehensive and inclusive approach to regional security by supporting complementary mechanisms to address, in a coordinated manner, the issue of all armed groups operating in the Great Lakes region, including those not covered by the Washington and Doha processes.*

4.6. Recommendations to MONUSCO:

- *Continue efforts to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of FDLR combatants and enhance the transparency of the process by regularly publishing detailed reports specifying, inter alia, the areas of origin of repatriated former combatants, while distinguishing between areas under the effective control of the Congolese Government and those outside its control;*
- *Intensify civilian protection efforts in areas most affected by hostilities;* and
- *Facilitate, in coordination with national authorities and humanitarian partners, humanitarian access to affected civilian populations, particularly in conflict-affected areas.*

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